The Intuition of Metaphysical Naturalism

The background issue of Naturalism vs. extra-naturalism is the question of the size of reality. Metaphysical Naturalism takes a firm stance on that issue: there is no reality beyond the tangible. This position is non-negotiable, because Metaphysical Naturalism is not science, it is a worldview, parasitic to science. Empirical science takes the voluntary position that the range of it’s abilities resides within the tangible. This position might be called functional naturalism, a statement of procedure and process limitations. Metaphysical Naturalism takes the statement of limitations within empiricism, then makes that position an inviolable axiom of faith.

How are we to analyze the validity of the Metaphysical Naturalist position on the size of reality? Well, first we can look for self-contradictions (coherence) within that belief. And we can look for areas of apparent reality that are outside the constraints of Metaphysical Naturalism. We can look for reality both inside ourselves and outside beyond the physical.

Belief
According to Bertrand Russell, (Problems of Philosophy, 1912, Oxford University Press, 1997, p129),

“Thus a belief is true when there is a corresponding fact, and is false when there is no corresponding fact. It will be seen that minds do not create truth or falsehood. They create beliefs, but when once the beliefs are created, the mind cannot make them true or false, except in the case where they concern future things which are within the power of the person believing, such as catching trains.”

Russell was not concerned here with worldview beliefs. He was referring to cognition of external reality, which produces within us beliefs about that which we apprehend through our senses, vs. beliefs about which we have no external apprehension, and which might or might not be connected to an external fact. He goes on to separate knowledge into “derivative” and “intuitive”:

“Derivative knowledge is what is validly deduced from premises known intuitively”. Ibid, p133, emph original

And,
“So long as we are dealing with derivative knowledge, we have the test of intuitive knowledge to fall back upon.” ibid, p135

Then,
“Our theory of truth, to begin with, supplies the possibility of distinguishing certain truths as self-evident in a sense which ensures infallibility.” Ibid, p135, emph original

And,
“In all cases where we know by acquaintance a complex fact consisting of certain terms in a certain relation, we say that the truth that these terms are so related has the first or absolute kind of self-evidence, and in these cases the judgment that the terms are so related must be true. This sort of self-evidence is an absolute guarantee of truth.” Ibid, p137, emph original

Finally,
“What we firmly believe, if it is true, is called knowledge, provided it is either intuitive or inferred (logically or psychologically) from intuitive knowledge from which it follows logically. What we firmly believe, if it is not true, is called error.” Ibid, p139, emph original.

From this we can see that Russell, the determined atheist, accepted that knowledge is based upon intuitive, self-evident principles.

Worldview smackdown:
“It (enlargement of the Self) is obtained when the desire for knowledge is alone operative, by a study which does not wish in advance that its objects should have this or that character, but adapts the Self to the characters which it finds in its objects. This enlargement of Self is not obtained when , taking the Self as it is, we try to show that the world is so similar to this Self that knowledge of it is possible without any admission of what is alien. The desire t prove this is a form of self-assertion and, like all self-assertion, it is an obstacle to the growth of the self which it desires, and of which the Self knows that it is capable. Self-assertion, in philosophic speculation as elsewhere, views the world as a means of to its own ends; thus it makes the world of less account than the Self, and the Self sets bounds to the greatness of its Goods. In contemplation, on the contrary, we start from the non-Self, and through its greatness the boundaries of Self are enlarged; through the infinity of the universe the mind which contemplates it achieves some measure in infinity. Ibid, p159, emph added.

Concluding,
“For this reason greatness of soul is not fostered by those philosophies which assimilate the universe to Man. Knowledge is a form of union of Self and Not-Self; like all union it is impaired by dominion, and therefore by any attempt to force the universe into conformity with what we find in ourselves. There is a widespread philosophical tendency towards the view which tells us that Man is the measure of all things, that truth is man-made, that space and time and the world of universals are properties of the mind , and that, if there be anything not created by the mind, it is unknowable and of no account for us. This view, if our previous discussions were correct, is untrue; but in addition to being untrue, it has the effect of robbing philosophic contemplation of all that gives it value, since it fetters contemplation to Self. What it calls knowledge is not a union with the not-Self, but a set of prejudices, habits, and desires, making an impenetrable veil between us and the world beyond. The man who finds pleasure in such a theory of knowledge is like the man who never leaves the domestic circle for fear his word might not be law.” Ibid, p160, emph added.

In his own way, Russell has falsified Metaphysical Naturalism. Knowledge limited by the desire to prove the limitation is not coherent knowledge. It cannot prove or validate itself. It is not apparent and certainly not self-evident. As Russell has shown, intuitive knowledge is actually necessary knowledge, and is the “fallback” for dealing with derivative knowledge. So in this sense, intuitive knowledge is both necessary and sufficient for much of rational thought.

Metaphysical Naturalism is based, then, on an intuition that there is no other reality beyond the tangible. This is of course, self-refuting, since the existence of intuition admits to the intangible. And intuition can easily be shown to exist, as Russell has done.