”The first segment of the video shows Dawkins addressing someone in the audience who had just told him that his belief in god is no delusion, to which Dawkins replies: “If you had been born in India, I dare say you would be saying the same thing about Lord Krishna and Lord Shiva; if you had been born in Afghanistan I dare say you would be saying the same thing about Allah.” And so on, you get the gist. (The “I dare say” is just as annoying as Craig’s “Surely,” but we’ll let it pass.)
Forward to time stamp 0:37 and you see Craig appearing on the screen, eloquently explaining to us that Dawkins just committed the genetic fallacy, dismissing belief in god because of the way it comes about (i.e., because of its origin). Of course, Dawkins does no such thing, and Craig lands himself straight in the mud of really really bad reasoning.”
Let's be clear. What Dawkins has said is that the person's assertion of the existence of God is due to where the person comes from, that the origin of the hypothesis is due to his heritage. If the person had different heritage, then he would have posed different religious hypotheses due to that difference in his heritage. This is an attack not on the validity of the hypothesis, but on the source / origin.
Massimo continues,
”First, let’s see what the genetic fallacy actually is. The Fallacy Files, an excellent resource on all matters fallacious, classifies it under “informal fallacies” (bear this in mind, it’s important), and particularly as a sub-class of Red Herring, related to the Straw Man and Bandwagon fallacies. The site defines the genetic fallacy as “the most general fallacy of irrelevancy involving the origins or history of an idea. It is fallacious to either endorse or condemn an idea based on its past — rather than on its present — merits or demerits.”
Craig is therefore claiming that Dawkins is dismissing the idea of god just because the guy in the audience believes in a particular god as a result of happenstance (i.e., the fact that he was born at a particular time in a particular place). But a first rule in philosophy (as opposed to sophistry) is that one always interprets an opponent’s argument in the most charitable way, to avoid setting up straw men. Had Craig followed this basic rule of intellectually honest discourse he would have acknowledged that Dawkins’ point was simply to show the arbitrariness of specific religious beliefs. Even if gods exist, it should give one pause that people fervently believe in their own “true” god simply because of an historical accident.”
The “charity rule” invocation is merely an attempt to redefine what it is that Dawkins said and meant, in order to salvage the statement from its obvious fallacy failure. Dawkins did not mean to imply, “if gods exist”. Nor did he mean the “arbitrariness of specific religions”, Dawkins meant that all religions are arbitrary by association. Dawkins was using the other religions in an attempt to sully the original God being discussed: Fallacy of Guilt By Association, and the Genetic Fallacy are both in play.
Now even if Dawkins actually had meant to attack the arbitrariness of specific religions, that would have been way off topic and not addressing the issue at hand: whether the person is justified in his belief. To be charitable to Dawkins we should assume that he at least was discussing the issue at hand; otherwise his reply is absurd, rather than merely false.
But Massimo makes the following amazing statement:
”But in fact, this isn’t all there is to the genetic fallacy. The Fallacy Files adds an important caveat to the definition, often neglected by sophists: “unless its past in some way affects its present value.” In other words, there are situations where invoking the origin of an idea or belief is actually pertinent to the discussion, and does not constitute a fallacy at all. This sort of qualification is what makes the genetic (and many, many other fallacies) an informal fallacy, as opposed to formal ones, where there are no qualifications and the reasoning is always bad (an example is affirming the consequent: If p then q. q. Therefore, p — there ain’t no saving this one).”
And how does this revelation pertain to the question at hand? Massimo does not even claim that it does; the entire paragraph has no value or meaning to Craig’s claim.
“unless its past in some way affects its present value.”Exactly why is this caveat to the Genetic Fallacy pertinent here? How does it relate? It is not, and it does not. The entire paragraph is a Red Herring, expressed by Massimo here:
” In other words, there are situations where invoking the origin of an idea or belief is actually pertinent to the discussion, and does not constitute a fallacy at all.”But of course this is not one of those situations.
Finally, Pigliucci makes the following claim:
” But in that case he [Craig] would run straight into a contradiction, because he is now saying that it’s okay for him to be “inclined” to believe that the (actually non existent) hardwired belief in god is the result of god’s will, but is denying Dawkins’ the complementary move of dismissing a belief on the grounds of its (cultural) origin.”
The idea of a possible “God Spot” in the brain has resulted from several studies, which Pigliucci either is not aware of, or is denying out of disingenuousness. The contradiction which he claims that Craig has encountered is that Craig claims an inclination to believe that the source of the possible God Spot is God, yet he denies that Dawkins can refute the God hypothesis based on its origin alone.
Let's take a look at these two arguments:
Craig: inclined to believe that a possible God Spot as being sourced by God.
If P then Q
P;
Q.
P> God Spot might exist;
Q> possibly God.
Full statement:
If the God Spot might exist, then possibly God exists;
The God Spot might exist;
Therefore possibly God exists.
This is not a statement with a truth value, it is a statement of possible truth values, not definite.
Dawkins: denies the God hypothesis based on its source.
Interpretation A:
If L then M;
L;
M.
L> Your claim depends entirely upon your origin in a certain location;
M> it is false.
Full Statement:
If your claim depends entirely upon your origin in a certain location, Then it is false; (this is the Genetic Fallacy)
Your claim does depend entirely upon your origin in a certain location;
Therefore, it is false.
Interpretation B:
If L then M;
L;
M.
L> if there are competing religions,
M> all religions are false and there is no God.
Full statement:
If there are competing religions, then all religions are false and there is no God; (this is the Guilt by Association Fallacy)
There are competing religions;
Therefore there is no God.
Dawkins statement is fallacious either way, so it cannot contradict any other statement.
Another way to demonstrate the Guilt By Association Fallacy is this:
“If there are ideas competing with your idea, then some must be false; there are ideas competing with your idea; therefore your idea is false.”
What has happened here is that Pigliucci has ridden roughshod over the actual statements made by both Craig and Dawkins, failing to extend the courtesy of charitable interpretation to Craig, while misusing it to extend an advantageous but false interpretation to Dawkins. That’s what seems to happen in the world of intellectuals possessed of a dogma which doesn’t contain absolutes.
Pigliucci brags that he “wiped the floor with Craig’s ass, repeatedly,” in a second debate. And later on he criticizes Craig’s choice of ties. I don’t think I’ll be needing his judgment on any of these issues.
33 comments:
The "Scandal of Particularity" is a big stumbling block for many folks.
Two questions. Are the criticisms of religious exclusivism totally without merit? Is atheism the only legitimate position for those who reject religious exclusivism?
I posted a comment on "rationally" speaking. Now watch as commenters desperately cling to their faulty reasoning.
”The "Scandal of Particularity" is a big stumbling block for many folks.
Two questions. Are the criticisms of religious exclusivism totally without merit? Is atheism the only legitimate position for those who reject religious exclusivism?”
None of the following is intended to be a Theodicy or proof of God; it is intended to examine concepts in terms of coherence only.
If coherence is the standard, and the posit is for a single deity, with sufficient power, intentionality and intelligence to create the universe, then that deity also could be coherently posited to have the capacity to meddle in it according to his own wishes and purposes.
Some Christian Theologists have posited that Melchizedek of the Old Testament was at least one other incarnation of God/Jesus. The Bible traces only one population but refers to other populations existing on the earth. I do not see any non-coherence in the idea that God/Jesus/Melchizedek might have appeared in other populations. However, it would not be coherent to think that God/Jesus/Melchizedek would have described a different sort of godhead than the one Jesus described. It also would not be non-coherent to have other populations stray from the unary deity, as did the Hebrews.
The idea that “I am truth” reflects the concept that coherence itself is a result of the creation made by the deity. The idea that “I am the way” reflects that looking for truth without dogma is the way to understand that which can be understood of the deity and the creation by the deity. From a logic point of view it seems to boil down to whether one accepts that there is truth, and that the truth is in and from a single or unary deity, vs. rejecting the deity and truth.
It seems coherent then, not to restrict with exclusivity, with the understanding that the unary deity be involved in any other possible occurrences, and not idols, the creation itself, etc.
This is in no way an accepted Theological truth, it is merely a personal viewpoint.
Unbelievable. I'm listening to the Pigliucci debate where he supposedly "won": here
????
Typical example:
Craig offers a modus ponens moral argument:
1. If not-X, then not-Y
2. Y
3. Therefore, X
It is impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion false, so the only thing in question is if both premises are true or false. Massimo should be presenting arguments that at least one premise is false.
Instead, we get:
"Slavery in the OT! God is mean! Insects! Look over there! A bird! A plane!"
?????
How is it possible for someone to have a doctorate in philosophy and not know how deductive logic works??!!!
How is this even POSSIBLE??!!!
HELLO?!!!
Martin,
Yup.
Plus he is thought qualified to teach thinking to other unsuspecting victims of ideology.
And of course he is a Public Intellectual, self-tasked with telling the rest of us his "truths".
One can see why he keeps comment moderation on full time...
Martin,
The next guy up at Massimo's "refutes" your comment by asserting the Genetic Fallacy in different words... Go Git 'im.
Eh, the flow there isn't good. Pigliucci has to moderate the comments and its too slow. The delay makes conversation difficult.
Stan/Martin,
Digression.
There's something that has puzzled me for a while, and I'm sure one of you could shed some light on this one.
Evolution and theism/deism. Are they really compatible?
Simply stated, evolution explains the appearance of humanity via chance and necessity- right?
Kind of like a cosmic slot machine. So..... Does it make sense to posit a chance mechanism with an intended result?
I suspect I may be Duns Scotus on this matter. (Irony- sharp guy) But that's how hits the pavement for me.
Chris,
See Aquinas' Fifth Way.
If final causes exist in nature, as Aquinas suggests, then it seems to completely forgo any need for intelligent design or even theistic evolution. The design is so inherent in nature that both atheists and theists miss it, if Aquinas is correct.
Thanx.
I'm off to Aquinas' Fifth Way.
Martin,
I tried posting something B4. I guess there was an engine failure. Fine, more to the point then.
OK, please forgive my denseness.
Aren't final causes defined by purposes?
Is the implication then that nature itself is conscious? (intentional)
"Aren't final causes defined by purposes? Is the implication then that nature itself is conscious? (intentional)"
The idea is the regularity. The moon always has the final cause of circling the Earth, as opposed to occasionally taking a jaunt around Venus and then the sun.
It's so inherent and you are such a part of it, that you probably don't even think about it. But the induction problem shows how there really is not justification for this regularity.
But nature is unconscious.
So, per the Fifth Way, there must be something else directing these things to have the regularity they do.
I hope you watched my video.
Martin,
I watched again. Btw, your videos are excellent! Clear and concise.
"...something else directing.."
OK, call me Chris Thick-Skulled.
Doesn't the Theory of Evolution, by defintion dismiss final causes? To the evolutionist, isn't the regularity in nature simply a brute fact?
To say otherwise; to suggest direction, is to reject evolution.
No?
My obtuseness persists?
Evolution only states that complex life is the result of blind forces of nature.
But, if final causes exist, then all they are doing is moving the problem back a step ("See? Nobody designed this bread. It came from this here breadmaker!").
Why are there even such things as random mutation and natural selection in the first place? Chemicals that can reproduce, forces that can act on them, time and space to allow it to happen, etc.
So if Aquinas is correct, then the regularity of these laws points toward an intelligence that directs them.
Martin,
Bear with me.
"...Blind forces..." and
"...intelligence that directs..."
Right. How are these compatible?
It is precisely because the forces of nature are blind, that they imply an intelligence directing them.
Let's say you see some bulldozers and cranes making buildings. And let's say that there isn't anybody inside of them (unbeknownst to you they are remote controlled). You notice that these vehicles are always "directed" towards the "end" or "goal" of making buildings, and never glaciers or mountains.
The vehicles are empty; they have no brains. So how do the cranes and bulldozers "know" to always make buildings and never mountains or glaciers? So you infer that someone must be controlling them somehow, from outside.
That's the idea. Nothing unconscious can direct towards an end goal without intelligent control. The forces of nature are unconscious. Therefore, there must be an external intelligence directing them towards their endgoals.
I know that I'm starting to sound like a broken record.
Your patience is appreciated.
"Evolution only states that complex life is the result of the blind forces of nature."
"It is precisely because the forces of nature are blind, that they imply an intelligence...."
In which case, the forces of nature are not really "blind", right?
As I understand it, the evolutionist defines "blind" as without final causes; that is accidental(not designed). The laws of nature represents the "necessity" - the regularity.
But here is the sticky point. To the Darwinian, the regularity is simply a brute fact- not a design or an intention, but a given. That's the point. Isn't that precisely what defines Evolution?
And beyond that, isn't that what the naturalist says about it all? It's "all" simply a brute fact. Something has "emerged" from nothing. Intention/intelligence has "emerged" from non-intention and non-intelligence. Isn't Evolution the representative par excellence of this notion?
So....Is Evolution really compatible with Theism/Deism?
>To the Darwinian, the regularity is simply a brute fact- not a design or an intention
This is assuming that final causes do not exist. If they do, then it seems that evolution is not a problem for theism; if they don't, then perhaps it is.
I'm getting all this from Ed Feser, whose book I highly recommend: The Last Superstition.
His contention is that final causes and formal causes were abandoned during the Renaissance due to ideological reasons, not philosophical ones. Leaving only efficient and material causes, and thus a "mechanistic" universe
which operates by blind forces.
This is reflected in Hume, who suggests that a brick is usually followed by the breaking of the window, but there is no necessary connection between the two and it is just because our minds associate them that we think there is. I.e., no final causes.
This "mechanistic" universe is then accepted by modern Intelligent Design proponents, who then have to try to make God into a half-deist tinkerer; the universe operates by blind forces but occasionally God has to step in to give it a push in the right direction. Feser thinks this is conceding too much to the materialists.
So bringing back final causes would make God back into what he is supposed to be: a theistic, not deistic, force which sustains and is behind everything. And evolution would then not seem to be a problem, as complex life is the final cause of natural selection + random mutation.
I can see the appeal of Thomism; it does seem to simplify and unify a lot of issues as far as theism is concerned.
Martin,
Thanks for the book suggestion.
I'm still not clear on Thomism. I'm getting the feeling that many folks, including career philosophers, don't really get Aquinas.
"This is assuming that final causes do not exist." There we have it. Doesn't the whole matter hinge on that!
Final causes=Theism/Deism.
"And evolution would then not seem to be a problem, as complex life is the final cause of natural selection and random mutation."
But, in that case, there'd be nothing "natural"(supernaturally directed) about natural selection and/or perhaps "random" about random mutation.
"But, in that case, there'd be nothing "natural"(supernaturally directed) about natural selection and/or perhaps "random" about random mutation."
I'm only an amateur at Thomism, but from my understanding there isn't really any such thing as "supernatural" on this view. There is only God, and his creation which is like music he is continually playing. He stops playing, and the creation stops as well. Thus, on this view, "supernatural" events like miracles would not be God breaking in to his (otherwise deistic) creation to alter the rules of nature once in awhile, but more like a musician playing a trill or a little jazzy departure from the main melody.
I think the idea is that the "supernatural" idea only comes into play when you try to mix a mechanistic philosophy (lacking final causes) with theism; you then need to posit God breaking in once in awhile to alter the rules of his deistic creation.
" There is only God, and his creation which is like music he is continually playing."
So, in the Thomist view, what we have is a kind of "supernatural" naturalism"?
The Divine is "creating" his creation always; you might say "suspending" it. Isn't that more of an Islamic perspective?
"Isn't that more of an Islamic perspective?"
It is what it is. Aquinas intended to show that a) theism, and not just deism is true, and that b) it can be shown to be true regardless of whether the universe is infinitely old or not.
So, to bring this thread full circle. My original question was "Is theism and evolution compatible?"
Truth is, I'm still puzzled and my needle is still "skipping" on this record. If you can deal with this repetition- gratitude.
Is the following true? Evolution is an account for the appearance of intelligent life that can do without a God (designer). On this view, Humanity is not a final cause at all, but the result of a blind non-directed process that is strictly chance and necessity.
If theism is to be made compatible with evolution, then final causes have to re-admitted. If that is allowable, then are we still talking about evolution?
If the answer is yes, and we can have evolution with or without final causes , what is the fundamental difference between the two?
I suspect the theist would say that the "necessity" of regularity that we see in nature isn't really a necessity at all.
"How do the cranes and bulldozers know to always make buildings and never mountains or glaciers."
This is the problem of induction. On this view, the phrase "blind nature" (undirected) is something of a misnomer. Regularity=design.
So... back to the original question. Are final causes and evolution mutually exclusive ideas?
I suppose that depends on how we define our terms.
The idea is that if final causes did not exist, then there would be no regularity and no ability for evolution to work at all. If final causes did not exist, then, like Hume suggests, when you throw the brick at the window sometimes it might turn into a canary instead of breaking the window.
If this were the case, then evolution could not operate at all in the first place.
Final causes = regularity = evolution.
No final causes = no regularity = no evolution.
OK. My dullness on this matter has been overcome.
No final causes=no regularity=no evolution.
You'd think then that theists would be the biggest proponents of evolution.
Evolution being further support for theism, not an alternative to theism.
Oh,
Is there a difference between theistic evolution and intelligent design?
"You'd think then that theists would be the biggest proponents of evolution."
Well, there are basically two types of theistic philosophies. One is the classical theism of Thomism, where God is sovereign over everything and the sustainer of all existence at all times.
The other is "personal" theism, where God is more of a superhuman in a mechanistic universe, where the universe would technically run without him and only requires his occasional intervention.
If you read Feser, he argues that the latter is conceding too much to materialists.
So who knows?
Either way, I find it all interesting.
Martin,
I, too, find it all interesting.
I was reading through some of your earlier exchanges with Stan.
Also, interesting. I'm curious, what's your position today?
I'm agnostic. 50/50. The strength of the theistic arguments is offset by the way the universe strikes me as empty; that there's nobody out there.
However, after learning a bit about logic and reason, I'm coming more and more to at least agree with Stan about the intellectual bankruptcy of atheism, at least as it is in its modern form. I think it would have been harder (though not impossible) to say that in the days of J.L. Mackie and A.J. Ayer. It's definitely at a low point right now.
@Martin
I have some questions for you. :)
- How is ID opposed to final cause argument ? The way i see it, both are proving teleological cause. ID uses complexity to base their argument while final cause uses the regularity/direction/"laws" as a base.
- Is final cause the equivalent of teleological cause ? Does final cause rationally "necessitate" conscious (as opposed to blind cause) ?
- Do directions rationally necessitate a final cause ? What if the direction is just like time ? Just because present comes after past, does it necessitate that present is a final cause ?
- Is it rationally impossible that blind cause can be a directed cause ? What if there is a blind cause "B" that keeps blind cause "A" in a direction/limit ?
- Is existence of regularity/direction in nature a fact ? What if someone points out the randomness in quantum nature ?
- Is "direction" in nature different from "order" in nature ? Is order/pattern in nature apparently the equivalent of final cause/direction observed in nature ?
- Can randomness produce a pattern/order ?
- How can the final cause argument be applied in debunking random evolution ? Mutation and natural selection in principle does not need a direction. To them mutation is a random process. While natural selection is a tautology ("species with ability to survive will survive"). I'm looking for a scenario where Darwinian evolutionary model necessitates a final cause.
Maybe the "less evolved -> More evolved" direction can be argued upon, but yet, the atheist need not hang onto such a direction to keep the theory alive.
Ibn,
I am not a professional Thomist, and so I will have a hard time answering your questions. Not to mention, real life calls and I don't have time to do write long comments. Everything I know I learned from Ed Feser, and so I would HIGHLY recommend you read his book The Last Superstition.
Ibn,
If you do a search on "Thomism discussion", several discussion groups will show up. Perhaps your questions can be entertained there.
The renowned Aquinas scholar Etienne Gilson remarked that GK Chesterton's short work "The Dumb Ox" was the most penetrating book on Thomas ever written. We'll see.
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