Richard Dawkins lives in a separate universe, one of “us vs. them” where the good guys all agree with him, and the rest are evil, by his moral determination. His latest thrust is for a more aggressive ridicule attack:
“I suspect that most of our regular readers here would agree that ridicule, of a humorous nature, is likely to be more effective than the sort of snuggling-up and head-patting that Jerry [Coyne] is attacking. I lately started to think that we need to go further: go beyond humorous ridicule, sharpen our barbs to a point where they really hurt… You might say that two can play at that game. Suppose the religious start treating us with naked contempt, how would we like it? I think the answer is that there is a real asymmetry here. We have so much more to be contemptuous about! And we are so much better at it. We have scathingly witty spokesmen of the calibre of Christopher Hitchens and Sam Harris. Who have the faith-heads got, by comparison? Ann Coulter is about as good as it gets. We can’t lose!””Massimo demurs. Along the way he acknowledges that the evidence that Dawkins claims is the basis for Atheism is not a valid argument, citing his own exposure to Eugenie Scott’s superior knowledge of philosophy and her influence on his views. In short, science adopts a voluntary (“functional”) materialism because it cannot empirically address or measure non-material issues. So any output from science has no bearing – by definition – on the non-material realm. This is entirely missed and not comprehended by Dawkins, and Piglucci calls him out on it:
“…the lowly creationist has just given the mighty evolutionist a humbling (if unconscious) lesson in philosophy by showing that evidence simply does not enter the debate. If evidence is out, then we are left with sheer rhetorical force. But there too, atheists are easily outmatched…”This in no way means that Pigliucci is dissuaded of his own Philosophical Materialism:
“That said, both Genie and I do recognize that science is one of the strongest arguments for philosophical naturalism, and I suspect that in her case, as in mine, a pretty big reason for why we are atheists is because of our understanding of science. Still, the philosophical/methodological distinction is both philosophically valid and pragmatically useful, since it doesn’t serve the purposes of either science or education to fuel an antagonism between a small minority of atheistic scientists and 90% of the world's population (those taxpayers, on whose good will the existence of science and the stipends of most of said scientists depend).Amazingly, Pigliucci seems to admit that his Atheism has no basis in material reality. Yet he repeats his attack on “creationists” with the following definition of faith, the one he always uses as an attempt to paint faith as a leap into the unknowable:
“it makes the creationist completely and utterly impervious to evidence: the more evidence you bring up, the more he feels validated in his faith, because faith is belief regardless or despite the evidence.This is exactly what Massimo is admitting about himself…He believes what he believes without the backing of scientific (material) evidence.!
[At this point I am without words! The astonishing lack of self-understanding is self-apparent. I shall let it stand as it is].
37 comments:
As always, your posts are full of very interesting and provoking thoughts, ideas and comments.
The last post of my blog was just about Dawkins and his almost obsessive preaching for materialistic atheism which sometimes border in clear intellectual dishonesty.
Maybe you're familiar with Dawkins' censorship of writer and journalist Richard Milton's article "Neo-Darwinism: time to reconsider"
Regarderless of if Milton's criticism of neo-darwinism is sound or not, the key point is Dawkins' accusation of Milton as a "covert creationist". Such label is rhetorically effective, but it's scientifically worthless.
Putting labels to people is not a logical refutation of their arguments. So calling "creationist" any person who dares to question neo-darwinism is not only illogical, but fallacious too.
The story of Dawkins vs. Milton (including Milton's entire censored article) is available here:
http://www.lauralee.net/milton2.htm
Milton is a writer specialized in unorthodox research and alternative hypotheses of science (all of them dissmised as "pseudoscience" by materialistic skeptics). Milton's website is:
http://web.archive.org/web/20041023082635/www.alternativescience.com/
Jime, thanks for your input and the links; I'll take a look at them.
You've hit the nail on the head with this comment, Stan:
"In short, science adopts a voluntary (“functional”) materialism because it cannot empirically address or measure non-material issues. So any output from science has no bearing – by definition – on the non-material realm."I'd expand on that and say that by the same token, religion has no bearing whatsover on the material realm.
So let's make a deal. Scientists should never make pronouncements about the non-existence of God, and religious proponents should never make pronouncements about the intervention of their non-material God into the material realm.
That includes the origins of the universe, the evolution of life, the healing power of prayer, human behaviour, morality and politics.
How does that sound?
No deal Matt, sorry. Your extension is valid only for the existence of a deity as it voluntarily removes itself from our universe, not for its influence within our universe.
Further, the things you list do not and will not have material causes assigned to them by empirical methods; none of them except evolution are material. And if you have empirical proof for evolution, you are invited to share it with me, per the invitation at the upper right on the blog page.
Let's take just one of your list items for examination: origin of the universe. Since space-time and mass-energy were created at the same instant, from what was essentially an infinitesimal point without preexisting, empiricism - which is based on space-time observations of mass-energy - is impossible prior to that instant.
Stephen hawking has posited the creation of the universe to have occured in a wave equation collapse similar to that which occurs in wave/particle observation, where a spectrum of possibilities are brought to singular materiality by the introduction of an observation (equation collapse).
But this hypothesis will never be tested, materially - empirically; it is beyond the capability of empiricism.
The same applies to the electrochemical flows in the brain: these will never be tested as creative, abstract thought, much less intuitive wisdom. This is because thought causes the mental activity, rather than the other way around. (This is the reason that monist-materialists try to deny free will).
And there is no reason to posit that a being which exists in a superset of our limited dimensions could NOT influence our dimensions, our materiality. In fact that would be mathematically irrational. But that is not testable, empirically.
Science will test away until the money is gone, beg for more, and continue indefinitely. But it will hit barriers in comprehension that it cannot breach. The theorems of Godel decorate that fact.
So, given the limitations of empirical science, and the presumed power of a non-material deity, there is no rational reason to make an agreement such as you suggest.
I assume no voluntary removal of the deity. I assume non-existence of the deity.
And of course these things won't have material causes assigned. That's the point. If such power existed it would confound and contradict material explanation. No such confounding phenomena are observed, ergo the assumption of non-existence is not contradicted, ergo belief in the non-existence is perfectly rational.
And despite your logical sleight-of-hand, you can't have it both ways. If you want to claim exemption from scientific enquiry, then you have to have a non-interventionist God.
Sorry.
Your statement is not proven and cannot be: "No such confounding phenomena are observed". To declare that there are no issues which are insoluble to materialism is a statement of belief, not fact; it is a tenet of dogmatic scientism.
Your position on intervention ignores the rational reality that extends beyond the material reality. Although you may deny it, you cannot provide proof to back up your denial. You must deny the intelligence and sanity of those who have experienced intervention, and you cannot do that.
As for material interventions, let's take Lourde's, where something is supposed to have happened of an intervening nature, leaving a new, flowing spring coming from a rock where no spring previously existed. Neither of us was there. Neither of us can confirm that; nor can either of us disconfirm it. A village full of people claim the spring occurred at that time, and that it has never ceased. But that is witness testimony. You cannot prove it wrong, nor that mass delusion occurred, nor any of the other material explanations you might conjure.
Your expected denial of this event as intervention is not and cannot be fact-based; it is likely probability based or dogma-based.
Since probability would not apply to an interventionist event, then your denial is purely dogma-based: it cannot have happened, merely because you don't believe it. Belief based on pre-existing axioms that exclude it, is prejudice.
Certainly it is not empirical, material fact. This is how it goes with most inexplicable events: denial must be based on no facts either way.
This is a form of credulousness enforced by dogma, a dogma requiring a singular solution, even if it means ignoring certain evidence such as witness input.
It is your privilege to remain in this mode of unprovable denial; however to require others to be in this mode with you is not your privilege.
Stan,
Your last comment was so full of falsities and fallacies I hardly know where to start.
First, the statement doesn't have to be provable for me to rationally accept it. It only has to be disprovable AND not disproven. It is both of those.
Next, I don't have to deny the intelligence and sanity of those who experience intervention. I just have to point out that eyewitness testimony is notoriously unreliable, unexplained does not equal unexplainable, and even clever people can be fooled by magic tricks, a fact stage magicians exploit every day.
And the intervention you describe... come on. Really? Is that really the best you've got? Water flowing from a rock is a miracle now? That speaks volumes about the willingness of believers to see the miraculous in the mundane, and it doesn't say much else. It's up there with the image of Mary in a toasted cheese sandwich.
Your smugness is hardly justified. If you believe without proof, then you are violating the basic tenets of your Philosophical Materialism. Such a position doesn't square with the major players, such as Sagan, Dawkins, et al.
So name one, just one, fallacy in my statements, and state the conditions that make it false. Just shouting "fallacy" has no meaning; it must be supported by evidence, and proper use of logic.
Your ability to accept an unproven belief on the basis of being falsifiable yet not having been falsified is an example of unwarranted credulousness. Further, falsifiability is Popper's method of separating the material from the non-material, meaning that you are still demanding that non-material evidence be provided in material form. Using a little set theory, surely you can see this is a logical error.
If you wish for a more challenging example, how about thought, specifically the meaning that is attached to thought. I presume that you believe that your thoughts have meaning. If that is so, and given the axiom of Philosophical Materialism, then what physical proof of meaning do you have regarding your thoughts? If you believe that your thoughts have meaning that is transferable to others, then meaning would be external, and palpable. So physical evidence would be feasible to gather for analysis.
Please provide that physical evidence: molecules or granules of meaning that can be passed around and examined under physical, empirical conditions. Not merely the location of thoughts as they dance across the brain, but the actual physical evidence of meaning of those thoughts, measured in grams (physical mass) and meters (physical size).
Nor is witness testimony allowed; no third parties who claim to apprehend meaning in your thoughts.
There are two possibilities if you fail to produce such evidence while still believing the premise:
First, Meaning is not a physical entity.
Or,
Second, your thoughts do not actually have meaning, or else the evidence could be produced.
I look forward to this discussion.
Stan, speaking to Matt, you write:
...there are no issues which are insoluble to materialism is a statement of belief, not fact; it is a tenet of dogmatic scientism.I'll grant that, but my question to you is this: where did Matt say that? Did I miss something? Did Massimo or Dawkins say this? I don't actually know anyone who actually says this. What I do hear is that some claims are so incoherent, subjective, etc. that they can be provisionally excluded in favor of naturalistic explanations. Surely this is the sense in which Pigliucci adopts his stance?
I think I was responding to Matt's assertion, in his first comment,"That includes the origins of the universe, the evolution of life, the healing power of prayer, human behaviour, morality and politics", which I take as a claim for the materiality of these things. The whole point of evolutionary behavioralism/psychology/sociology - or whatever they call it - is to prove these things to be soluble in the material realm.
Stan,
Your main fallacy is the requirement that for a statement be accepted as true it must be proven.
While proven statements are true, not all true statements are proven. That's a simple logical fallacy right there.
A sufficient condition for acceptance of a statement is simply that the statement is both disprovable and not disproven.
VALID:
If a statement is disproven, it is not true.
Therefore if a statement is true, it is not disproven.
INVALID:
If a statement is proven, it is true.
Therefore if a statement is true, it is proven.
You also said:
Your statement is not proven and cannot be: "No such confounding phenomena are observed". To declare that there are no issues which are insoluble to materialism is a statement of belief, not fact; it is a tenet of dogmatic scientism.Two things wrong with this:
First, as Scott said, nowhere did I say that there are no issues insoluble to materialism. I know this is your own personal little bugbear, but it actually doesn't come into this particular argument.
Second, that statement doesn't have to be proven. It has to be disproven. By you. All you have to do is produce an example. Just one. Go ahead. I'll wait.
Matt,
Thanks for your comments, and your increasing civility which I appreciate.
Let me try to hone my communication skills. What you seem to hear is not what I am trying to convey.
You claim to believe in something which you cannot prove. Not just lack of proof; total inability to prove. You cannot prove that there are no instances of "confounding phenomena" because, (a) proving a negative is not possible; (b) you do not and cannot have the ability to fully investigate every purported instance on record; (c) such instances of confounding phenomena never leave adequate evidence because they would, by definition, be either temporary reversals of natural law or temporary injections of non-natural, non-physical occurrences.
Any material evidence that might have been left behind is of course, material; this means that it is refutable as having been associated with temporary, non-material, non-physical singularity anomalies, by arguing, correctly, that it does not prove non-materiality.
This means that temporal, physical evidence suitable for the investigation of empirical science is not ever available - by definition - regardless of the probablity of the singularity.
Therefore, not only is there no possibility of direct evidential investigation of such singularities, there also is no possibility of evidential falsification... ever.
This is what you demand, production of evidential falsification, which is impossible. Yet you use it as a criterion for belief.
Therefore your denial of the existence of "confounding phenomena" is not based on even the remotest possibility of proof, much less DISPROOF and is therefore not a valid premise for any argumentation.
In fact, it does rise to the second of Popper's criteria for the use of falsification for demarcation between (a) empirical knowledge and "mathematics and logic", and (b) "metaphysics" [Popper, "The Logic of Scientific Discovery"; pg 11]. Inability to falsify is an indication, per Popper, that a premise is “metaphysical”, neither temporal nor empirically addressable.
Arguing against metaphysics by demanding physical evidence is not a coherent argument. Searching set [M] and not finding [!M] is not only non-coherent as an argument against [!M], it is tautological: [!M] cannot be located (eg. for discovery) in [M]. Therefore, it is not useful in rational argumentation.
I hope this clears up my position; if not I will try again.
It clears up your position, but your whole argument is founded on the idea that any evidence of a supernatural event would be temporary and ephemeral.
Upon what do you base that assertion?
As an example, let's take the alleged parting of the Red Sea. The singularity that occured was the removal of water from a place where it had normally existed, with no visible, tangible means for accomplishing that. When the singularity ceased and the water returned to its normal position, there would not be any remaining physical evidence to validate, empirically, that it had occured. So all that remains of the singularity is the memory of it in the population that experienced it (a historical assertion).
So neither validation nor invalidation of the singularity is possible, if one requires physical evidence and empirical rigor in order to make the validation incorrigibly unquestionable.
And the memories of humans, notoriously faulty, are not of empirical value either.
So if we posit that such a thing happened, there is no conceivable material proof or disproof; so only agnosticism with regard to this event is realistic, unless witness testimony is allowed.
So this alleged event can only be given credibility or discredibility by an unsubstantiable belief that it occured or did not, either way.
Few events that are alleged to have occured as non-material singularities leave behind material, physical traces of having occured. That actually is the reason that I referred to the events in Lourdes, France, where alleged visions and repeated healings have recurred. The physical attribute which remained behind was the new, permanent spring. This of course doesn't prove the singularity. And of course there is no possible empirical proof of a vision, nor is there empirical disproof possible. So it falls into the category of metaphysics, outside the purvue of empirical science.
Philosophical Materialism has decided a priori that there is no such thing as metaphysics. It is a flat denial where only agnosticism should occur, if logic is to be kept intact. Because it can be neither empirically proven nor empirically disproven, it cannot be a physical fact. Yet Philosophical Materialism asserts it to be true, as a physical fact, and bases its entire philosophy on it. So Philosophical Materialism denies itself, a self-refutation.
Stan
The point is, Stan, that it's not a defining feature of supernatural events that they leave no physical evidence. That's just an assertion you're making.
Let's stick with the parting of the Red Sea as an example. Just because there weren't any physical remnants doesn't mean there couldn't have been any.
If that event had happened in modern times there would have been multiple examples of mutually confirmatory evidence: changes in local atmospheric pressure recorded at base stations, changes in water depth tracked by buoys, a decline in fish populations as a result of what was (no doubt) a traumatic event, and mountains visual evidence recorded from multiple angles by satellites and every second Israelite filming it on their cell phone camera as they wandered through.
I'll grant you that agnosticism is reasonable when it comes to historical events, simply because records are sketchy. But given the extraordinary coverage we have in modern day, that simply begs the question: why have all the miracles stopped?
Matt,
The records you mention are eyewitness types of evidence, all of which can be forged. If the allegation of forgery is applied to each of those instances, then what durable evidence is left? Dead fish can be produced with electroshock. Data manipulation / photoshop can account for the rest.
But your real question is why the alleged miracles have apparently stopped. At this point we have left the realm of physics and entered into the realm of metaphysics and theology. Any answer given will not be supportable by empirical evidence of any sort, and would therefore be (I assume) unacceptable to a Materialist. This is of course prejudicial rejection without consideration.
However, there are possible answers to consider, if one does not reject them first.
First, according to the Old Testament (which contains the allegations of the Red Sea singularity event), contact with the deity ceased some 400 years BC, through both singularities and revelations (contact via a single person in the culture).
Then there was a short spate of singularity activity around 30 AD to roughly 80 or 90 AD, ceasing at that time except for very isolated alleged incidents.
The New Testament documents the alleged changeover from the old covenant to a new covenant. The new covenant develops the concept of a personal interaction with the diety, which is engaged through introspection. If one assumes that this is possible, that a being coexisting in a dimensional overlay could influence each individual individually, then presumably the need for overt singularities and prophesy would disappear.
However there is a major caveat to this: presumed knowledge of such a being and its motives is purely speculative; it cannot be confirmed in any material form that would be empirically satisfying to the restricted Materialist realm.
Any knowledge that would be intellectually satisfying must come from introspection in the same fashion that the basic axioms of logic are known: intuition of possible truths outside the boundaries of the material world. (All basic axioms of logic and rational thought exist in a metaphysical space).
So again there can be no definitive, conclusive material answer.
Of course there can be a material answer. Again, your statement that there can't is nothing more than assertion.
While one or two examples of evidence could be faked, faking the kind of evidence I described would be incredibly difficult.
The keywords I used were "mutually confirmatory" and "from multiple angles".
You can fake one picture, or one piece of footage, but faking the multiple types of evidence and having them all agree would take a consipracy of vast proportions.
Take the footage on its own: imagine the work involved in convincingly faking the hundreds of pieces of footage of such an event, taken from different angles by different people, on different types of phones in different formats. There'd be people in the shots, so they'd all have to match up with respect to who was walking behind whom, etc. It's just not feasible.
Besides, faked footage is pretty easy to spot.
The fact is Stan, proof of my position is, as you've said yourself, a logical impossibility.
However, disproof of my position is not. The arguments that you've produced to say why it can't be disproven are just excuses to justify why it hasn't.
Every statement is an assertion unless it is a question... Your use of the word "assertion" doesn't seem to map to your intent. Either my assertion is true or it is false.
Your example of likelihood of fakery has no bearing on the original issue: the alleged Red Sea incident had only eyewitness accounts to record it.
You discount any thing I say by a personal declaration that it is not valid; we have come full circle in your denial.
You choose to believe in that which you cannot prove, that is your choice, and you may justify it however you wish. It in no way modifies my original statement concerning Massimo's double standard for the use of faith by others vs. the use of faith by himself.
We are at an impasse where I choose not to continue in your circularity. Either you can disprove the alleged Red Sea incident or you cannot.
If you have an empirical disproof, let me know. Otherwise, I have other things to do.
Matt,
Assuming that I am still not clear in my communications, let’s reduce this issue to logical symbology in order to eliminate all possible semantic problems. We will get straight to the heart of the logic.
We will use your premises and set them into the standard syllogistic format:
Premise 1:All of (set W) is in (set H);Premise 2:All of (set Q) is in (set W);Conclusion:All of (Set Q) is in (Set H).Let Set W = Set of Falsifiable but not falsified statements;
Let Set H = Set of believable statements;
Let Set Q = unverified singularity statements, such as the alleged Red Sea Incident.
The conclusion is that All “unverified singularity statements, such as the alleged Red Sea Incident”, are in the “Set of believable statements”.You can map out some Venn diagrams to confirm this syllogism.
The result is that by your reasoning you find that you have obligated yourself to the conclusion that singularities must be believed because they could be falsified, yet have not been.
But I don’t think that is what you mean; your logic doesn’t seem to fit your worldview, I suspect.
Based on this, I am willing to continue this conversation; I am curious to see what justification you have for this discontinuity.
Stan
When I use the word "assertion" I mean it in the sense of "assertion without evidence", particularly relating to an assertion that requires some evidence, or at the very least some kind of logical argument, to back it up.
For example, your assertion that miraculous events cannot possibly leave any physical evidence. I notice you ended up resorting to theism (and specifically Christian theism) to justify that one. I'll consider that one internet to me. :^)
Thanks for the symbolic logic argument, though. I'm a math guy so that does make things nice and clear. I agree with the conclusion that all unverified singularity statements are in the set of believable statements. In fact, that's obvious . . . if some people believe it, then it's in the set of believable statements.
The problem is that you've then made a huge leap by saying that all believable statements "must be believed".
That's demonstrably false, by the simple fact that two mutually contradictory statements can both be believable.
For example, here are two "believable statements":
* Joseph Smith was inspired to write the book of Mormon based on gold tablets presented to him by angels.
* Joseph Smith was a fraudster who made the whole thing up.
Are you saying that I'm obliged to believe both statements? That's not possible.
Or are you saying that because they are contradictory statements, neither is really in the set of believable statements?
If so, then that contradicts your conclusion, because any statement about an unverified singularity event would no longer be in the set of believable statements. It's always possible to believe the contrary position. After all, there's no evidence to contradict that position. So in that case, the conclusion that "All of (Set Q) is in (Set H)" must be false.
So where does this apparent contradiction come from? I looked back over the logic, and here it is:
The premise that "All of (set Q) is in (set W)" is not valid. Singularity events are not actually falsifiable. It's not possible to prove (for example) that the water coming out of the rock at Lourdes was not by way of divine intervention.
Set Q actually sits in the complement of Set W, not in Set W. The syllogism therefore does not even allow us to draw a conclusion about the believability of singularity events, let alone make the statement that such things "must be believed".
Bingo!!
The logic of the syllogism above was mapped from your previous assertions, which you agree turn out to be incorrect when analyzed symbolically [unless you feel forced to believe due to your rule].
Your assertion process was that (a) belief is justified based solely on the possibility of falsification, but not yet falsified; (b) singularities could, in fact, be falsified.
This is what I plugged into the standard syllogistic statement. (reread the comment).
Your statement that you believe based on possible falsification alone, then, turns out to require belief in singularities, given your belief that singularities are possibly falsifiable.
My argument was that singularities do not remain intact and therefore cannot be falsified using empirical investigative techniques – therefore they are not falsifiable and satisfy Popper’s criterion of being metaphysical in nature.
BTW, it's not Set Q that belongs in the complement of Set W, it is the statement attributed to Set Q.
And BTW #2, you asked a theological question involving theological entities (miracles), so I gave the disclaimers and then answered it. Is an “internet” a game point or some such? Maybe this is merely a win-lose game to you? In which case, I am wasting my time…
On second thought, this has been interesting and not a waste of time.
Stan
Yeah, the "internet" thing is kind of a running joke.
It's making the point that these sorts of argument aren't usually win-lose games, but some people like to treat them as such. And so you get the meaningless phrase "you win the internet" which represents a meaningless victory. Or something.
It's just a gag. Please don't take it as anything other than that. I've really enjoyed this discussion too.
Back to the syllogism . . . no bingo I'm afraid, because that wasn't my premise.
In my earlier comment I said
"First, the statement [that unverified singularity events have a natural explanation] doesn't have to be provable for me to rationally accept it. It only has to be disprovable AND not disproven. It is both of those."What I'm saying there is that disbelief in the supernatural nature of purported singularity events is what is falsifiable.
In your syllogism, you've used the premise that belief in the supernatural nature of purported singularity events is falsifiable, which is not true.
Let's review:
Premise 1:All of (set W) is in (set H);
Premise 2:All of (set Q) is in (set W);
Conclusion:All of (Set Q) is in (Set H).
Let Set W = Set of Falsifiable but not falsified statements;
Let Set H = Set of believable statements;
Let Set Q = unverified singularity statements, such as the alleged Red Sea Incident.
These refer to statements that are believable, not beliefs. The syllogism is referring to what sort of statements (of presumed events) are believable, not to the beliefs that result.
Your original statement was that you based belief on falsification, yet not falsified. The statement you make below can be modified to have the opposite meaning by changing the word "natural" to "non-natural" with the effect that you must believe that, too.
(1)"First, the statement [that unverified singularity events have a natural explanation] doesn't have to be provable for me to rationally accept it. It only has to be disprovable AND not disproven. It is both of those."(1)"First, the statement [that unverified singularity events have a NON-natural explanation] doesn't have to be provable for me to rationally accept it. It only has to be disprovable AND not disproven. It is both of those."A statement that requires believability for both positive and negative senses cannot be true. The criterion of belief is not adequate to sort out the two states.
Now you assume that you can disprove a vision claimed by another person. What sort of empirical, replicable proof would you provide? You assume that you can disprove the parting of the Red Sea. Where is the empirical, replicable proof that you claim is possible?
You are creating premises that are not supportable yet you believe the premises despite non-validation; therefore you feel justified, based on the unsupported premises, to believe a conclusion you create which is dependent upon unsupportable, unvalidated premises. This is not valid logic.
What you are proposing is within the Philosophical Materialism realm, which merely proposes that by searching Set (M) no signs of Set (!M) can be found - using criteria designed only for detecting elements in Set (M).
your position is becoming a circular argument as surely you can see.
I should be more clear. You are expressing a faith in materialism, based on lack of material DIS-proof. This is an unwarranted rejection, without any empirical standing of non-material entities, a subject that we can discuss if you wish.
But you are basically expressing a faith in something that you cannot validate empirically. So it is a leap of faith.
Stan, you're switched around syllogism just doesn't work.
Let me be clear:
Set Q is not in Set W.It's a false premise.
Unverified simgularity events are not falsifiable. It's impossible to prove that a singularity event has not occurred.
If you want to claim that Set Q is in Set W, you need to explain to me the criteria by which I could falsify (for example) the Red Sea incident. If you can't do that, your argument just isn't valid.
My premise is that the naturalisitic interpretation of unverified singularity events is falsifiable.
I'll even give you the necessary criteria: the production of conclusive evidence that one of the known laws of nature has been contravened. I gave numerous examples of possibilities for this in your Red Sea example.
I appreciate we're back to where we started, but that doesn't make it a circular argument. We're just back to the point you failed to address earlier. I'm once again asking you to address it.
And I just don't buy your assertion that non-material entities have no empirical standing. If that were true, then there would be no extension at all of the non-material into the material realm, which means no miracles and no divine revelation. Is that really your conclusion?
I'll accept the assumption of materialism takes a leap of faith, but it's a much smaller leap of faith than that required to accept theism. After all, over the last couple of hundred years science has come up with all sorts of naturalistic explanations for things once considered supernatural, from weather to earthquakes to mental illness. What reason is there to think that this will stop?
We have objective evidence that materialism is a useful way of understanding the world, because it makes predictions which are borne out in practice and mutually confirmed by independent parties the world over. Can you name a religion that can claim the same thing?
Just after I posted that last comment I found this great quote from Jerry Coyne, which nicely sums up my position:
"But over centuries of research we have learned that the idea 'God did it' has never advanced our understanding of nature an iota, and that is why we abandoned it."
Your response is clear, and it is incorrect. The syllogism is correct as it stands. What is incorrect is THE STATEMENT ATTRIBUTED TO SET Q. I said that before, and like my other responses, you are ignoring them.
The syllogism becomes false only because of your assertion that you believe based not on fact, but based on "falsifiability and yet not falsified". When that statement is placed in an accurate format, it places you in a position of believing in miracles. Your solution is to call the format bad, when in fact it is textbook solid.
The real solution for your issue is to move your statement such that it is in Set Q for certain things and out of Set Q for certain other things. This makes it self-refuting.
I cannot think of a more clear way to explain this to you. Blaming the format is not getting you anywhere.
Now as for singularities, I repeat, how do you intend to falsify the following claims: (1) parting of the Red Sea; (2) A vision.
If you claim that you could if you were there, then you are claiming an impossibility. You are not and cannot be there.
So how do you intend to do it? Merely asserting a faith that it can is not sufficient; a method of falsifying, right now, those claims is what counts.
Fact is, you cannot do it, short of claiming faith of some sort.
Finally, your final quote is merely an assertion of Functional Materialism, not a proof of Philosophical Materialism. I have no problem with the basis for empiricism which is voluntary, functional materialism. I have said this dozens of times. But Functional Materialism cannot prove, ever, Philosophical Materialism. And that is what you seem to keep trying to do.
I have to go, there is lightning flashing around the house and I need the computer off.
Stan, I think we need to pull this back a bit.
Earlier you proposed the syllogism:
Premise 1:All of (set W) is in (set H);
Premise 2:All of (set Q) is in (set W);
Conclusion:All of (Set Q) is in (Set H).
Where
Set W = Set of Falsifiable but not falsified statements;
Set H = Set of believable statements;
Set Q = unverified singularity statements, such as the alleged Red Sea Incident.
I argued that for natural explanations of singularity events this syllogism works, because such statements are indeed falsifiable and Premise 2 is valid. But for non-natural explanations the syllogism falls apart, because Premise 2 isn’t valid.
That’s the really the crux of my argument.
In your last comment you said:
“What is incorrect is THE STATEMENT ATTRIBUTED TO SET Q."Which statement are you talking about? Your statement that these singularity events have a supernatural cause, or my statement that they have a naturalistic cause?
Question well stated.
The statement is the "Let" statement, which concerns singularities without prejudice as to cause:
Let Set Q = unverified singularity statements, such as the alleged Red Sea Incident.Regardless of cause, the singularities fit into your criterion for belief.
It appears that you are now trying to separate out two categories of singularities; those with natural causes that could be falsified, yet have not been, and those with supernatural causes which could not be falsified.
But this violates your original assertion that even supernatural singularities could be falsified.
In response to my comments that a supernatural singularity could NOT be falsified, you replied, "Of course there can be a material answer. Again, your statement that there can't is nothing more than assertion.At that point, I went to symbolic logic to demonstrate that point: that non-material, supernatural singularities cannot be considered falsifiable, Or you must be logically be obligated to believe in them.
Now if you choose to remove the subcategory "singularities with supernatural causes" from the Set Q, and place it in Set !Q, then you have declared that those singularities cannot be falsiified, which, of course, was my original point, which you denied. But now you appear to be accepting that point...?
Hope this is more clear.
Stan
Ah, I think I see the problem. We're actually in agreement on this point.
When I said "of course there can be a material answer . . . " I wasn't arguing that supernatural causes are falsifiable. All I meant was that if it can't be positively shown that there's been some violation of natural law, then it's reasonable to suppose that there's a natural explanation.
But even if there were a natural explanation for a supposed singularity event, it still wouldn't falsify the supernatural explanation. A plausible natural explanation just makes any supernatural explanation unlikely.
As you know you can never 100% prove that any given natural explanation is true, because such explanations only involve a model or mechanism that gives the same outcome as that observed. For example we often have competing scientific theories that explain a single set of observations in different ways. All the scientific method can do is falsify the ones that are wrong.
And that's the basis of my original point. Natural explanations are always falsifiable. Therefore, if a supernatural event has really happened, we should observe some violation of the known laws of nature. That would immediately falsify every natural explanation, leaving the supernatural explanation as the only option.
Matt said,
"Therefore, if a supernatural event has really happened, we should observe some violation of the known laws of nature. That would immediately falsify every natural explanation, leaving the supernatural explanation as the only option."And we are back to the crux of the issue. How do you observe something that is over and done with, before you can get your instruments into the truck to go see if it has "natural explanation".
What you are describing is "plausible deniability". This usually comes in the form of asserting that the natural cause is "mass hallucination" or some other unprovable assertion which is used to deny any possibility of non-natural singularity occurance. This is Just So Story Telling based on a complete lack of physical evidence save witness reports.
Based on eye witness reports, there is no reason that a natural phenomenon would show up just in the nick of time to part the Red Sea, allow the Israelites to cross, and then close up over the pursuing Egyptian army.
So the next best thing, from a Philosophical Materialist standpoint is to declare either (a) mass hallucination of an inconceivable event, or (b) it never happened... Both assertions without any evidence whatsoever, but based on the need to deny the supernatural overtones of such eyewitness records.
Making up natural causes is easy. Proving that they happened that way is not.
Calculating a numerical probability is not going to happen. Asserting a probability is easy.
So it all boils down to what it is that you want the answer to be, and then asserting that answer as either truth (Philosophical Materialist answer), or most probable (Denialist answer).
What really happened is unknown and will remain unknown; making assertions about the factuality of it is merely creating dogma to support the presuppositions of one's belief system (worldview).
That was an excellent way to put it Stan, when you said:
"So it all boils down to what it is that you want the answer to be . . . "This raises a question for me, though: what's your criteria for saying that something is supernatural in origin? From your previous arguments it seems that literally anything could be supernatural. All that's required is for someone to claim that it's so.
So is that your criteria, or is there something else?
My criteria, whether you're talking about biblical miracles or television psychics, is that extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence. If you're claiming that the laws of nature are being contravened in some way, then you need to provide me with positive evidence that that's the case.
The burden of proof is on you.
And so it must be because, as we've agreed, it's logically impossible for me to prove that it's not supernatural.
It is not, however, logically impossible for you to prove that it is supernatural.
When you say:
"How do you observe something that is over and done with, before you can get your instruments into the truck to go see if it has 'natural explanation' . . .". . . you're not making statement of logical impossibility. You're just making a lame excuse.
You're still claiming that supernatural events are necessarily fleeting, short-lived, ephemeral and leave no residue. And yet you provide no justification for that claim, even though your whole argument hangs on it.
Matt said,
“That was an excellent way to put it Stan, when you said:
"So it all boils down to what it is that you want the answer to be . . . "If you quote me, please be sure to keep the context:
"So it all boils down to what it is that you want the answer to be, and then asserting that answer as either truth (Philosophical Materialist answer), or most probable (Denialist answer).I think that you are asking for a technical definition of the constitution of a supernatural event. I'll have a go at it.
Assume that there is Natural Law, N. N is consistent, understood (within the current limits of science), and universally agreed upon.
At some point in time, To, a localized event is claimed to have been observed which requires the absence or reversal of N, in order to have happened. At time T1, the Natural Law, N, resumes.
If there is no T1, then N was not a fixed natural law; it changed and the change to a new law or state remains and can be studied at the convenience of the investigators. This is not a singularity, it is a step function change in the previously stable natural law, N.
Lame excuse? No, it is a definition.
A singularity has a beginning and an end. Case in point, the parting of the Red Sea, which allegedly opened when the Israelites approached, and then closed when the Israelites were on the opposite shore.
Singularities are the subject here, unless you have changed it somehow. Weeping statues, psychics, etc. are not singularities.
You said,
”My criteria, whether you're talking about biblical miracles or television psychics, is that extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence. If you're claiming that the laws of nature are being contravened in some way, then you need to provide me with positive evidence that that's the case.
The burden of proof is on you.
And so it must be because, as we've agreed, it's logically impossible for me to prove that it's not supernatural.
It is not, however, logically impossible for you to prove that it is supernatural.”Your quote from Carl Sagan needs to be made more specific; its use of the vaporous term “extraordinary” obscures the reality; the statement should be this:
”Extra-natural claims require extra-natural evidence.”Actually the original claim was that physical evidence of supernatural events is possible and not required, iirc. I believe that has been refuted. Now apparently, the challenge is to provide Logical evidence, not physical evidence. Your original position was that you need not to provide proof; now your position is that I must provide proof?
But your presumption is that an extra-natural domain does not exist; so how can I posit such a thing if your position is that the domain can’t exist because it doesn’t. Are you prepared to accept an assumption that a non-physical, non-material, extra-natural domain might exist?
This is where most materialists bail out. No statement containing a reference to a non-material domain can be valid, because (a priori) there is no non-material domain in their view.
Can you accept that a non-material domiain might exist? Are you prepared to proceed?
I can accept that a non-material domain might exist, but I don’t accept the assertion that it intrudes into our material domain.
That's a claim that requires evidence, and you haven't successfully refuted the claim that physical evidence of supernatural events is possible.
You've used the word "localized" to define singularity events, which is fine (although unnecessarily restrictive and somewhat arbitrary) but it still doesn't follow that no evidence would remain.
For the Red Sea example I've offered a number of different examples of lasting, objective evidence that (had the technology existed) be cross-referenced and mutually confirmed.
O.K. Then we'll stop right here.
You consider it unnecessary for yourself to possess material evidence but it is necessary for me to provide logical evidence.
You consider cell phone cameras a solution to the parting of the Red Sea (alleged) singularity, but you provide no material evidence or type of material evidence that would actually disprove that event.
And now you have reverted to a demand for material evidence for a claim of non-materiality.
This is going nowhere, and because this is farming season, plus other blogging considerations, I choose not to pursue what appears to be a closed Materialist philosophy.
But thanks for your participation, it has been an interesting conversation, and very civil which I truly appreciate: civility is in such short supply these days, especially on the web.
Best Regards,
Stan
Thanks, Stan. I've enjoyed this discussion too.
I'm sure we'll speak again!
...Matt
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