Martin tries to make his assault almost encyclopedic, including ideas about Positive Atheism, Negative Atheism, Theodicies, Atheist arguments against a deity, teleologic arguments, as well as the idea that Atheists cannot be considered moral.
The Concept
The first sentences of Chapter 1 set the ground rules:
”What must be shown in order to support negative Atheism with respect to the existence of the Christian-Hebraic God? How does one justify the view that one ought not to believe in an all-good, all-powerful, all-knowing God who created the universe?”[1]From the last paragraph of the book:
”In view of the fact that the controversy between atheists and nonatheists in Western society has usually been about the question of an all-good, all-knowing, all-powerful being exists, there was good reason to limit the discussion to atheism in the narrow sense.”[2]Thus, Martin sets up a thesis for defining a deity according to an ecclesiastic viewpoint which he presumes represents all Hebraic-Christian conceptions, one which he proposes to knock down in order to justify Atheism. His presumptions that the qualities, “all-good, all-powerful, all-knowing”, are necessary attributes for defining and fully justifying such a being are never questioned nor are they supported in any fashion; they are assumed as valid.
The basic premise of the argument he makes in this book is that it is noncoherent to assume the existence of a being that could be “all-good, all-knowing, all-powerful” , and that these characteristics are necessary and sufficient to the concept of a deity. He uses this understanding of a deity in all of his arguments. He assumes that by defeating these three assumed characteristics of a deity, that the entire concept of the existence of a deity is defeated.
From his personal background, Martin was brought up an Atheist in a Catholic neighborhood [3]. In his discussions with friends, his Atheist views were not treated with scorn, and presumably he learned theism from them. He later studied the philosophy of science and became fascinated with “the incommensurability of scientific theories”. He became a professor of philosophy.
Professor Martin makes the following statement regarding the analysis he performs in the book:
”It is far better, in my view, to develop certain middle-level principles of justification that are in accord with our ordinary and scientific rational practice and to argue for atheism in terms of these than to justify atheism in terms of some larger and more controversial theory. In fact, if one had to wait for the availability of a general theory of rationality and justification, that is free of problems and widely accepted before judging that some belief was irrational, a judgment might never be made. Moreover, although I use inductive arguments in this work, I provide no general account of inductive arguments. I appeal to common rational practices regardless of how their details are construed by inductive logicians. Although I am sympathetic with some general theories of justification, the coherence theory in particular, I leave their defense to others. Indeed, since this book’s basic quarrel is with one version of foundationalism, I can with complete consistency accept other versions of foundationalism.This is a striking admission of not adhering to known logical principles, and not caring to define them. Based on these two factors, choosing insufficient characteristics as the necessary and sufficient characteristics of a deity, and choosing to ignore disciplined logic, the entire book proceeds.
While Martin attacks theodicies of many varieties, that alone is not necessarily a conclusive argument against the existence of a creating deity. He attacks the existence of a deity straight on in the Positive Atheism section, starting with Chapter 11.
Attacking the Concept
The same mode of attack is used throughout the book. So illuminating its use in one attack pretty much covers the same issue in the remaining arguments. Here we will start with Martin’s attempt to maneuver general terminology into a specific case of non-coherence, using “all-knowing”, or omniscience as the target.
In terms of all-knowing, Martin defines omniscience as “having all knowledge” and then tries to refine that definition in order to accomplish coherence for a being to have such knowledge. He claims that philosophers have defined three categories of knowledge: “Propositional or factual knowledge, or knowing something is the case and is analyzable as true belief of a certain kind”; “Procedural knowledge, aka knowledge-how”, or knowing how to do something; “knowledge by acquaintance” which is direct acquaintance with material objects. And later he seems to use another undefined quality, “moral knowledge”, or knowledge of immoral entities such as lust and envy.
By the end of this process, he has decided that there are types of knowledge that a deity could not conceivably have.
First, being disembodied, God could not have “knowledge-how” (skill knowledge), based on the logic that he could not understand how to do gymnastics because he has no body. [4]
Initial comment: This decision is based on the presupposition that humans, or at least the author, can know exactly what it is that a disembodied but coexistent deity could know. It is more likely that the author does not know the limits of the deity’s knowledge, than it is that a deity “could not know” certain things.
Second, Martin asserts that a morally perfect God could not have knowledge of lust and envy.
”One aspect of lust and envy is the feeling of lust and envy. However, part of the concept of God is that He is morally perfect, and being morally perfect excludes these feelings. Consequently, there is a contradiction in the concept of God.” And, ”Freedom from such feelings as lust and envy is precisely what religious believers expect from a saint, and it is inconceivable that God would be less morally perfect than a saint.” [5]
Initial comment: This definition of moral perfection is in error. Moral perfection is not produced by ignorance of immoral choices nor is it produced by absence of ability to be tempted; moral perfection is produced by strength of character which allows one to behave morally in the face of immoral temptations. This requires knowledge of moral vs. immoral choices. So this argument is a definitional failure, having been based on a non-valid premise.
Third, a deity cannot know that he knows everything, unless he has explored the infinite reaches of space-time, which is impossible. A super-set declaring to be a complete set of all knowledge is not possible.[6]
Initial comment: The assertion that both time and space are infinite is unprovable and in the case of space, not necessarily a scientifically valid premise considering that string theory posits a wrap-back universe, perhaps toroidal in shape. In the case of time, it had a start; it is also possible that it will have a stop; there is no reason to declare infinitude as a fact. Further, to an entity with no restrictions from mass-energy and space-time, the scope of the universe, its history and its future might well be all visible – or comprehendible – all together, or as we might say, in unison. Limitations due to time-sequentiality and limitations of large distances are meaningless if there is no time or space from the vantage point.
Fourth, Martin attacks the idea that God is “completely free”. Richard Swinburn has argued that God is perfectly free. Martin defines this as freedom to do anything in the future. But, according to Martin, God cannot know in advance whether He will perform a miracle because God cannot know the future:
”God cannot know now that He will or will not intervene in some future event. Consequently, He cannot know now whether any event will occur in the future. He cannot know what the future actions of his creatures will be; he cannot know what His own future actions will be; He cannot know if any event governed by natural laws will occur, since He cannot know now if He will intervene in the natural course of events. This seems to cover all future events.”[7]Initial comment: Again this is blatantly materialist, and the non-material, extra-dimensional, time-free and space-free characteristics of a deity are completely opaque to Martin.
Fifth; Martin then attacks moral perfection:
”Given that God cannot know whether any particular future event will occur, it follows that God cannot know whether His past actions have been moral. This is because the morality of His past actions and forbearances depends in part on what will happen in the future, [long term consequences] which He cannot know.”[8]Initial comment: Once again the argument is made based on a material understanding of the deity, one that is not necessary in order to posit such an entity, and one that ignores the non-material characteristics of a being without space-time and mass-energy limitations.
Martin applies the same logic to omnipotence as well as the Problem of Evil, as well as other Atheist stumbling blocks. He makes the following comments concerning theodicies in general:
”… the continued failure of theodicies [to provide conclusive proof of the existence of a deity] provides inductive evidence that no explanation of evil is possible. Thus the failure of the theodicies considered in this chapter [Natural Evil, Ch 16], combined with the failure of other theodicies , provides inductive evidence that no adequate theodicy of natural evil is possible”.Initial comment: As he stated in his introductory comments, Martin eschews all logic except inductive logic and the idea of coherence. He fails to acknowledge any limits to the validity of inductive logic, including the inductive fallacy. He also fails to understand the limits of coherence and its inability to apply to non-temporal entities and non-simultaneous situations.
He makes another assertion in a later chapter that it is essential for theists to provide an acceptable theodicy for the Problem of Evil, or else the problem stands as a refutation of the existence of a deity. There are two insurmountable problems for this assertion: first, the only explanation that seems acceptable to Materialists is a purely Materialist explanation which would presumably explain the motivations of a deity completely constrained to within Materialist requirements and Materialist paradigms; this is a non-coherent demand. Second, there is no reason for theists or anyone else to assume that they know anything about the motivations of a deity.
The Premises
Are these basic arguments correct, despite the initial objections pointed to above? Let’s start with questioning the basic premises.
Is it necessary for the human understanding of a First Cause that the First Cause be necessarily omniscient in the sense that Martin projects? Or is Martin’s interpretation of omniscience a folklore or fable sense? As he develops his sense of the qualities of omniscience, he finally comes to this definition:
”If P is omniscient, then P would have knowledge of all facts about the world. Let us call this totality of facts Y. If P is omniscient, then P knows Y. One of the facts included in Y is that P is omniscient. But in order to know that P is omniscient, P would have to know something besides Y. P would have to know:Martin quotes Pucceti who argues that (Z) is impossible. It is declared that the deity cannot see the future, cannot see the infinite limits of space and cannot see the infinite reaches of time.
(Z) There are no facts unknown to P.”
However, the argument here is based on a Materialist viewpoint of the deity. In fact the entire system of arguments that Martin sets up is based on material limitations of a proposed deity, which are predetermined limits to the existence of a deity; these then are dogmatic limits. Claiming that the deity is time-limited is a claim for an artificial limitation which is not necessary for a conception of a deity which exists outside of space-time, having created space-time.
There is no reason to limit the concept of such a being to time-limitations such as those to which we humans are subject. Plus existing outside of time and without mass, plus not being of our universe, all these things automatically exempt the deity from the restrictions, not just of those particulars, but also from the secondaries: laws of nature, which are time and mass dependent, and laws of logic, which are based on observations of the characteristics of the laws of nature. So the very idea that a deity must be logically coherent is absurd, since the deity exists outside of the domain within which logic and coherence exist and to which domain they are restricted. An entity existing without time, outside of time, is beyond our time-bound capability to understand.
Let’s examine this further.
COHERENCE OF A DEITY
Where is God?
Where does God exist? The Materialist arguments made in this book are contingent upon a Material deity, one that is, at a minimum, bound by space-time and mass-energy, and that these limitations disallow certain “all-“ characteristics that humans allegedly attribute to a deity. But Materialism is disallowed if actual attributions to a deity are considered, including not being bound to Materialism, and not being bound to Material “truths” including, ultimately, time-based functions such as logic and coherence. Let’s pursue that.
If we assume that String Theory is originally based in sound science, that the mathematics is demonstrably and replicably sound, that the mathematicians are neither deluded nor illuded, then it is possible that the Theory is about something rather than nothing. It is possible that accurate mathematics could project through our material reality and into adjoining realities which are not apprehended materially. It is also possible that the theory is correct in positing 11 dimensions – now expanded to 26 possible dimensions, of which we occupy only three, those which we designate the three physical dimensions of space: x, y, and z.
Since the Theory posits that the extra 8 (or 23) dimensions are extra-material and in all likelihood unknowable; cannot respond to the material requirements of science (making some doubt that the theory is science on that account); and since the theory says nothing about the ability of some intelligent entity to exist in one or more of those dimensions or outside all of the dimensions in some supervisory dimension coexistent with all of ours, then it is possible to posit that such a non-material being might exist, might inhabit extra dimensions not available to material scrutiny, and that it is not in any way dependent upon the space–time continuum that binds humans. This is a coherent solution to the question (unasked here), where is God.
Logic is Time-Sequentially and Simultaneously Based
Since space-time is a prerequisite for sequential logical functions, such as cause and effect scientific propositions, which are sequential, as well as if / then logical propositions, which are simultaneous, there is no reason to believe that such logical functions or operations are valid or even necessary in dimensions outside of our space-time. Logic and coherence are resident only in our universe, and are based on the observation of the rational functioning of our universe: the behavior of mass-energy within space-time.
Since mass-energy, along with space-time, were created at the big Bang as posited and mathematically demonstrated by Hawking et al., there is no reason to believe that an entity existing outside our own dimension would be required to leave mass-energy tracks in our space-time continuum. For the same reason, there is no reason to believe that time exists in dimensions outside our own space-time continuum. Although the extra dimensions of string theory might possibly be time based, there is no reason to presume that a supervisory dimension(s) would necessarily be.
Hence, requiring an entity such as might exist in those dimensions which are not available to humans to be subject to space-time and mass-energy restrictions, as well as sequential logic, is itself not coherent, because it requires something of that entity that is not essential to that entity for its existence.
Coherence
This argument resolves to this: The existence of a creating deity cannot be understood using the artifacts of material existence, which are space-time and mass-energy. So coherence or non-coherence, being time dependent, do not apply, except to members of the x, y, z universe which are dependent upon space-time and mass-energy.
While it might be tempting to conclude from this that the deity can, in fact, be non-coherent, there is no reason to assume anything other than that the deity is either totally coherent, at least with regard to his interface with the members of this particular coherent universe, or at least partially coherent, under our standards. There is no possible driving logic that proves him totally non-coherent.
It is also possible to conclude that we can know nothing of such an entity, other than that which he chooses to reveal to us. So we cannot know how the terms, ”all-knowing, all-powerful, all-whatever” actually apply to such a being, except that we can presume that they do not presuppose any noncoherence in a potentially completely coherent being.
Conclusion
Thus, “omni-coherent” is an underlying characteristic that is ignored in Martin’s analyses. Omni-coherence is a limit to be placed on the other omni-characteristics, which are erroneously assumed to be definitive by Martin in all of his arguments.
Martin’s entire underlying thesis in this book is that undermining a [strawman, or incorrectly understood] folk-ecclesiastical viewpoint of a deity is sufficient to justify Atheism. Even such a thesis is demonstrably incorrect, since no human derived ecclesiastical viewpoint (especially a materially limited viewpoint) can be presumed to be sufficient evidence to justify knowledge of the existence of such a creating entity. [9] So destroying that ecclesiastical viewpoint is without value in justifying disbelief.
Martin declares certain personal opacities up-front, particularly his disdain for the rigors of certain logical processes. It is apparent that there are other opacities in operation, too, specifically an understanding of the science of origins and dimensions. Much of this has been developed since the book has been written. Still, the selection of obtusely defined, materially limited characteristics as the sole necessary and sufficient characters of a creating deity seems to be insufficient for any sort of argumentation in a serious debate that goes beyond theodicies and the arguments above. The arguments made resolve to the level of word thrashing rather than existential disproofs.
[1] Martin, “Atheism – A Philosophical Justification”, pg 26.
[2] Ibid, pg 476.
[3] Ibid, pg xi.
[4] Ibid, pg 288.
[5] Ibid, pg 291.
[6] Ibid, pg 297.
[7] Ibid, pg 298.
[8] Ibid, pg 299.
[9] Knowledge of meta-material factoids or truths cannot come from material sources. Other sources produce such knowledge. For example, higher mathematics can be justified materially even though its source (logical abstraction) is not material. Thus knowledge comes from logical abstraction as well as from empirical investigation. Now there is descriptive mathematics, based on physics, that describes non-material, or meta-material entities, such as parallel dimensions.
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