First let’s discuss Naturalism. Naturalism is a philosophy, a worldview, which consists of a primary concept: all that exists is material; and a secondary concept: all knowledge must be evidence based, with science and empiricism being the source of all knowledge.
Clark’s introduction to Naturalism is this:
“It’s important to acknowledge upfront that naturalism depends on taking rational, evidence-based empiricism, epitomized by science, as our way of knowing about what ultimately exists. This is the basic commitment naturalists make about knowledge, and it explains why the see the world as of a piece, not split into the natural vs. the supernatural.” [note 1]Naturalism is accepted, then, because of science; supernatural existence is not disproved, it is locked out by definition, a definition made by Naturalism, not by science. Science merely admits that it is restricted by its abilities to observe and measure, which are material limits; it does not, cannot, say that nothing exists beyond those limits. So Naturalism goes beyond the bounds of science (and logic) in its claims.
An example of Naturalism is Bertrand Russell’s famous statement:
“While it is true that science cannot decide questions of value, that is because they cannot be intellectually decided at all, and lie outside the realm of truth and falsehood. Whatever knowledge is attainable, must be attained by scientific methods; and what science cannot discover, mankind cannot know. “Ignoring Russell’s faulty understanding of truth and falsehood [note 2], both of his statements first concerning knowledge and then concerning what mankind cannot know are not scientific statements. So if his statements are true, then they also are false, classic failures of coherence. Both statements are self-refuting, paradoxes, logical failures.
Bertrand Russell; Religion and Science (1935), ch. IX: Science of Ethics.
Returning to the first two concepts of Naturalism: the first observation we can make is this: what is the evidence for either of those positions? Is there material, empirical evidence that “all existence is material”? Is there material, empirical evidence that there is no knowledge outside of the knowledge of material existence provided by empirical science? Of course not. But not to be deterred, Naturalists both make the claim and then later rescind it in order to preserve it.
The claim for full causality is fundamental to Naturalism; however, Naturalists are quick to admit that some things – although fully caused – are too complex to submit to causal analysis, so we will never understand them. This covers a lot of ground with faux determinism, things like the mind, and even portions of the free will argument. The free will denial appears to encompass the main issues of Naturalism, so I will focus on that for the remainder of this article.
Naturalists like to present a dichotomy, which they then dismantle in favor of determinism over free will, or what they present as free will.
Hume's Fork
"Either our actions are determined,
in which case we are not responsible for them,
or they are the result of random events,
in which case we are not responsible for them."
Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, quoted in "The Myth of Free Will".
The Free Will Dichotomy
The dichotomy seems to be this: fully causal (determinate) human actions, v.s. radical contra-causal freewill.
Fully causal, determinate human action is the Naturalist position, predicated on the unproven proposition that there is nothing within the universe that is not material and therefore subject to cause and effect, which in turn is a first principle and an axiomatic proposition of empirical science. Thus, nothing can exist (materially) that is not a material effect produced by a prior material cause. So, in an all-material universe, all human actions are material effects which require material causes, and therefore, all human actions are completely pre-determined by those material causes. These material causes are said to be genetic and environmental, and are inescapable since at birth we enter into an ongoing series of caused events. We are born into an unfolding pre-determined narrative, sporting a pre-determined set of causes for our behavior. A fully materially caused human action leaves no room for individual freedom to determine the action, hence free will is an illusion.
Clark says,
“There’s no causally privileged agent who could have done otherwise in the circumstances of your life as it unfolded; all your decisions, food and bad, arose without the benefit of a supernatural self that made things happen as they did. This rather startling realization, so contrary to the Western assumption that individuals can (and should) transcend their circumstances, releases us from the regret, protest, shame and guilt wrapped up in the supposition that we could have done otherwise as a situation develops”. [Note 3]As we shall see, Naturalists dither around the issue of agency within the narrative. Clark’s earlier assertion was this:
“Human persons don’t disappear under Naturalism, even though we can explain how they originate and develop. Without contra-causal freedom, we remain complex, autonomous creatures, who act for reasons and motives that are legitimately ours, not anyone else’s. You don’t stop being a locus of rational, effective behavior just because you were caused to be that way. Your will –expressed in your passions, plans, and actions – is just as strong as ever. And your thoughts and actions feed back into the further development of your character and motives, giving you a significant (but of course not contra-causal) role in shaping yourself.” [Note 4].but then again, Clark emphasizes:
”Naturalism denies that we have this sort of leverage [contra-causal] since it holds that everything about us, including our capacities for memory, enticipation, thought, deliberation and planning, ultimately comes from somewhere else via our genes or our environment or both. The moment-to-moment expression of these capacities, including our conscious thoughts and actions, and indeed our very selves in every respect, are fully caused phenomena”. [Note 5]And later he quotes B.F.Skinner:
”Nothing about the position taken in this book [‘About Behaviorism’] questions the uniqueness of each member of the human species, but the uniqueness is in the sources [genetics/environmental history]. There is no place in the scientific position for a self as a true generator or initiator of action” [Note 6]But Clark then takes this tack in order to salvage human agency despite lacking any free will:
”Even thought our actions are caused, that doesn’t mean they don’t have effects. It simply is not the case that no matter what we did, the future would have happened as it did. Without making efforts we don’t get what we want, therefore the future depends on us to a great extent. So Naturalism does not entail fatalism.” [Note 7]These quotes should be sufficient to illuminate the logic shuffling that goes on in the anti-free will world. Again, the fight against free will is couched in terms of contra-causal free will, a position no one takes. The concept of radical contra-causal freewill seems to presume that such a decision environment requires an existence where there is no intellect, no discernment, no judgment, as well as no sensory inputs, because all those things are fully materially caused, and could not be part of contra-causal free will. So an exercise of contra-causal free will would be to make a choice without either a mind or a concept of existence.
So is radical contra-causal freewill as Naturalists define it truly the thesis which is being defeated by the antithesis, which is fully causal human action? Who, exactly, has proposed such a thing? It appears that radical contra-causal free will is a straw man, irrational in its conception in order to be easily destroyed. The dichotomy as presented, is false.
The actual thesis proposal of dualism is not contra-causal free will at all. The proposal is that free will is another aspect of life, and life is not caused by the deterministic assembly of molecules, but is caused by an undetectable or at least undetected source. It is clear that assembling molecules into the exact form of a human being will not produce life in that assembly; it is for this reason that the term “life” is bent into ambiguity by those defending Naturalism, Philosophical Materialism and Atheism. Life is observable, but not material. And that cannot be, because “Naturalism is True”, remember? For the Naturalist, Naturalism is a first principle upon which everything else must depend. It’s true because it is defined as Truth. Yet even the most rabid evolutionist will agree that all life “comes only from prior life”, and is not assembled from deterministic elements, ad hoc. (Otherwise evolution is out the window).
Evolution, in fact, requires a First Life in order to maintain its position of common descent. The cause of First Life, if the cause is necessarily material, fails the empirical criteria of the principle of Cause and Effect. The failure consists of creating something deterministically that is outside and beyond the capacities and limitations of the cause. A cause is not seen, ever, to create an effect that is greater than the cause itself. But under Naturalism, a purposeful cooperative of molecules and cells is created (caused) from deterministic, non-cooperative individual molecules. This failure is a fatal failure of Naturalism. But there is more.
The naturalist approach for dealing with the Common Sense issues of free will is another logical fatality. If the individual empirical finding is that he, the individual, has the capacity to choose, has the capacity to change himself and become something beyond his genetics and environment, this Common Sense empirical understanding comes to have logical standing if it is universally held or nearly so. Thus Naturalism needs to find a way to cope with this Common Sense empirical understanding of personal agency, and resulting “personhood”. So the Naturalist claims that the illusion of free will works, but it is still an illusion under the determinism required by Naturalism, which is presumed True. So while we appear to have it, and we use it to our benefit, it does not exist. Another failure of logic.
But still another logical failure mode is this: the distinction between the fully deterministic atom and molecule, and the human “person” is made circularly: the human is a person because we can see that the human is a person. Thus there is no need to think that determinism at the molecular level necessarily forces determinism at the person level. Why not? Because we can see that it is not so; humans do make plans and accomplish goals. This is a major failure of Naturalism; the Naturalist belief system refuses to acknowledge simple empirical observations of a universal faculty which is inherent in all humans. Instead Naturalists insist that it is an illusion. Why? Because Naturalism is declared true, and free will violates Naturalism. There is no thought of rejecting Naturalism in the face of empirical facts which contradict it.
And that destroys the logic of full determinism and fully caused actions of humans. We easily can see that it is not valid.
Next, let’s examine Clark’s position on spirituality, which he attempts to co-op for Naturalism. He presents several quotes, including these:
“To understand that we are structurally no different from the rest of the cosmos is let ourselves expand into infinity”.It is clear that Naturalism is a religion, one that is to be believed despite any contradictory evidence, one that inspires awe in its believers, one that has “sacred depths” where words are meaningless yet haunting.
Chet Raymo, ”Skeptics and True Believers” [Note 8]
“The realization that I needn’t have answers to the Big Questions has served as an epiphany. I lie on my back under the stars and the unseen galaxies and I let their enormity wash over me. I assimilate the vastness of the distances, the impermanence, the fact of it all. I go all the way and then I go all the way down, to the fact of photons without mass and gauge bosons that become massless at high temperatures. I take in the abstractions about forces and symmetries and thy caress me like Gregorian chants, the meaning of the words not mattering because the words are so haunting”
Ursula Goodenough, ”The Sacred Depths of Nature”[Note 9]
And now for Progressivism as emergent from Naturalism. Clark devotes an entire chapter to Progressivism, and begins to justify it in the first paragraph of that chapter:
”Appreciating that persons are not self-made, but completely a function of environmental and genetic circumstances, lends support to humanistic, progressive and effective policies”. [Note 10]It will be no surprise then, that criminals are not responsible for their actions, because we are responsible for their defective environments. But then, on to Social Justice, wherein he remarks,
”There are no literally self-made men or women that deeply deserve their fortunes”. [Note 11]He quotes John Rawls, “A Theory of Justice”:
”It seems to be one of the fixed points of our considered judgments that no one deserves his place in the distribution of native endowments, any more than one deserves one’s initial starting place in society. The assertion that a man deserves the superior character that enables him to make the effort to cultivate his abilities is equally problematic; for his character depends in large part on the fortunate family and social circumstances for which he can claim no credit.” [Note 12]Clark summarizes thus:
”A naturalism that accepts causality will help shift the justification for having a reasonable standard of living from getting what you deserve on the basis of self-caused merit, to getting what you need to live a fulfilled, satisfying life.” [Note 13]Is there any remaining question about either the attachment of Naturalism, Philosophical Materialism, and Atheism to Progressivism and Leftism, or the siren song of classist, redistributionist, communism? And consider who it would be that would decide exactly what you deserve, and what sort of life you should lead in order to be fulfilled. Because you have no free will, it won’t be you. Naturalism is not merely misguided; it is logically wrong and if taken to its conclusion, it is dangerous.
Coming soon:
Naturalism and Personhood - who is and who is not a person; also, Morality under Naturalism, and the exceptionalism of Naturalists.
Notes:
Note 1: Clark; Encountering Naturalism; Center for Naturalism; 2007; pg 6.
Note 2: Science does not produce truth, it produces contingent factoids that are
subject to further findings to establish their degree of validity or non-validity.
Note 3: Clark: EN, pg 31.
Note 4. Clark: EN, pg 19.
Note 5. Clark: EN, pg 78.
Note 6. Clark: EN, pg 87.
Note 7. Clark: EN, pg 78/79.
Note 8. Clark: EN, pg 56.
Note 9. Clark: EN, pg 57.
Note 10. Clark: EN, pg 39.
Note 11. Clark: EN, pg 42.
Note 12. Clark: EN, pg 43.
Note 13. Clark: EN, pg 43
10 comments:
Is the blind spot that obvious?
Why yes, it is.
Good job here.
BTW--
It would seem that according to naturalism that a man would get exactly what the laws of nature (physics?) demand he gets.
I guess the idea that 'it isn't fair' is demanded by the laws too.
Ho hummm.
That is an interesting point, Sonic. In an evolutionary biological world where the fittest survive and the unfit do not, the Naturalist ethic is anti-evolutionary - punishing the fit for the benefit of the unfit. That goes against the progressivism of 100 years ago, which sought to stop the procreation of the unfit. At the time, that seemed to be the concept of what was fair for the progress of the race.
Modern Liberals and Progressives are actually neither. What they do have in common is that their philosophical ethic puts them in complete control of their inferiors.
FWIW, here is Richard Carrier in a debate presenting five arguments for metaphysical naturalism.
Less than 30 seconds into Carrier's argument, here is my reaction: In the very first sentence he sets the stage for a subjectively based, psuedo-probabilistic argument based on "evidence" which he no doubt interprets as material evidence only...
It'll take some time to read this thoroughly; we'll see how close I have come.
Yes, I'm sure there are problems with it. I just thought it a handy central location for some formal arguments for naturalism. I like formal arguments, for any viewpoint. Otherwise it's difficult to tell if something is fallacious or not.
His opponent also offers some good formal arguments for theism.
Richard Carrier on Naturalism aka Philosophical Materialism (see Martin's link, above)
(I have not yet read his opponent's position - the following comments are my own observations on Carriers opening statement)
I wrote a refutation of Carrier’s opening statement point by point. Then I realized that there is a general case refutation that should be addressed.
Carrier makes his case based on a stated presupposition: that philosophical naturalism (PN) is true. But this approach is incorrect, because it leads directly to circular reasoning. The presumption must be that naturalism is false, then prove that presumption to be incorrect. This is because PN is a subset of BT (basic theism). Carrier needs to show that the BT superset of PN does not exist, using only PN. That would be like trying to prove that the color red does not exist using only shades of green. Here’s how it goes in Carrier’s arguments:
Stated presupposition: PN is true. Carrier openly asserts this at the start. It should be asserted as P0.
Presupposed Premise P0: PN is true.
Stated premise: P1 (true IFF PN is true)
Stated premise: P2 (true IFF PN is true)
Conclusion: PN is true, because P1 and P2 are true.
But P1 and P2 are true only if PN is true; so PN must be true in order for PN to be true – circular.
Carrier cannot prove any of his premises are valid without first presupposing that philosophical naturalism is true. So his opening arguments fail, completely. I have not read beyond Carrier's opening arguments.
Carrier:
”I assert that N [Naturalism] is true and that all observed phenomena are explained by CN [Carrier’s Naturalism], and every kind of phenomenon entailed by CN is observed.[2] For the purposes of this debate, any elements of this assertion that remain unchallenged should stand.”
P1: We should believe any proposition that follows from the findings of more reliable methods over any proposition that follows from the findings of less reliable methods.
P2: CN is the only worldview that follows from the findings of the most reliable methods.
C1: Therefore, we should believe CN.
I shall assume only P2 will be challenged.”
The “most reliable” terminology and designation are certainly challengeable, as are “observed phenomena”. For example, Naturalism is not an observed phenomenon; it is a presumption based on material limitations of empirical science.
If one assumes that the most reliable methods of observation excludes mental observation, then Carrier's Naturalism is valid. But Carrier’s apparent presumption that personal mental observations are not valid cannot be the case. At rock bottom, the only reliable process we have is the judgment faculty of our own brains. We judge everything, even the credibility of empirical data, as well as abstract arguments against abstraction.
And the conditional limitation to “observed phenomena” is likely limited by Naturalists to empirical data, an irrational limitation considering that a mind is very likely not empirically observable under replicable, invariable, laboratory conditions; observing a brain does not give input on creativity of the mind, for example. Because empirical observation is automatically limited to physical entities and automatically excludes observation of non-physical entities, not because those do not exist, but because they are functionally limited to physical observations, the empirical limitation imposed by Naturalism is an unjustified presumption, neither a logical conclusion nor an empirical fact itself.
(continued)
Basic theism is a superset of empiricism. When empiricism closes in on a valid answer to a physical issue, it does not invalidate the precept that the physical law has an originating source, prior to, and able to cause the law to exist. It is a logical error to suppose that ecclesiastic adherence to bad empiricism falsifies theism, any more than current science advocates adhering to bad empiricism (or bad worldviews) falsifies Science.
Also, there is no reason to believe that empirical science provides a final truth on any subject, certainly on subjects it cannot test such as those outside space-time, mass-energy, functional constraints which limit empirical testing and observation; there is no reason to believe that such physically restricted measurements could ever detect all possible sources of knowledge, including abstract knowledge sourced by the human brain itself, much less external transcendental knowledge. Carrier’s Naturalism is unproven and unprovable, if it demands, a priori, a physical construct for all of possible reality. Because that has neither logical nor empirical basis, then N is highly likely false. From a probability standpoint then, it should not be believed.
ADI: Standard Argument from Evil. He forgot to deny Free Will, so that free will is a valid argument against ADI: P10 is false. God is not obligated to do that which he gave to humans to do: P7 is false. Nor is God obligated to operate in a fashion that is congenial (or even rational) to humans: P8 is false. In fact under evolution and Nietzsche’s explanan there can be no evil under Naturalism. So God cannot be declared evil, by using Naturalism as a basis or as a conclusion. Nor can the existence of evil be a case against the existence of a deity.
AMBD: Carrier starts by asserting the necessity of the brain for the mind. But while the brain is necessary for humans to operate in the physical arena; the brain is not SUFFICIENT to explain how or why humans operate. To assert sufficiency is to assert that cause and effect, in the case of human intellect, either (a) is non-entropic, a violation of universal law, or (b) does not apply to the human intellect. If entropy can be violated, it is not a universal law. A universe without entropy would be far different from the universe we observe: there are no non-lossy machines. So intellect is not explained by cause and effect, and is outside the purview of Naturalism. Since intellect exists, then Naturalism is false.
And the human intellect is either (a) an expectation of physics, and mass/energy, or (b) it is not explained by physics, and mass/energy. But intellect is not an expectation of mass/energy, so intellect must be outside the purview of physics, and mass/energy.
Moreover, there is no reason to expect a deity to obey the same moral code given to guide physical humans [1]; there is no reason to expect any mind to operate perfectly correctly per Carrier’s speculation; there is no reason to expect that a deity would want to bestow humans with a completely brainless mind, especially given the physical arena available to humans; and there is no reason to speculate on what most Christians would choose, if they could (Atheists do this a lot, and demonstrate thereby that they do not understand the basis for theism, which is not based on what Christians would choose or would choose to believe; in fact, theism is not logically tautological with Christianity); thus P14 through P20 are false, rendering C7 false.
ACA: Carrier immediately asserts “facts” that he cannot possibly know. Only something like 6% of the universe is observable, and that in highly granular lack of detail. Also, life is not necessarily restricted to any of our particular limitations; it is not even necessary for life to be carbon based. And he immediately goes to subjective probabilities based on created “facts” (I knew it would show up somewhere).
P21 is circular: A is true because of B; B is true because of A – where A = we exist; B = we observe A. He ignores the many-universes theory which applies here, and manages to attribute it to P22.
P22 is actually a statement of the many-universes theory, and it is a mistake to attribute that to theism which does not need it; yet the many-universes theory gives a 100% chance of our existence. So this is a beginner’s mistake, giving theism 100 % probability. Ooops.
ANL:
This argument is incorrect because it front loads a bad assumption. It is assumed that the deity, being non-material, is therefore located no-where, when it is more valid to think of the deity existing everywhere, and moreover, existing “everytime” meaning existing without time but all times accessible to him. Because this is outside space-time and mass-energy, it is so counter-intuitive to physicalists that they don’t seem to grasp it without assistance.
APM:
The necessity of the brain for the physical interface of mind to matter is again mistaken as SUFFICIENT for a mind. It is not sufficient. While I usually avoid analogies, the computer analogy seems appropriate and without any logic failure in this case: Just as a physical computer is a necessary platform for wireless connection with the massive internet as well as physical inputs from keyboard, mouse, dataloggers, etc, yet it requires software, a non-physical presence, in order to function both materially and non-materially; so it is possible to conceive of the brain as a necessary physical platform for the non-physical mind, connected with both transcendental input as well as physical input from sensory organs.
There is only one reason to declare the brain as SUFFICIENT for the mind: a dogmatic adherence to the unproven and unprovable tenet that there is no dimension beyond our sensory dimensions. In other words, a built-in presupposition that Philosophical Naturalism is true.
Notes:
[1] Moral and ethical principles are based on action-consequence, a subset of cause and effect. Since a deity necessarily exists outside of our mass-energy, space-time universe – having created it – then the deity exists in dimensions that do not necessarily have cause and effect principles in effect. What that does to the necessity of moral action-consequence principles we can only speculate; but the necessity is not a given and cannot be used as a valid premise.
Also, moral principles did not arrive on the scene with the first humans, even according to Judeo-Christian tradition. So moral principles are not a constant feature of theism, and therefore, using moral principles to define God does not follow from theism, and cannot be used as valid premises.
Whew! It'll take me awhile to absorb all that!
But yes, I fully agree the naturalism has flaws.
When was TIME explained scientifically?
I'm pretty sure the problems presented in the book "About Time" by Paul Davies still exist...(Certainly Einstein considered that the 'now' might be outside of science to explain).
This would invalidate his opening premise...
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