Massimo and Free Will

In a recent article for Psychology Today, Massimo Piggliucci takes on the subject of free will and why we can’t possibly have it…. or does he? At least he starts out that way.

Analyzing the words “free” and “will”, Massimo concludes that for “free”,

”Unless you are a dualist [Note 1] — a thankfully dying breed among philosophers — you can’t possibly mean free from causal interactions with matter/energy, i.e. independent of the laws and materials of the universe.”

That is a direct contradiction of the position of Bertrand Russell, who made the specific claim that the intentionality exhibited by humans is directly opposed to deterministic laws of physics; the laws of physics apply to humans only when they are uncontrollably falling, for example.

Massimo goes on sarcastically,

”The will, whatever it is and however we like to conceptualize it, is grounded in the biological activity of our neurons. And last time I checked our neurons are made of matter, exchange energy (in the form of electrical currents and chemical reactions), and are subject to the laws of physics. So if that’s what you mean by “free,” it’s a no starter.”

Under which of Maxwell’s Equations, or their derivative: Ohm’s Law, does the human will fall? Obviously, physical laws determine ionic charge flow, and only that. There is no law of matter or energy which predicts a will to be caused under certain voltages across certain impedances. To assert that electric currents alone produce a will that is captive to the caprices of the electron flow is absurd: trivially absurd.

Perhaps Massimo’s wiggle-word, “grounded”, is the clue here, despite his assertion of “causal interactions with mass/energy”. But he gives no more than just that, a side-step to avoid the reality that there is no will to be had due to the physics of electron flow. It seems more likely that he really thinks this to be the case. He says,

” (think of those experiments showing the time-delay in electrical potential between when a muscle is being activated to perform a given action and when the subject becomes aware of having made the decision to perform that action, for instance).”

This is a reference to a recent article claiming just that: the conscious mind doesn’t know the decision until it has already been made, and then the conscious mind is informed of that fact. If this is taken at face value, as Massimo apparently does, then the ions and electrons really are making the decisions and then informing the consciousness that the decisions have been made. But let’s apply a little more skepticism here than Massimo did. First, let’s assume that this is not crackpot science. We don’t know how the measurements were made, what biases – both electrical and worldview – were in play, whether or not this is falsifiable, and whether it has been replicated. Nonetheless, if it is the case that the conscious mind only exists to receive the confirmation that the decision has been made previously by electric charge flow, then the conscious mind is totally determined by a physical controller, and is a puppet. Under these conditions, the conscious mind is deterministic and without free will.

But wait. The conscious mind is also “merely charge flow” according to the mechanist view of the mind. So what we would have would be a sensation of charge flow, arranged somehow in a manner to give it “meaning”. Now ignoring for a moment the issue of how charge flow translates into “meaning”, we still need to discover how charge flow came to make the decision involving meaning in the first place, and exactly what rules – laws of physics - of the physical world are involved.

Now we all know that electromagnetic transmissions such as radio and TV signals contain information. The electromagnetics are a “carrier” of information, and are not information themselves unless we are analyzing the wave/packet characteristics of the waves themselves. Any information that is “carried” is placed there by intelligent modulation of the electromagnetics, which is performed by sentient beings.

Similarly, computer charge flow is coupled cycle-by-cycle through logical gatings and state machines by a “modulating” overarching software, which is placed there by sentient beings.

So there seems to be no physical referent for inducing the conclusion that the will is simply and purely the product of charge flow in the neurons of the brain. Of course the argument that the mind disappears at the death of the neurons is taken as proof of the physical “grounding” of the mind / will. And also of course, the disappearance of the mind cannot be proven, because the malfunction of the “carrier” does not prove the non-existence of the mind.

This might not seem entirely satisfactory until we ask this question: how are the electrical charges in the neurons excited in such a way as to provide consciousness; will; intellect; comprehension; abstract creativity? Should all of the intellectual functions be regarded as mere artifacts of voltage across an impedance, one that is prior to, and not controlled by the conscious mind? A voltage which we do not consciously induce? And if so, why should anything done by the intellectual functions be considered meaningful or of any value whatsoever?

The more complete analysis has to include the issue of what is it that causes the initial electromagnetic charge excitation in the first place? What is it that endows ionic charge transfer with the intellectual capacities and faculties that we think we have? And how is electricity endowed with meaning, if we don't do it?

When someone pretends to discuss free will without even asking these questions, it seems apparent to me that a worldview bias is being asserted, and not a quest for knowledge. Let’s consider Massimo’s final statement:

”What all of this seems to suggest is that the undeniable feeling of “free will” that we have is actually the result of our conscious awareness of the fact that we make decisions, and that we could have — given other internal (i.e., genetic, developmental) and external (i.e., environmental, cultural) circumstances — decided otherwise in any given instance. That’s what Dennett called a type of free will that is “worth having,” and I consider it good enough for this particular non-dualist, non-mystically inclined human being.”

It is enough to “feel” as if we have free will, and we could have chosen a different decision, although not consciously?

So which is it Massimo? Are we just feeling free but are really duped puppets? Or are we actually free to change our minds, to modify our behavior? Which is it that even a casual glance at human behavior would suggest?

It is philosophically necessary for Philosophical Materialists to deny an actual free will, for the reason that an actual free will really does indicate a non-physical reality in our craniums – mental behaviors not pre-determined by the laws of physics. After all in a purely material, physical universe, the laws of physics are the Law. We cannot but obey them…. Right? As Bertrand Russell said, “Wrong”. [paraphrased].

But Massimo wiggles once again. Without claiming that “it is so”, he claims rather that it is good enough for him, because he is a “non-dualist, non-mystically inclined human being” . I think I might add that he also is not inclined to ask the hard questions that might lead away from his personal Atheist worldview.

Note 1: Or a tertiary (neutral) monist. Behind the constitutionally incompatible entities of mind and matter there could be a more fundamental entity, one which is the true source of both mind and matter. Russell cited the non-deterministic, intentional behavior of humans as proof against material monism, and the possibility that neutral monism would solve that dilemma. Material monism, along with the arguments necessary to support it, such as anti-free will, necessarily require suspension of rational inquiry into the mental characteristics of humans and other living things. This results in theories such as behaviorism.