Sunday, May 30, 2010

A Single Unit of Intellect

I am compelled to push the question even further: Whence intellect? The idea that by taking a walk through the machinery of the brain we can see the origins of intellect and mechanisms of consciousness and rationality, this idea is gaining a following which also believes that MRI scans are a picture of thinking.

This leads to some serious questions which I will attempt to capture here for our leisurely rumination.

First we need to look at some presuppositions, so that we can remove them from blocking the inquiry path. First amongst these is that the mind is inseparable from the brain. The mind clearly ceases to exist in the brain at death. Out of body experiences have been recorded by the likes of Richard Feynman and A. J. Ayer. There seems to be enough evidence to allow us to at least consider a separable mind.

Second, the idea that the machine is the mind is a demonstrable fallacy, especially when compared to the hardware / software analogy of computers and their offspring, robots. Looking long and hard at a computer motherboard tells us nothing about the meaning of the bits flying through the registers, nor even anything about Windows or UNIX or other personalities that the machine might have, much less the teleology of the machined code, which can’t be deduced without external help. Although analogies always ultimately fail, this analogy seems alright; but if it is not satisfactory, let’s take a walk through the brain, where we find only neurons and biochemical discharges, not actual physical thoughts or concepts which we could physically grab and analyze. So once again, coupled with the evidence above, this seems sufficient to allow us to consider the issue without the “machine is the mind” idea being an a priori constraint on our investigation.

Third, the idea that electrons have meaning is just flat false. Electrons that have been intelligently placed in relative positions or relative movement that allow them to carry meaning which is modulated upon their relative position or their electromagnetic fields are the stuff of information systems like computers, radios, televisions, telephones, etc. The electron itself does not have meaning.

Fourth, we should define intellect. For our purposes here we can use this:
”Intellect is the ability to make a decision concerning whether or not to act, based on inputs concerning the environment, or rational inputs requiring decisions, or abstract non-material entities of interest.”
This definition seems to be stripped down as far as possible from the standard definition which allows for “capacity for knowledge and rational thought”. Such a truncated definition might allow for capturing a single unit of intellect, which we will proceed to attempt to do.

Now from a macro view, it seems necessary to determine first whether the intellect can be thought to be caused, under any circumstance whatsoever, by a physical thing or group of physical things assembled together to cause it.

Taking first the single physical cause for the intellect, what physical entity can we find which would allow us to predict that a natural artifact of its existence is intellect? We have much to choose from, all the mass and energy in the universe, in fact. So which single thing can we find that would lead us to think it would naturally produce intellect? I can think of none. No element, no particle, no field, no energy differential can be thought to naturally or necessarily lead to intellect.

So now let’s consider the compound or aggregate grouping of any things mass-energy in the universe which might be thought to cause intellect. After all serendipity declares that the whole might be greater than its parts, yes? Well, not mathematically. So if we group particles into atoms, do we expect intellect? If we group atoms into molecules, do we expect intellect? We cannot fall for the idea that because intellect exists, then it must be due to [fill in the blank]. We need to be totally honest here. Is there any molecule that when observed would lead us to expect intellect, just because of that molecule? What about an assembly of molecules? Or an assembly of an assembly? Or all that with electricity too.

It seems clear that none of the physical attributes of the universe would lead to an expectation of intellect or intelligence.

What about natural selection? Is it expected that the ever changing environment would select a set of molecules that are intellect? Or a more relaxed criterion: Is it expected that natural selection would select a set of molecules that is a tiny bit of intellect? And what does a “tiny bit of intellect” even mean?

One might argue for the tiny bit of intellect claim as Dennett did, by making up evolutionary stories to support it. But what about evidence? Is there any evidence that a tiny bit of intellect can exist? What would it be? How can we describe a single unit of intellect?

A single unit of intellect, which we have to assume for the “tiny bit of intellect”, would need some things. It would need a processor; it would need functional software;, it would need a necessary external physical function to enable it to be naturally selected in the environment. The processor could conceivably be tailored accidentally to specifically handle the code which it is given. And the code could conceivably accidentally match an environmental need which might be naturally selected for.

But what would the requirements be for these elements? The processor must be able to handle its routine, which means that it requires a minimum complexity and code compatibility; the code must handle the environmental situation, which means that it too requires a minimum complexity, including a compatibility with not just the processor, but also the external environmental sensor and the communication links. All this requires a run-from-reset and an energy feed to its animated parts, both internally and externally (these being required to trigger selection). It requires data connections to communicate to and from linked external animated outputs. It requires sensory inputs to determine when to run the routine in order to provide the animated outputs. And it would likely need limiting features to tell it when to cease running the routine. It would necessarily be closed loop, and not oscillate, ever.

This is not the same as a reflexive signal in, muscle jerk out, open loop. Nor is it the same as constant repetitive signals such as produce heart beats or breathing, nor consistently operation of cilia. Intellect, by minimal definition requires a decision to be made before an action is taken.

Now that we have defined a unit of intellect, what material entities or processes can we find in the universe that would produce an expectation of producing it? For instance, did a machine evolve to accommodate the pre-existing necessary code? Or did the code evolve to accommodate a fortuitously composed pre-existing machine? Even a single unit of each? The odds here are preposterously against it.

So there are no material entities or processes that I can conjure within rational, non-phantasmagoric boundaries which predict or force the advent of a single unit of intellect. But if you can come up with some, I’m sure a great fortune awaits you.

Now let’s look at the problem of the separable mind. Again, we cannot exclude this a priori merely due to materialist dogma. Let’s consider first detectability and then the impact of a separable mind if it is found to be the case.

In the case of detectability, we must assume the scientism stance: we will assume that the separate mind will one day be detected. This is necessary in order to consider it for discussion, and it won’t be argued against by those who defer everything to science. And after all, radio waves were discovered in my great-grandfather’s day, who is to say what will be found in my great-grandchild’s day? [Note 1] So we will assume that the mind is found to be separable from the brain.

After tapping into the mind which is separate from the brain, we can ask: what is the impact of knowing that the mind is not the brain?

The impact is not necessarily a guarantee of a deity right at first blush. As Bertrand Russell surmised, there might be a separate substance, a separate element of existence, about which we know, well, absolutely nothing. Russell saw this as a necessary relief from both the anentropic, physical law-breaking actions of humans which he said could not be denied; but he did not address the problem of the uncaused causers, which humans demonstrably are.

It is the problem of the uncaused causer which deflates most – maybe all - materialist theories of mind. Because materialism, Philosophical Materialism especially, requires every effect to have a cause, and this produces a causal chain clear back to the big bang. If the human mind, or that of other living things, causes things but has no demonstrable cause itself, that break in the causal chain lies outside the materialist doctrine and defeats its axiom of no non-material existence.

One might think that materialists would flock to Russell’s theory of a separate “thing”, a separate existence which supports the mind and its activities. But they cannot; that also opens the door to the possibility of an outside intellect, one that could also exist upon or within that unknown, separate existence, one that primes or jump-starts the intellect in newborns. Even one that causes non-material concepts such as morality, justice, rights and responsibility.

So here we find dogma. The separable mind concept cannot be defeated, but it also cannot be accepted due to … dogma: there can be no external intelligence. It is so decreed. All things, mind included and maybe especially, must be material.

It seems non-coherent to think of the mind as a product of non-living, non-sentient mass. Or energy: no matter how focused or intense, it remains non-sentient also. It also seems non-coherent to think of the mind as a fixed thing, stuck to the web of neurons in the brain pan. The mind is a dancing thing, and its dance is not predetermined by fixed connections.

Perhaps those connections are voluntarily changed to accommodate the mind. This is part of the “plastic brain” concept. But that also defeats the materialist dogma: if the mind changes matter, if the mind is in control, it still is an uncaused causer. Materialists just can’t seem to win this one.

Note 1: The standard restrictions on science always apply, and cannot be denied rationally. This assumption is made for argument’s sake.

9 comments:

sonic said...

I predict that the separate mind will be detected after the higgs boson, but before dark matter. I wonder if we could find a bookie to cover bets on this...

Stan said...

What if dark matter is the mind?

Unknown said...

My question for you here is: where in the universe have we observed a mind that was completely divorced from a brain?

The answer, of course, is nowhere: so far we have only found minds where there are brains.

This does not presuppose any materialist claim that the mind is only the brain, or which came first, or anything - merely that, thus far, it seems that a brain is a necessary prerequisite for a mind.

This begs a very important question: is it reasonable to make theories of the mind without any reference whatsoever to the physical stuff of the brain?

Stan said...

If the brain is a scaffold for the mind, and if the scaffold is continally adjusted by the mind to suit the mind, and if the scaffold is completely different for some minds (e.g. hydroencephalytics) then discussing the scaffold seems to be a distraction rather than a part of the cause of the mind.

Unknown said...

The brain is not a scaffold - else you could take the scaffold away and the structure remains. No one has ever observed a mind without a brain. It is a necessary feature of the mind. How do you dismiss a necessary feature as a mere 'distraction'?

Stan said...

You misread the intent of the scaffold, which is to hold up working, sentient agents. Scaffolds are not meant to hold up edifices.

A mind is a non-physical entity. Demanding physical evidence of a non-physical entity is a category error, one that is common to Philosophical Materialism, which is dependent upon that defect.

No one has observed a mind in a brain either; to declare that bioelectric discharge is the mind is unsatisfactory in terms of cause and effect. Ionic discharge does not in any way predict a mind.

The necessary denial of out-of-body experiences, which produce no material evidence, is another irrational category error. The accurate view of agnosticism is ignored in favor of categorical statements, such as "never observed", which are erroneous statements from an unprovable Materialist belief system, i.e. not empirical, not demonstrable, not replicable. The Materialist belief system is dogmatic in that respect, and is therefore religious rather than rational.

Unknown said...

"No one has observed a mind in a brain either"

On the contrary. Every man who thinks observes that he has a mind; and while he lives, he observes he is in possession of a brain as well. He may have as many out-of-body experiences as you please; nonetheless while he remains alive he retains possession of his brain, and eventually must return there if anybody is to hear anything of these experiences.

Are you saying that you do not have a mind? Or are you saying that you do not have a brain? If neither of those are true, then you yourself observe that you have at once a mind and a brain. There, at least, is one observation of minds and brains coming together. It's almost tautological - if you didn't have a mind you'd have nothing to say; if you didn't have a brain you'd have no way to say anything. This itself is not a Materialist statement of any kind Nor is it saying that the mind is the brain, or is contained in the brain, or is inseparable from the brain . All this says is that, during life, separable or inseparable, brains and minds are found together. (do you actually disagree with this statement?)

Neither does this demand any "evidence" that there is a non-physical mind. If there is a non-physical mind completely separable from the brain, then that is that; there is no way to physically deny this assumption. Indeed there is no way to study the workings of a non-physical mind scientifically. So what do we do, write off the mind as being off-limits to science? Maybe... but there remains the physical brain, which in life accompanies it. Why then not study it, and see what science might be able to tell us about it? See, perhaps, if we can learn anything about why it is that a non-physical mind would require a very specific, very specialized, and extremely complicated material object called the brain in order to make itself be physically observable? You do not need to make any assumptions about the nature of the mind in order to focus on studying the brain to study the mind - because that is the only possible connection to the mind that science is capable of studying.

Again, why on earth would you dismiss the study of the brain as a "distraction" from questions on the mind? It is the only possible connection to the mind that current-day science can study! It is for this reason that science mostly concerns itself with material theories of the mind - not because of "dogma", or fear of absolute moral authority.

And, of course, until such a thing is observed, there remains the possibility, admit it or not, that the assumption of a non-physical mind is incorrect. In the meantime, why dismiss material theories of the mind simply because they are material?

Finally, modern neuroscience is far more sophisticated than you give it credit for. You stated:

"It seems clear that none of the physical attributes of the universe would lead to an expectation of intellect or intelligence."

But in science, this is not at all "clear". For example, I am currently reading "Bright air, brilliant fire" by Gerald Edelman, in which he outlines a material theory of the mind he calls 'neuronal group selection' (it is more or less a simplified condensation of his earlier three books). He is very explicit about the material assumptions of the theory - but you would be surprised at the robustness of explanatory power it is nonetheless able to achieve. If you think you can soundly rebut such a theory using a short thought-experiment, then you didn't really understand it. I'd suggest reading more about what material theories of the mind actually look like before entirely dismissing them. Needless to say, they do not consist of clunky, poorly-conceived computer analogies.

Unknown said...

"No one has observed a mind in a brain either"

On the contrary. Every man who thinks observes that he has a mind; and while he lives, he observes he is in possession of a brain as well. He may have as many out-of-body experiences as you please; nonetheless while he remains alive he retains possession of his brain, and eventually must return there if anybody is to hear anything of these experiences.

Are you saying that you do not have a mind? Or are you saying that you do not have a brain? If neither of those are true, then you yourself observe that you have at once a mind and a brain. There, at least, is one observation of minds and brains coming together. It's almost tautological - if you didn't have a mind you'd have nothing to say; if you didn't have a brain you'd have no way to say anything. This itself is not a Materialist statement of any kind Nor is it saying that the mind is the brain, or is contained in the brain, or is inseparable from the brain . All this says is that, during life, separable or inseparable, brains and minds are found together. (do you actually disagree with this statement?)

Neither does this demand any "evidence" that there is a non-physical mind. If there is a non-physical mind completely separable from the brain, then that is that; there is no way to physically deny this assumption. Indeed there is no way to study the workings of a non-physical mind scientifically. So what do we do, write off the mind as being off-limits to science? Maybe... but there remains the physical brain, which in life accompanies it. Why then not study it, and see what science might be able to tell us about it? See, perhaps, if we can learn anything about why it is that a non-physical mind would require a very specific, very specialized, and extremely complicated material object called the brain in order to make itself be physically observable? You do not need to make any assumptions about the nature of the mind in order to focus on studying the brain to study the mind - because that is the only possible connection to the mind that science is capable of studying.

Again, why on earth would you dismiss the study of the brain as a "distraction" from questions on the mind? It is the only possible connection to the mind that current-day science can study! It is for this reason that science mostly concerns itself with material theories of the mind - not because of "dogma", or fear of absolute moral authority.

And, of course, until such a thing is observed, there remains the possibility, admit it or not, that the assumption of a non-physical mind is incorrect. In the meantime, why dismiss material theories of the mind simply because they are material?

Finally, modern neuroscience is far more sophisticated than you give it credit for. You stated:

"It seems clear that none of the physical attributes of the universe would lead to an expectation of intellect or intelligence."

But in science, this is not at all "clear". For example, I am currently reading "Bright air, brilliant fire" by Gerald Edelman, in which he outlines a material theory of the mind he calls 'neuronal group selection' (it is more or less a simplified condensation of his earlier three books). He is very explicit about the material assumptions of the theory - but you would be surprised at the robustness of explanatory power it is nonetheless able to achieve. If you think you can soundly rebut such a theory using a short thought-experiment, then you didn't really understand it. I'd suggest reading more about what material theories of the mind actually look like before entirely dismissing them. Needless to say, they do not consist of clunky, poorly-conceived computer analogies.

Stan said...

Your first point is that the mind exists, the brain exists, therefore the mind is the brain. Regardless of trying to merely argue that minds are found whenever brains are found, (the same can be said of minds and beating hearts), it is not proof in any way that the mind and the brain are the same.

This argument is insufficient to prove the supposed tautology that the mind is the brain is the mind. This tautology fails at death, anyway, when the brain exists but the mind is not observed.

Nor does it address out-of-body experiences.

The next point seems contained here:

"but there remains the physical brain, which in life accompanies it. Why then not study it, and see what science might be able to tell us about it? See, perhaps, if we can learn anything about why it is that a non-physical mind would require a very specific, very specialized, and extremely complicated material object called the brain in order to make itself be physically observable? "

In no way do I object to studying the brain. I object to declaring that the mind is understood by observing blood flow to certain areas of the brain. And that is what is being declared. It is non-scientific and non-rational to jump to that conclusion from blood flow observations.

"You do not need to make any assumptions about the nature of the mind in order to focus on studying the brain to study the mind - because that is the only possible connection to the mind that science is capable of studying."

But those assumptions are being made, of course. Even your statement seems to contradict itself in that regard: "...studying the brain to study the mind..."

Analogies generally fail, but maybe this one works to an extent: Would you study the construction of an automobile in order to determine why it drove from Georgia to Alaska? The question is one of agency. Why would electrochemical ionic discharges produce agency in an otherwise inert mass?

"that is the only possible connection to the mind that science is capable of studying."

This statement is true and is the crux of the problem for materialists: they cannot study the actual agent, so they reduce it to a material entity. This is addressed fully in Menuge's "Agents Under Fire", a logical analysis of irrational reductionism used to "undefine" (if you will) agency, its characteristics and source. A case for serial reductionism in order to eliminate uncomfortable non-material effects is made by Daniel Dennett, and is refuted syllogistically by Menuge. Reductionism is used for entities that are too complex for empirical analysis, and it necessarily eliminates those characteristics that differentiate the entity in the first place. I.e, the entity is modified to fit the analytical tool. This makes reductionism a tool of false analysis.

"If you think you can soundly rebut such a theory using a short thought-experiment, then you didn't really understand it. I'd suggest reading more about what material theories of the mind actually look like before entirely dismissing them."

I haven't read Edelman, but I will do so. You should read Dennett and Menuge, too. If you can refute Menuge, I'd like to see it. Your presumption of my ignorance is, well, presumptious.