” He asked me if I admitted that the scientific position demands that we reject all alternative explanations — whether we can consider supernatural causes. I've thought about this before, and I told him no. I am willing to consider other possibilities, if someone provides a useful, testable, confirmable means for evaluating truth claims.”
PZ was irritated that the questioner, a hated Creationist, considered this answer to be a confirmation of his, PZ’s, rejection of supernatural existence. After all, PZ was willing to consider supernatural existence so long as the evidence is natural, of course.
This is a basic category error when (category A) = ! (category B), demanding that category B must be found within category A, and if it is not found in category A, then category B does not exist. The basic definition of supernatural is that it is not natural. It doesn’t seem to be all that difficult to comprehend that for this argument, A = !B. It’s simple. It’s a definition.
But this false stumbling block is placed out as a catch for the logically unwary, by those who probably know better (or surely should): university professors like PZ. Now if PZ doesn’t know better, then his ability at logical analysis is flawed at the most basic level. And if he does know better, then he is dishonest.
Perhaps this evaluation seems a bit harsh: either woefully deficient in the principles of logic and rational thought, or dishonest. I see no third road, no valid reason to make fallacious statements like this one.
19 comments:
There is an interesting article here by atheist Richard Carrier. He rejects strict methodological naturalism and agrees with the criticism of the Judge Jones case about the arbitrary line drawn that excludes the supernatural in science.
He argues instead for a pragmatic methodological naturalism: while we should not arbitrarily exclude the supernatural from the pool of live options, we should not seriously entertain these options in cases where they go against everything we currently know about the universe.
The problem I have with this kind of Categorisation is that "supernatural" is not well-defined.
Consider an equivalent argument:
Someone claims that 2 + 2 = 5. I point out that no, 2 + 2 = 4.
They point that I'm using mathematics whereas I should be using supermathematics, and then I would see that they're correct.
What this shows (and what PZ was saying) is that proponents of the supernatural haven't defined how to evaluate claims about the supernatural. All they do (as you've done here Stan) is say that empiricism is insufficient.
OK, fine. So tell me, how do we objectively evaluate their truth?
The article I linked is long, but worth reading for one perspective. Especially because he's an atheist who rejects the court conclusion in the Dover case.
Essentially his definition of "supernatural" is any mental phenomenon that is not reducible to a non-mental explanation. If a Harry Potter magic wand produces an effect just by saying the magic words, this effect would be testable and measurable just like any other.
So science should be a systematic method of examining the reality of the world we live in, whatever that is, not just testing natural explanations of things.
I think science is a systematic method of examining the reality of the world we live in. As Carrier pointed out in his article (and I agree), the focus on naturalism is a pragmatic rather than an epistemological position.
He shows that it is possible to support supernatural explanations with evidence, and I think we can agree that even hard-nosed scientists would be interested in such things should they eventuate.
That was a great article, by the way. Thanks for the link.
Stan's point is well made-
To demand that something show up as what it isn't is flawed logically.
This is an important point in that any further discussion of the subject that misses this fact will not be sound.
It is also true that how we define the words 'natural' and 'supernatural' is of importance.
The link to Richard Carrier is interesting in that he does attempt to make a distinction that could possibly be determined. This is different than many philosophers who define 'natural' as 'whatever science finds'. (This of course rules out the possibility that science could ever acknowledge anything as supernatural).
It is interesting to note that currently it is possible to set-up an experiment such that the object of interest (say an electron) can operate in one of two different states (wave-particle) depending on the choice of the experimenter. In order to predict the behavior of the object, one must know the choice of the experimenter. At this time these choices are considered 'free'--(not fixed or determined by the physical aspects of the theory) and there is no known formula that can be used to predict them.
In this sense I would suggest that Carrier is defining the term 'natural' and 'supernatural' in a way that would deem physics (as it is currently formulated- the 'orthodox interpretation of Heisenburg/von Neumann) as a theory of the interaction between the natural and supernatural.
I wonder if he is aware of this and if knowing this would change his mind about the definitions.
Sonic,
But isn't the waveform collapse a result of the observer's interference when he's doing the observing? Doesn't he add electromagnetic radiation to the equation and thus cause the particle to become either a particle or a wave?
Matt said,
" So tell me, how do we objectively evaluate their truth?"
The test for truth is internal coherence, lack of valid contravention, inability to falsify, realization of incorrigibility and immutability.
These are not empirical tests. They are subjective; that is why no one else can do it for you, you must do the heavy lifting for yourself if you are to know the truth about truth.
Truth cannot be proved; it can only be perceived, and discriminated against its inverse: falseness. If it is seen to be coherently inevitable, it might be accepted as truth, despite the inability to prove it empirically.
Science does not provide truth; it provides only temporary factoids that are currently useful in describing phenomena that occur in space/time with regards to changes in mass/energy. These factoids are conditional on current technology, previous findings, and might change with future findings. So science, in every regard, is mutable.
Truth is immutable, regardless of space/time, mass/energy. E.g.: A tautology is a tautology and cannot be otherwise (a tautology about tautologies).
Philosophers call truth "incorrigible", because it is totally independent of what we think about it, do about it, or whether we accept it or not. The First Principles are called incorrigible, yet Nietsche rejected them (out of his characteristic orneriness) which resulted in his Anti-Rationalism philosophy. There is little discernable difference between Anti-Rationalism and irrationality, except that the irrational will reach rational conclusions at least part of the time.
By the time I finished Carrier's article, I wasn't sure what his point actually was. Had he fully redefined "supernatural"? Rather than re-read the whole thing and take notes, I went back to the section on mind/soul, and I found that he was arguing a tautology: if an entity is found to have natural causes, then it is natural:
Carrier:
"If these soul-bodies retained mental function through some naturalistic mechanism, so that all mental powers and properties were still completely reducible to the mindless interaction of particles (like another brain made of soul-stuff, comprising, let’s say, a system of mutually interacting particles of dark matter), then as strange as this soul-body would be, it would be a natural body. It might yet have a supernatural origin, but that's a separate question. The body itself, the substance, would not be supernatural."
This appears to say "if it is natural, then it is natural".
He goes on to say,
"However, if this soul-body turned out to have no relevant sub-structure, if in fact it simply carried a person's "mind" with all its functions and powers and properties, all as an irreducible "property" of that soul-body, and not as the product of any system of interacting parts within it, then this soul-body would be a supernatural substance."
I don't see why we don't just say that 'natural' means consisting of mass/energy within space/time. 'Supernatural' means not consisting of mass/energy within space/time.
Since we don't understand all of the natural existence, e.g. dark matter, dark energy, it seems not possible to categorize any physical phenomenon as being outside natural causation. This should include (I think) quantum events, at least for now.
The mind, however, might be defined by its apprehension and comprehension of non-material truth, and the supervisory capacity of the mind over the material brain without being a captive part of the brain. (I have a post coming - I hope - on this subject). The volatile process of mental comprehension is without any definable physical substance or source of focused intelligent energy (ionic charge transfer is not a cause of intelligence): there are no comparable natural analogs for intelligence or mind, no equations for reference. It can be thought of only in non-natural terms.
Also, it seems to me that the definitional problem is not inherent in either scientists or Theists. It is a problem in Philosophical Materialism in this sense: If there actually were a deity, then it/He would be natural, since natural is what 'is'. But we see no natural deity using our natural techniques, so there is no deity.
It is this definition of "natural" that is incorrect.
Martin-
Before the measurement is taken, there is a decision as to when and how to take the measurement.
It is this decision that is considered 'free'- in that it (the decision- an action of a 'mind') is not determined by the physical description. There is no known formula to determine what the experimenter's choice will be.
In this sense I would suggest that this decision comes from a mind that is described (in physics anyway) in a way that would fit the definition of supernatural from the Carrier article.
(your question about what causes the 'collapse' is a good one, I don't know that anyone knows this- that's why there are so many 'interpretations' of QM) ((The many worlds- for example- posits that there isn't a collapse…))
I don't think it's fair to paint Carrier as talking in tautologies when he's just explaining his definitions to make them clear. Every mathematical equation is inherently tautological too, but it's still useful.
I think the definition Carrier offers of supernatural (mental entity disconnected from anything material) is a good one. It fits in well with the common usage of the word 'supernatural'.
Your suggestion of "not consisting of mass/energy within space/time" isn't as well-defined, and could be used to talk about events 'prior to' the Big Bang (being as they are outside of our space/time), but I wouldn't describe such things as necessarily supernatural.
Matt,
If you think that "supernatural" is defined by the disconnect from anything material, but you don't allow mass/energy, space/time to define that same thing, then how do you define "material", if not in those terms?
Since "material" existence - by the conventional understanding of the term - started at the Big Bang, what is your reason of extending the definition of "natural" beyond the "material" (to include before the Big Bang), unless you have redefined the term "material"?
BTW,the only equations that are tautological are of the form x = x; they only have one meaning - identity: x equals itself. Equations of the form x = f(y) have meanings beyond tautology; they identify characteristics of x that are outside of x. Equality is identity only if the intent is to reduce the equation to x = x, which is rarely, if ever, the case.
Under Carrier's definition, the 'supernatural' refers specifically to 'mind' being disconnected from the material, not just anything.
Getting back to the point you made a few comments ago ... you said the test for truth is "internal coherence, lack of valid contravention, inability to falsify, realization of incorrigibility and immutability."
It's pretty obvious that the first three are necessary-but-insufficient and could be applied to the Lord of the Rings as well as the Bible.
My question is about the final two properties, which presumably bestow 'necessity' upon a particular truth.
How do you verify these properties(even subjectively) for any particular truth?
Matt said,
"'supernatural' refers specifically to 'mind' being disconnected from the material, not just anything."
So this is your definition? Just mind, nothing else?
"How do you verify these properties [realization of incorrigibility and immutability](even subjectively) for any particular truth?"
How indeed? Here is where we enter into a domain that is foreign to Materialists, the subjective domain. Truth is not verified, it is realized. Either you consider it, apprehend the qualities surrounding the issue to be or not to be incorrigible/immutable, or... you don't. It's personal, it's internal, it's subjective. But there are guidelines, which you have above.
That's why truth is deniable, but not falsifiable. This might seem like a riddle or bafflegab, but it is not - and maybe you do understand what I mean. If not, I can elaborate, and if I am very careful about definitions, we can connect.
Let me know.
Yes, that was the definition of 'supernatural' offered by Carrier. I think it's a good one.
Regarding 'truth', I see an inherent contradiction in your structure of truth realisation, which you may be able to clear up for me.
Doesn't the subjective nature of the 'realisation' make the truth itself subjective and hence not immutable?
It's easy to conceive of two different people 'realising' two mutually exclusive truths, and both of them being thoroughly convinced of their position.
Does that mean one or both of them is wrong? How do you determine which?
You may say this is a fault with the realisation and not a fault with the truth itself, but surely we're concerned with reliably apprehending the truth if it exists.
Subjective realisation seems to me, at the very basic level, to be insufficient for the purpose.
(Of course this whole thing is assuming that there is such a thing as absolute truth, something of which I'm not convinced).
Matt said,
"Does that mean one or both of them is wrong? How do you determine which?
The tests for coherence, etc, will work every time, or not at all. Like Planck said about entropy, either its always valid, or its never valid. If you depend on someone else's determination, then you have not confirmed or disconfirmed for yourself, so you cannot know whether they have done the job or not. That's why you have to ignore what others think, and do your own determination. Possibly you will conclude that nothing is true, but we can sort through that when it happens.
The point again is that you have to do it yourself.
Hint: It starts the same way for every seeker: The first new assumption must be that everything you currently know is either false or suspect; only if the slate is first cleaned can you stock up with valid truth statements upon which to build a rational worldview. Otherwise prior presuppositions will prevent it. This is not easy, I know from experience; but it is gratifying to have completed.
Second is to examine whether there is anything valid enough to pass the tests of coherence, etc, assuming that you accept coherence as a criterion.
It is purely up to you, though. No one else can do it for you. So I will stop here.
Fair enough. Thanks Stan. This has been fun. We must do it again sometime.
Cheers.
Matt,
Sorry that you're leaving, I didn't mean it that way. But come back any time, you're welcome here.
I wasn't in any way implying unhappiness ... I should have added an emoticon! :-)
I really enjoyed this discussion, I just figured it's reached a kind of logical conclusion.
I appreciate the welcome and I appreciate the way we can have a civil discussion even though we have such very diverse views.
We'll definitely talk again!
:-)
Matt,
Good! Jump in at any time....
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