Denying the Self

Massimo Pigliucci is a triple PhD who is both an evolutionary biologist and now an historian of science. Massimo is a staunch defender of evolution, a member of the Altenberg 16 at the forefront of new evolutionary thought, and a Materialist / Atheist activist. I sometimes go to Massimo’s blog, and I find it to be a measured, calm delineation of Materialist thought – as compared to PZ Meyers or any of the New Atheists.

Excerpted from a recent blog at Massimo’s place:

“A study published in the 13 February 2009 issue of Science magazine by H. Takahashi and collaborators has investigated what happens in the brain when we experience those socially triggered feelings of envy or self-satisfaction. The results are rather stunning, if perfectly logical in hindsight: the researchers found that the same neural circuitry that is involved in the generation of physical pain and pleasure is also in charge of generating the analogous reactions in response to apparently more abstract situations. For instance, people experiencing envy because of another's success activate the pain circuitry of their brains, and when that person is befallen by misfortune, the reward neurocircuitry is activated because we feel delighted. On the more positive side, making a donation to a charity not only stimulates the reward system, but it does so more intensely than when we receive money ourselves.

Biologically this makes sense because the human species' survival and reproduction -- those golden standards of evolution -- depend as much on social interactions as on interactions with the physical environment.”

Massimo has previously denied the existence of anything like a “life essence” and he has continually taken the position that brain scans prove there is nothing more in the brain than localized voltage activity during a perception. For example, the perception of “red” is merely a collection of voltage activity in a certain local area of the brain, and that, coupled with our knowledge that “red” is a certain wavelength of light that impinges upon neurons in the eye, fully explains everything about “red”. Presumably there is a gland somewhere that contains the experience of “red” that is triggered. In the case of logic, a “logic gland”? The train of thought stops there…forcibly if necessary. (Except for rather gratuitous references to evolutionary inferences).

The hard problem of monism is to explain away the difference between neural voltage activity and personal subjective experience. So it is easier to deny that personal subjective experience even exists, and that is what monists do.

At Neuralogica blog, Materialist Steven Novella defends monism:

The materialist hypothesis - that the brain causes consciousness - has made a number of predictions, and every single prediction has been validated. Every single question that can be answered scientifically - with observation and evidence - that takes the form: “If the brain causes the mind then…” has been resolved in favor of that hypothesis.

For example, if the brain causes the mind then: there will be no documented mental function in the absence of brain function; altering the brain biologically will alter the mind functionally; mental development will correlate with brain development; and mental activity will correlate with brain activity (this holds up no matter what method we use to look at brain activity - EEG to look at electrical activity, PET scanning to look at metabolic activity, SPECT scanning to look at blood flow, and functional MRI to look at metabolic and neuronal activity).

This evidence cannot be dismissed as the “easy problem” nor as mere correlation. Brain function correlates with the mind in every way we would predict from the hypothesis that the brain causes the mind. From a scientific point of view, the mind is a manifestation of the brain.

As I have discussed previously, one way to dodge the obvious conclusion from this evidence is to confuse the question of how the brain causes the mind with the question of does the brain cause the mind. We certainly have much to learn about exactly how the brain functions to produce all mental phenomena, but this in no way diminishes the fact that the question of whether or not the brain causes the mind is settled - it does.

Novella dodges the hard problem with four points: first, scanning finds all that there is to find; second there is no part of the mind that is not predicted from scans; third, there is no hard problem; fourth, the matter is settled.

By claiming to predict the mind, Novella is playing a word game. Nothing about the brain predicts a mind; certain features known of the existing mind are being “explained” by Novella, not predicted. Imagine an alien finding only a sleeping person. Equipped with all the material technology imaginable, he measures neural electrochemical currents and voltage differentials in the humans head. From this he predicts that the human… has a mind? Is rational? Experiences? Of course not.

Novella’s predictions are retroactive explanation attempts based on the prior knowledge that there IS a mind that needs to be explained. And in the process he ignores the issue of experience, the hard problem, very likely because he can neither predict nor explain it.

Neural voltage activity is rationalized by Materialists into some sort of magical, or delusion of, experiential self. This is accomplished by referring to the logic circuitry now known to be embedded within, not only in the neural relationships, but within neurons themselves. The fact of the existence of that electrochemical circuitry is inferred to obviate the need for a separate mind to perform logical functions - and by unstated extension, corresponding experiences. Voltage differentials resulting in electrochemical currents in and between neurons ARE the mind: they are one and the same, identical, according to monists. But physically, materially, all that has changed with changing voltages in the brain and its logic circuitry is the routing of electrical activity around the neural network. Physically the mind doesn’t physically exist; voltages and secretions physically exist.

When Massimo denies perception as different from neural voltage/secretional activities, we are left with no reason to think there to be anything to his ideas other than voltage differentials. If the mind is only the brain, why should the mind perceive anything that is not the brain, such as physical phenomena like voltage or secretions? If the mind is the brain, then a slew of voltage readings would be the expected result of neural voltage activity; enhanced or depleted physical responses should result from changes in organc secretions. What is there to give those voltage differentials “meaning”? What is there to give the secretions “consciousness” or “rationality” or “will”? Presumably Massimo assumes his ideas to have meaning. Presumably he had the free will to make his case.

For Philosophical Materialists, the need to stop the train (of thought) at the point of neural voltage activity in the brain is driven by the total inability to explain the next step: consciousness; and the step after that: rationality. Why these should be derived from voltage activity is inexplicable. Moreover these are not predictable from the existence of a gaggle of neuronic activity.

If voltage activity in a certain lobe is thought to trigger an experience, all that could be triggered in the material brain is: more voltage differentials. So the experience of “red” is just voltage; the experience of "logic" is just voltage; the experience of "self" is just voltage. There is nothing to cause a transition to anything else, because there is nothing else to be detected in the brain but neural paths and voltage differentials.

So “justice” is just a neural electrochemical pathway, as are “human rights”, “self restraint”, “discipline”, “meaning”, “love”, etc. And so are “consciousness” and “rationality”. Or maybe they are secretions from, say, the “meaning gland”? The reductionism is apparent and is forced.

Presumably one must be conscious in order to apprehend Massimo’s words. Presumably one must be rational in order to appreciate Massimo’s logic.
And presumably Massimo thinks his writings have “meaning”.

Massimo and the monists are stuck at the voltage level in their theory of monism, due to the necessity of NOT having a mind, just a brain. So if monism is true, there is no reason to either predict or to believe that there is any ability to appreciate, to experience, to take joy in the knowledge of, monism.

Is monism axiomatic, as Novella insists? It is counterintuitive to say the least. Axioms are at least intuitive. So monism must be proved and must conform to rules of logic in order to be thought a coherent theory. The idea that it can indeed be proved now by voltage activity on brain scans is specious and insufficient to disprove the possibility of dualism. The idea that it will be proved using some currently unknown technology is unprovable and is a faith called scientism.

Is monism compelling as a philosophy? Monism is actually a requirement of another, overarching philosophy: Philosophical Materialism. Monism is an example of forcing a premise in order to maintain the conclusion as “truth”. This is known as rationalization, which is a logical fallacy, and is as opposed to rational thought, which requires the conclusion to be accepted ONLY if the premise is known to be true. It is intellectual dishonesty to declare a premise true merely to make the conclusion appear valid.

If the “self” is contained in the brain as electrochemical flows, then our putative perceptions are faulty and have no meaning beyond that. The idea that meaning is actually caused by electrochemistry is not likely to be proved. In fact it is so unlikely that it is rationally absurd.

The entire value of the argument for monism is contained in one hierarchical issue: monism is required if Philosophical Materialism is to maintained as “truth”. But more than that, if Philosophical Materialism fails, then Atheism is hazarded to subsequent rational thought, and can no longer be robustly sustained. And maintaining Atheism is necessary, even at the cost of selling irrational premises in order to keep it safe.

Massimo on evidence:

”Finally, my issue with faith doesn't have anything to do with humility or lack thereof. The problem that Feynman (and I) finds with faith is that it means that one believes in something regardless or even despite the evidence. This attitude is not only profoundly irrational (by definition), but also embodies one of the worst values we can possibly promote in our society. At the very least it leads to poor thinking, and at the worst it brings about the sort of uncritical acceptance of doctrines (religious or secular) that too often has had tragic consequences for humanity.”

This is Massimo’s normal tack: to presume that his views constitute evidence, and other views do not. Assuming that he means “material empirical evidence” as did Feynman - his appeal to authority - then the evidence required for his philosophy is more than lacking: it is false because it cannot exist. But Massimo does not mean empirical evidence; he means inferred, philosophical evidence (one should read what Feynman thought about philosophy and philosophers).

Neither Massimo nor any materialist can prove that there is no non-material existence. Nor can they prove monism. Nor can Massimo prove that religion is more hazardous to society than is Atheism, a proposition which he implies through guilt by association; in fact the evidence is quite the contrary. So Massimo’s statement violates his supposed ethic: he believes that which he cannot prove using materialist, empirical processes – and some of which is demonstrably false.

But his philosophy, Materialism, also violates his supposed ethic, so the ethic is not really part of Massimo’s thought process. For Massimo and the Materialists, the agenda proves the premises. And by Massimo’s admission that is “profoundly irrational”.