In electrical circuits, ground is the point of reference for the voltages of the rest of the nodes in the circuit. It is the one point in the circuit which has a known, established voltage: zero volts. The absolute voltage of any circuit node is determined by measuring its voltage with respect to ground. For different circuit stages to work deterministically with each other, they need a common ground, a conductor with low impedance so that the physical voltage on the ground conductor remains as close to zero as possible. With a good common ground, circuits can be made to interface with each other.
If the grounds between stages of circuitry (systems) are not common, i.e. the voltages between the grounds for each stage is not zero, then it is not possible to know how one circuit relates to the next, and failure is guaranteed.
Any electrical designer who ignores his grounds is in for a heap o’learning.
Now let’s consider philosophers. Many philosophers like to say that philosophy is the rational analysis of arguments. Or some variation on that. Supposedly an argument is made, say that,
“If P is true, then Q is true;
P is in fact true;
therefore Q is true”.
So far so good… except is P really, in fact, true?
In order to know if P is true (to support the contention that Q is true), we need another argument:
”If N is true, then P is true;
N is in fact true;
therefore P is true”.
But is N really, in fact true? We must find yet another argument to support N, and so it goes. It could go on forever, in an infinite regression of arguments which never reaches a known “true” by self-evidence, or by definition, or by some other form of unquestionable authority.
Or perhaps the argument chain actually turns around and refers to the original argument as a source of support. This is self-referential, and it, too, never terminates in a known “true” by self-evidence, or by definition, or by some other form of unquestionable authority.
The third possibility is that the chain of arguments does in fact terminate in a statement which is a known Truth. This terminating statement is a “ground”, or an absolute axiom which supports the argument which refers to it. So if the chain of arguments which terminates in such a ground is valid at all points, i.e. the logical format is correct, then the original argument can be known to be correct. And this is the only option of the three possibilities which contains that knowledge; the infinite regress and the circular arguments cannot produce knowledge.
Interestingly, Philosophers in general reject the existence of grounding Truths. So where does that leave the truth value of their declarations? Without some sort of inflexible guiding principle, some veridical axiom, some inviolable, incorrigible, external ground, all thoughts become relative, floating in a tide of unknown and unknowable, non-existent truth.
The result is an attempt to create a truth out of nothing, ex nihilo, just by thinking really hard about it.
DESTRUCTION of REALITY
Bertrand Russell concluded that there is no way to refute hard Skepticism, that which denies that reality exists. (Brain in a vat, etc.) He also said that he wished that all those who deny reality would get into their automobiles, drive straight into a tree, and then defend their Skepticism.
But the intellectual attempt to destroy reality is based on the need to eliminate the concept of grounding. Hence the theories that consciousness doesn’t exist, that “self” doesn’t exist, that agency doesn’t exist, etc. Materialist reductionism is absolutely necessary if the physical limit on existence is to be maintained. And the physical limit is to be maintained at all cost – no non-physical existence can be allowed a foot in the door. That would destroy the ideology.
So the ground for Philosophical Materialism is just this:
” There is NO non-physical existence, period”.
How does this statement stand up as an absolute ground for every and all arguments? Is there evidence for this statement? Is it incorrigibly self-evident? How about its corollary:
All things are physical and therefore are subject to Cause and Effect.
Is there evidence for this statement? Is it incorrigibly self-evident?
These are not observed facts, they are desired outcomes which are desired in order to protect an ideology which requires them to be true. Under these “principles” it is necessary to declare and somehow prove that certain non-physical things are, in fact, physical. Or failing proof, to claim that they do not even exist, being illusions or delusions.
Here we have the case where the grounds of Philosophers do not match the grounds of logicians: the First Principles. (While philosophers might claim to be logicians, they abandon logic immediately when it contradicts their ideologies).
Taking the first Materialist ground, ” There is NO non-physical existence, period”, this statement is a proposed principle, a supposed axiom. Principles do not physically exist in nature; they are intellectual constructs, created to demonstrate a proposed universal truth. So the statement itself is not physical. And its meaning is not physical. If the statement has any meaning at all, then it contradicts itself, and thereby runs afoul of the First Principles of Logic and Rational Thought, specifically the Principle of Non-Contradiction.
So at this point one must choose (or walk away befuddled) between the Materialist ground or the Logician’s ground.
Or try desperately to prove that a principle is either a physical object or doesn’t exist at all, that meaning is either a physical object or doesn’t exist at all, or some other obfuscation to try to eliminate the obvious conflict.
The gulf is even wider between those who declare ethical standards for us, and those who want grounded moral standards. As the great Arthur A. Leff pointed out, an impeccable ethical standard requires an ethical standard giver who is beyond reproach, beyond question, perfectly ethically impeccable in every way. When a philosopher declares an ethic, Leff points out that the proper response is, “Sez Who? Who sez so, and who are you to say so? What exactly gives you the right to determine any ‘standards’ for me?”
If there is no human who can be shown to be unquestionably morally impeccable, then there is no Ground for any human-declared ethic. What we must have for an impeccable, unquestionable ethic is a “Grand Sez Who”. Otherwise, ethical posturings are merely the ungrounded opinions of certain humans regarding how they think the rest of us should behave.
It is the lack of grounding in philosophical and ethical thought which destroys the value of philosopher’s maunderings. If all philosophical arguments are infinite regresses or circular, or in the case of ethics - just opinions, then they are totally without truth value. But because of the perceived eliteness of these “thinkers”, their output is given far too much value in the popular culture. Untethered thinking leads to nihilism and hedonism, a fact demonstrable in our current culture. Lacking grounding is dangerous.
I remember the first television attack on moral grounding, the sit-com “All in the Family”. Liberal notions were given logical, loving overtones while grounded ethical notions were depicted as hateful, bigoted and stupid. The first ungrounded movie was “Water Hole #3”, a western comedy which had no good guys, only bad guys and worse guys. It was funny in a guiltless, amoral sort of way. (note 2) After that movie, the white hats were portrayed as stupid bigots or not at all.
During the ‘70’s, the boomers became the Me Generation, grounded only in themselves and nothing else. The national currency was completely ungrounded by the final removal of reference to gold by Nixon (started under FDR). Easy credit was the ungrounding of spending based on income and actual net worth. The "dot.com" bubble was the ungrounding of value based on actual profit. The housing bubble was the ungrounding of mortgage approval based on income and ability to repay. The list of ungroundings goes on and on, and it is not positive.
The final ungrounding is the loss of rational thought, which is replaced by rationalized thinking. Untethered thought leads straight to Nietzsche’s Anti-rationality, whether it is recognized or not. Anti-rationality leads to emotionalism, the “I want” which is displayed in Materialist and Leftist mantras. And that’s where we are now. “I want this to be true, so it is true… for me”.
Addendum
The ungrounding of the meanings of words is a recent phenomenon, useful in defending irrational ideology. Or is it new:
'When I use a word,' Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, 'it means just what I choose it to mean — neither more nor less.'
'The question is,' said Alice, 'whether you can make words mean so many different things.'
'The question is,' said Humpty Dumpty, 'which is to be master — that's all.'
Lewis Carroll
Notes
1. Or evolutionary biologists or some cosmologists.
2. For example, a farm girl is raped and likes it so much that she follows her rapist around for the rest of the movie, begging for more.
26 comments:
Stan,
Enjoyable post, especially the last few paragraphs.
However...
”There is NO non-physical existence, period”, this statement is a proposed principle, a supposed axiom. Principles do not physically exist in nature; they are intellectual constructs,
But is this principle/axiom not derived from observing the physical, making hypotheses about reality on its basis, and then making experiments - or further observations - which then further confirm said hypotheses?
And does the statement or the thought behind it not exist in the physical reality of the brain in the form of chemical activity, blood flow to a certain area dealing with this question, synapses, etc?
And as writing, does it not exist on the physical page, or the electrons in a computer and their effect on liquid crystal in monitors?
Indeed, if the statement had no physical reality to it how could it be transmitted to others to review? How could it, in fact, exist?
If there is no human who can be shown to be unquestionably morally impeccable, then there is no Ground for any human-declared ethic.
No, not one human, but what about humanS? Cannot a sound human-declared ethic be arrived at by the discussion, debate, and mere use of reason - not authority - by a group of humans, many humans? Over time? The a-million-people-can't-be-wrong approach to discovering truth?
Is this not far sounder and more solid than an ethics arbitrarily handed down by a higher authority, often containing ideas quite at odds with daily life (ancient and modern) and indeed common sense which then scholars and thinkers have to use all means of rationales and tricks to somehow sheohorn them into how they might apply to our lives?
And what of the marked differences in the ethics that have been handed down by this authority as evidenced in the sacred texts of, say, the Abrahamic religions? In some, porc is banned, in another not. In one, alcohol is banned, the others not. In each, the concept and understanding of the deity is quite markedly different. If they cannot agree amongst each other on the nature of God then what hope is there for a grounded ethics?
There seems to be none (grounded ethics, that is), aside from the most basic ones of belief in, worship of, and sacrifice for the deity, and, respect for life, respect for others (so long as they're adherents of your religion, of course), not cheating, not lying, not stealing, no adultery (especially if you're a woman), etc.
I suppose these last may constitute a ground in ethics but it's pretty broad and general, and the differences between the religions are sometimes just as large as the commonalities. For the rest, the things that are not addressed in the sacred texts, we're on our own, or subject to the interpretations and very human weaknesses of religious legal scholars and the like. Again, not very grounded.
Just had to write down the possible objections that came to mind. If it rambles a bit or seems fuzzy, I trust you'll get the gist of it. These cannot be new arguments, I'm sure.
”But is this principle/axiom not derived from observing the physical, making hypotheses about reality on its basis, and then making experiments - or further observations - which then further confirm said hypotheses?”
There is no physical experiment which can disprove non-physical existence. Testing in category A cannot determine whether category B exists or does not exist.
”And does the statement or the thought behind it not exist in the physical reality of the brain in the form of chemical activity, blood flow to a certain area dealing with this question, synapses, etc?
And as writing, does it not exist on the physical page, or the electrons in a computer and their effect on liquid crystal in monitors?
Indeed, if the statement had no physical reality to it how could it be transmitted to others to review? How could it, in fact, exist?”
A statement might exist in many physical forms while being transmitted from one individual to another. The meaning however, is contained only in the minds of the transmitting individual and the receiving individual who interprets the symbols. Symbols without meaning are… well, meaningless. And the bits, the ones and zeros which transmit this message, they exist as voltages or magnetic polarities until they are interpreted and meaning is given to them.
I remember a commenter at another blog who claimed to have a jar full of Meaning on his desk. I think he wanted to sell it.
If meaning were a physical lump which we could pick up and hand to someone, then even our faculty for extracting meaning would be meaningless, because meaning could be installed, rather than learned.
”The a-million-people-can't-be-wrong approach to discovering truth?”
The idea of immutable truth is that it is impervious to what anybody thinks about it, says about, or votes about it. The “voting method” of ethical determination is subject to the “tyranny of the majority” problem, which leads to slavery, or to the decay of cultures through entitlements, and so on.
”Is this not far sounder and more solid than an ethics arbitrarily handed down by a higher authority, often containing ideas quite at odds with daily life (ancient and modern) and indeed common sense which then scholars and thinkers have to use all means of rationales and tricks to somehow sheohorn them into how they might apply to our lives?”
If you are referring to Judeo-Christian ethics, it is divided into apodictic and casuistic types, with the ten commandments being the apodictic ethic. Which means that the eternal ethical principles are the ten commandments; the remaining laws were specific to a given culture. The ten commandments range from relationship with a creator, to personal behavior, then to relationships to others. This was later summarized as “Love up” and “Love around” by Jesus.
It is not necessary to shoehorn any ethic into the behaviors of a society; in fact that is contrary to the presumed universal nature of an ethic. Shoehorning an “ethic” into existing behaviors is merely approving of whatever behaviors happen to be exhibited at the moment. The main objections to the ten commandments are that a) they refer to absolutes which are anathema to self-worshippers, and b) they demand behaviors which are uncomfortable to hedonists.
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(continued from above)
”And what of the marked differences in the ethics that have been handed down by this authority as evidenced in the sacred texts of, say, the Abrahamic religions? In some, porc is banned, in another not. In one, alcohol is banned, the others not. In each, the concept and understanding of the deity is quite markedly different. If they cannot agree amongst each other on the nature of God then what hope is there for a grounded ethics?”
The change in casuistic rules says nothing about the existence of a creator, nor about his consistency in dealing with his creations. Some pots crack in the furnace and are destroyed by the potter. Other pots need special care depending on their construction.
The universal grounding of ethics remains constant. The specifics of a culture’s needs might change, but the universality of the concepts in the ten commandments remains… even though the dimension of a creator is denied and the hedonist culture hates the remaining restrictions.
”There seems to be none (grounded ethics, that is), aside from the most basic ones of belief in, worship of, and sacrifice for the deity, and, respect for life, respect for others (so long as they're adherents of your religion, of course), not cheating, not lying, not stealing, no adultery (especially if you're a woman), etc.
I suppose these last may constitute a ground in ethics but it's pretty broad and general, and the differences between the religions are sometimes just as large as the commonalities. For the rest, the things that are not addressed in the sacred texts, we're on our own, or subject to the interpretations and very human weaknesses of religious legal scholars and the like. Again, not very grounded.”
The things you mention are both restricting and for some items, non-existent (note 1). If we take the issue of honesty just by itself, then the issue of character and its components re-emerges, after a seeming death drowned by hedonism. Honesty includes intellectual honesty, as well as honesty in personal dealings and honesty when no one is watching. Honesty relates directly to trust; I can trust those who are scrupulously honest. Trust leads to the best of relationships. There is a domino effect.
The differences in religions is of no consequence unless one feels that it is necessary for all religions to be equally true, which is impossible. And no religion needs to be true, just taken as a logical proposition. But possibly one basic set of principles does survive a test of coherence – but first one has to ask oneself, “what exactly does it mean to be intellectually honest?” And what are the principles of intellectual integrity? And the questions that follow on.
”Just had to write down the possible objections that came to mind. If it rambles a bit or seems fuzzy, I trust you'll get the gist of it. These cannot be new arguments, I'm sure.”
I appreciate the chance to address them, thanks. I am not a theologian nor am I a defender of all Abrahamic religions; these answers come from my understanding of theology, primarily Judeo-Christian based. My understanding of Islam is that it has rational lapses and historical fallacies.
Note 1. There is no differentiation between men and women in the ten commandments, except in the last, which says not to covet your neighbor's wife - a restriction on men. Adultery is not sexually differentiated.
Stan,
Many thanks for your reply. I certainly know you're not a theologian nor defender of Abrahamic religions. I merely used them as an example since I'm more familiar with these than other religions.
There is no physical experiment which can disprove non-physical existence. Testing in category A cannot determine whether category B exists or does not exist.
Yes, therefore, the more intellectually honest (or accurate) thing for Philosophical Materialists to do would be not to make any pronouncements on the question of non-physical existence at all.
I suppose this is the position of agnosticism. Yet, agnosticism is still atheism and always will be since physical evidence is the only accepted criteria for determining the existence of something. It is a hypocritical position, really.
I suppose the issue is what do we mean by 'existence' in the first place? (I suppose I should re-read your First Principles articles again.)
The meaning however, is contained only in the minds of the transmitting individual and the receiving individual who interprets the symbols.
Yes, and is this process of interpreting the symbols and deriving the meaning of them not a biochemical one occurring in the physical brain? And the containment of this meaning in the mind, is this not also residing in the physical matter of the brain?
You will say mind exists outside the physical brain but, how so? On what basis? I'm fairly certain there is no physical evidence to support this, so then belief in this separation between mind and brain (or body) becomes, just that, belief. I'm aware this is a long-standing debate though not if it's been settled. However, the inroads neurologists have made into the physical workings of the brain and their demonstrated effect on things such as 'mind', and even personality, does tend to favour the materialist view. You will say science cannot test for something which is outside the realm of the physical, yet then how can we know the non-physical IS true? Just through logic? What is the objective truth test for this?
I realise you have probably answered these questions in articles throughout your blog and were I to formulate a more interesting response to your comment I'd search for and read those first. Perhaps you can direct me to the most appropriate ones and spare yourself the tedium of writing everything all over again, unless, of course, you don't mind answering these questions anew.
The differences in religions is of no consequence unless one feels that it is necessary for all religions to be equally true, which is impossible.
Is it? In their broadest set of ethics and principles, are some religions really more true than others? Is this not the beginning of a slippery slope, the place to which it leads being exploited time and again by atheists as a source of ridicule of religion (and by extension the negation of the existence of any god)? Or by “true” do you mean in terms of the internal consistency of the logic of their doctrines? Is that how you're measuring truth here?
And no religion needs to be true, just taken as a logical proposition.
At first I didn't get what you meant here, but after writing the last sentence in my previous paragraph, I think I do. Is this correct?
Would you care to explain what the rational lapses of Islam are? Historical inaccuracies? (I realise this is getting away from things, so an answer isn't important, just curious)
Again, please forgive my impromptu and somewhat rambling manner of thinking and writing.
All the best.
100411 Neurostuff
”I suppose the issue is what do we mean by 'existence' in the first place? (I suppose I should re-read your First Principles articles again.)”
Well, an example would be to ask, is there any sense in which the First Principles exist?
”Yes, and is this process of interpreting the symbols and deriving the meaning of them not a biochemical one occurring in the physical brain? And the containment of this meaning in the mind, is this not also residing in the physical matter of the brain?”
Here an analogy with software/CPU works fairly well. Software is not of the CPU, nor is it attached to the CPU; it is a series of states that dance around, on and through the CPU. The results, when required are stored temporarily first in volatile caches and later in less volatile magnetic memory. The only software that is part of the CPU is the boot ROM.
So is the CPU the “mind” of the computer? Or is the software the mind? Since the software controls the operation of the CPU, it would appear that the software is the dominant player, which plays on the court which is the CPU. Without the software, the CPU remains in a holding loop, doing nothing. When the machine dies (power failure), the CPU remains physically just as it was: it is the software that goes away.
All analogies ultimately fail, of course, which is why they are only analogs and not the actual argument. But this analogy seems to closely resemble the target topic.
”You will say mind exists outside the physical brain but, how so? On what basis? I'm fairly certain there is no physical evidence to support this, so then belief in this separation between mind and brain (or body) becomes, just that, belief.”
Actually I do not say that the mind exists outside the physical brain, I say that it exists “on” the physical brain. The CPU/software analogy demonstrates that relationship in a known technical fashion. In terms of belief, the assignment of abstract thought to a lump of meat is also a “belief”. There is much criticism of the overreach of neuroscientific claims from within the neuroscientific community itself; claims made are metaphysical claims extrapolated wildly from actual limited data (bloodflow).
Here is a blog of a neuroscientist who is a skeptic of the metaphysical claims being made in his own field:
http://neuroskeptic.blogspot.com/
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(Continued from above)
”You will say science cannot test for something which is outside the realm of the physical, yet then how can we know the non-physical IS true? Just through logic? What is the objective truth test for this?”
First let’s take care with the term “objective”. Many Materialists take that term to mean “referring to a physical object”. Philosophers tend to think of it as the opposite of subjective, i.e. not purely internal or introspected.
If you require the first definition, physical existence, then that is a category error: seeking non-A by searching A. So we need to address the second meaning, which is not-subjective.
Starting with science, it is important to understand the philosophy of science. Science presupposes that certain things are true. These include the First Principles of both existence and truth, plus the assumption that Cause and Effect is valid and will continue to be valid, plus that the rules of Logic and mathematics are valid and will continue to be valid. Science depends on these things and cannot function if they are not valid. However, science cannot prove any of these things, using its techniques of induction – hypothesis – deduction - experiment – repeat. And moreover, induction and deduction both suffer from the “inductive fallacy” which limits their abilities for knowledge to the realm of “probabilistic” knowledge only.
Now the principles which underlie science are not known scientifically, so how are they known? They are not material entities, subject to physical experimental investigation. Yet they are part and parcel of the knowledge base, and are essential elements of it. These are “truths” which are known to logicians as “self-evident” statements. And they are non-physical. So what then is the cause for these “truths”? Does Cause and Effect even apply to such non-physical entities?
Or do these non-physical entities even exist? If not, why are they necessary for science?
”In their broadest set of ethics and principles, are some religions really more true than others? Is this not the beginning of a slippery slope, the place to which it leads being exploited time and again by atheists as a source of ridicule of religion (and by extension the negation of the existence of any god)?”
I’ll go one better. “Religion” is a catch-all phrase that is reductive to nothing when used by Atheists. A better word would be “ecclesiasticism”, which is the human implementation of what ever might possibly be real in a non-physical realm, say a Godel realm of hierarchy in dimensions, as posited by string theory – which is not ridiculed by Atheists.
Under this view of “religion” as human “ecclesiasticism”, is there any doubt that humans will not have a 100% correct understanding of, say, dimensions 6 through 9, much less any type of existence within them? I’m not saying this is the case, but it is an analog of scientific and mathematical weight. Trying to blame “religion” is a flawed Atheist pastime which has no bearing on what might be actual outside the detection of our particular sense system. And we can say that there are existences which are not available for examination by physical experimentation (unless we deny that certain things exist which we also deem self-evident).
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(Continued from above)
” ‘And no religion needs to be true, just taken as a logical proposition.’
At first I didn't get what you meant here, but after writing the last sentence in my previous paragraph, I think I do. Is this correct?”
I don’t think it is possible for any ecclesiastic doctrine to be knowledgeable enough or complete enough to be considered True in the incorrigible sense. However, the propositions of the tenets can be examined for Non-Contradiction and logical validity, and that sorts out most of the contenders.
”Would you care to explain what the rational lapses of Islam are? Historical inaccuracies? (I realise this is getting away from things, so an answer isn't important, just curious)”
First, the split of Sunni and Shiite go back to the death of Muhammad, at which time a coup occurred, wresting the power from the family lineage, and taken by an acolyte; the acolyte seized all the existing documents recording the sayings of Muhammed, re-wrote them into his own form, and then destroyed the originals. So the so-called sayings of Muhammad are not actually those of Muhammad, they are the edited and revised sayings of his acolyte – who has no authority to have done so.
Second, the “religion of peace” also is the religion of destruction, as is called for in several Surahs. This is only one of the internal contradictions which Islam presents, and which Muslims live within. I recommend reading the Qur’an, it is on-line, and not as long as the New Testament as I recall. There is a site somewhere that gives four translations, side by side.
”Again, please forgive my impromptu and somewhat rambling manner of thinking and writing.”
Again, no need to apologize, it is the reason I am here.
The CPU/software analogy works quite well for the physicalist, too. I would outline the argument as follows.
What exactly do we mean when we talk about "the software"? How does it differ from the mere pattern of bits in those parts of the memory which are going to be fetched as instructions?
To a physicalist, the important facts are these:
1) The behaviour of the system can in principle be analyzed completely without any appeal to the existence or nature of "software" other than as the actual physical bit states in memory. At every instruction execution, the state of the system changes in a way which is wholly predictable, unless the system has some built-in random number generator in which case it is predictable in a probabilistic sense.
2) The description in purely physical terms may be inconvenient to use, so we may refer to "the software" as an abstraction of certain parts of the physical state (e.g. the memory contents of the parts of the memory which will eventually be executed as instructions). An abstraction in this sense is not a "thing", it is merely a partial description.
3) The software in this sense has no properties or behaviour other than that resulting from the properties or behaviour of the hardware.
4) The software likewise has no causal powers that don't result from the hardware.
5) The software might change itself over time, raising the question of continuity of existence. For example, after a long period of execution, there might be no original instruction remaining. However, it may still be useful to describe it as still being the same "the" software as it was before, describing it in terms of causal continuity rather than identity.
The analogy of all these things to the theory of mind should be obvious.
So at what point do you disagree? Is there something about the physicalist account of the CPU/software system which you reject, or alternatively, what part of the analogy to the physicalist mind/brain account is insufficiently strong?
Andrew G,
The problem with the software analogy is that "software" involves the manipulation of symbols.
But on a physicalist worldview, nothing counts as a symbol unless some mind interprets it that way. There is no teleology in materialism, and so electrons cannot point beyond themselves to a specific target.
Thus, software theories of mind are circular:
1. Mind is:
2. Software, which is:
3. The manipulation of symbols, which involves:
4. Symbols, which on materialism nothing can be so unless they are interpreted that way by:
5. A mind
”1) The behaviour of the system can in principle be analyzed completely without any appeal to the existence or nature of "software" other than as the actual physical bit states in memory. At every instruction execution, the state of the system changes in a way which is wholly predictable, unless the system has some built-in random number generator in which case it is predictable in a probabilistic sense.
That is just not true. No one can tell by looking at the states of the hardware, what command will be issued at the keyboard level next, nor what new data will be introduced. In many cases, it is not known what instruction will come next (IF / THEN). Without those external functions, the hardware deterministically does nothing useful. If the hardware has no boot ROM, it will sit at the RESET Vector forever, or it will “run off in the weeds”. It is deterministic yes; useful, no.
The hardware does what it is told; it is told what to do by a) software which is developed, stored and loaded externally; b) an intelligent operator, external to the hardware.
”2) The description in purely physical terms may be inconvenient to use, so we may refer to "the software" as an abstraction of certain parts of the physical state (e.g. the memory contents of the parts of the memory which will eventually be executed as instructions). An abstraction in this sense is not a "thing", it is merely a partial description.”
If by “not a thing” you mean that it exists in a non-material sense, then you have left the materialist domain. I don’t think that is what you mean, since you are arguing a physicalist viewpoint.
Your “partial description” covering an “abstraction” has no meaning within a hardware/software system. If you are denying that software exists except as a physical thing, then you likely haven’t done any code yourself. From the perspective of a S/W engineer, software is codified intelligence coupled with data which will operate on a platform which is deterministic hardware…. And that is the viewpoint of the Hardware engineer, too. The codified intelligence is able to be transported on many different “carriers”, from holes in paper to RF energy. The carriers are not the codified intelligence; the carriers merely deliver or store the codified intelligence. The same is the case for MOSFET latches and magnetic media in the hardware.
”3) The software in this sense has no properties or behaviour other than that resulting from the properties or behaviour of the hardware.”
That is absurd. The software has the capacity to control the operations of the hardware; if that were not true the systems would be useless. Again, the hardware is a platform upon which the software operates, the software having been transported there and purposely loaded and run in order to force the hardware to do its bidding.
”4) The software likewise has no causal powers that don't result from the hardware.”
Nor does the hardware have causal powers that don’t result from the software. Hardware without software is junk; a boat anchor.
(continued)
(continued from above)
”5) The software might change itself over time, raising the question of continuity of existence. For example, after a long period of execution, there might be no original instruction remaining. However, it may still be useful to describe it as still being the same "the" software as it was before, describing it in terms of.”
Three different things here. First, self-modifying software has never been successful as far as I know. It is (or was, anyway) a programming error to have the software modify itself.
Second, if there is no instruction remaining, that is either due to bit volatility in the hardware (a defect), or improper coding. Programs don’t stop, they loop looking for further instructions.
Third, the statement , “causal continuity rather than identity”, will need explaining; Cause and Effect mixed in with identity (presumably the First Principle) doesn’t seem to connect.
” The analogy of all these things to the theory of mind should be obvious.
Maybe to you, because you have created them (in error) to support that which you think is the theory of mind. But they are errors. But apparently created as a rationalization of a favored theory.
” So at what point do you disagree? Is there something about the physicalist account of the CPU/software system which you reject, or alternatively, what part of the analogy to the physicalist mind/brain account is insufficiently strong?
The CPU/Software system is an obvious design which couples a deterministic physical set [ hardware ] with a non-deterministic, non-physical set [ software ]. These two entities overlay and occupy the same space (the software requiring no x,y,z space, being non-physical), and each is required to accomplish a working, general purpose system. Using the same hardware, over and over, different software is consciously and purposely loaded and run, producing different outputs for different data sets and inputs.
Or looking at it from another view point, the hardware always has states; but those states are meaningless without software being impressed upon them. There is no net mass/energy change in the system due to having organized states due to the presence of software. The computer doesn't get heavier when loading Windows 7 (although the wallet gets lighter, an epiphenomenon).
I reject the physicalist account of software on the same basis as rejecting the physicalist account of intellect and knowledge. These things are non-physical, yet they exist. Just like “meaning”, you can’t have a jar full of these things, unless they are first impressed upon a carrier. Mistaking the carrier for the entity is a category error.
To those who design and develop such things, these attributes are obvious in HW/SW systems. Whether that transfers adequately into a brain / mind analog depends on how far one wishes to push the analogy. All analogies fall apart; they are not the actual argument, so if pushed far enough they will be forced to fail.
However, the existence of intelligence which operates on a biological brain as a substrate or platform seems to do two things: a) strongly resemble the HW/SW analog, and b) to suggest pre-existing intelligence, just as does both software and hardware.
The analogy fails at certain points: current hardware and software both are serial and clocked (synchronous); the brain is massively parallel and asynchronous. This means that there is no brain state which is analogous to a hardware state. Thus all freestanding intelligence operates far differently from manufactured electronics. Also the freestanding intelligence has capabilities of both growth and regeneration, physically, and self-correction intellectually. Not to mention agency, of course.
However, both systems can produce faulty conclusions when incorrect assumptions are fed into the process.
I should probably point out that software is my field, and I've been programming for upwards of 30 years on everything from microcontrollers to old-school mainframes and modern servers. I've also debugged hardware by writing diagnostic software and debugged software using an oscilloscope and signal analyzer, so I have a better grasp than most about the low-level interactions.
You don't accept that the behaviour of a simple CPU/memory system can be described in purely physical terms? All that the CPU is doing is reading a group of bits from memory, and using them to control the behaviour of a set of logic circuits that may then change the bits stored in registers or memory, and then repeating the process indefinitely. Is it not the case that if you know the memory and register contents before single-stepping an instruction, and you know the instruction set (which is just a description of a physical system, namely the CPU's instruction decoding logic), then you can deduce what the resulting changes will be? Even if you have no idea what the "software" is supposed to be doing?
Martin: I suspect you've never worked with industrial process control.
Not all software is the manipulation of symbols with no meaning other than in someone's mind. In process control, the software is manipulating representations of physical facts, and the output it generates is a representation of physical actions to be taken by the machinery.
If we must pull rank on each other, I was an R& D Electrical Engineer, I developed hardware, including microcontroller circuitry and hardware microprocessor emulators, including test software for complete instruction set exercise, as well as emulator instruction set exercise, and including the use of scopes, logic analyzers, and all the routine analytical equipment necessary.
You said,
”3) The software in this sense has no properties or behaviour other than that resulting from the properties or behaviour of the hardware.
4) The software likewise has no causal powers that don't result from the hardware.”
I said,
”And the hardware has no causal properties that don’t result from the software.”
Now you say,
”You don't accept that the behaviour of a simple CPU/memory system can be described in purely physical terms?
That was not the issue of course. The issue is a system analog of the mind / brain, which is a CPU / software system, not a CPU / memory system. You have changed the subject mid-conversation in a reductionist move to the limited subject of hardware internals, CPU and memory:
” Is it not the case that if you know the memory and register contents before single-stepping an instruction, and you know the instruction set (which is just a description of a physical system, namely the CPU's instruction decoding logic), then you can deduce what the resulting changes will be? Even if you have no idea what the "software" is supposed to be doing?”
Yes, that is the case; there was no argument otherwise: the CPU is deterministic; the memory is deterministic. And is it not the case that the CPU, without the software, is useless? Is it not the software which activates the CPU in the first place, pulling it out of RESET and vectoring to a starting point? Is not the data flow determined by the software? Is not the output a result desired by the operator in conjunction with the software – not the desire of the CPU?
Take a spreadsheet program: the CPU has no concept of what it provides; the software is specific to the task desired by the operator. Both the program and the operator are focused on spreadsheet operations. The CPU is blindly performing routine functions which it always performs when instructed to do so, yet without any clue as to the meaning or teleology of its operations.
The fact remains that the software, being an organization of states, has no specific physical being since it has no mass/energy nor does it occupy space. The organization of states has meaning, and it is created and controlled by intelligent agency. It is the meaning which gives software its value, and it is the deterministic operation of the CPU/memory system which gives it value.
Why do you feel a need to argue against this?
Not pulling rank, but responding to your suggestion that I "likely haven't done any code myself".
What I was trying to establish by giving the physicalist description of the CPU/software system was whether or not we had enough common ground for me to even begin an argument about the physicalist description of the mind/brain by analogy.
In order to identify the specific point at which we part company, is it possible for you to address the CPU/software system without treating it as any kind of analogy? Only when we agree on the nature of the CPU/software system to begin with is it possible to argue sensibly about analogies. Please assume that for this discussion, I'm not making an analogy unless I explicitly say so.
So if we agree on the deterministic nature of the CPU/memory system, then that's the first step of an argument.
The second step is this: as a consequence of the first, it is necessarily the case that nothing else besides the memory and register contents (and any input devices that instructions can access) has or can have any kind of causal power over the behaviour of the CPU at this level of description.
The third step: as a consequence of step 2, if we go on to say that the "software" is some kind of entity or concept which has a representation in the form of physical memory contents (i.e. the instructions that get executed), then it is necessarily the case that the "software" has no causal powers which are not in some way embodied in its physical representation.
Do you disagree with these steps, and if so, where?
OK, I have already claimed the hardware components to be deterministic (CPU / memory). We seem to agree there.
Item 2. The behavior of the CPU is designed in; it will respond in a preordained fashion when it sees certain contents in a register. It will do this repeatedly and reliably.
Item 3 a. … "software" is some kind of entity or concept which has a representation in the form of physical memory contents”;
Tentative approval with the right to object to potential misuse of the generality: “physical”.
Item 3 b. ”then it is necessarily the case that the "software" has no causal powers which are not in some way embodied in its physical representation.”
Preemptive objection. While the software does not “cause” the CPU to operate, neither does the CPU “cause” the information to produce meaningful results. It is already agreed that the CPU / memory system is deterministic. But the introduction of software is neither automatic nor deterministic; it is done by an agent, one which gives the software meaning (as opposed to random bits), one which purposefully translates the meaning into machine language for the processor to operate on, and one which interprets the outcome of the operation, extracting the meaning of the CPU-massaged instructions.
Are we good to this point?
Upon further thinking, I suspect that for item 2 you hold a meaning that I do not, specifically that the software “causes” the CPU to do something. Let’s take another analogy and tempt ourselves to embed it.
If we take a balance type scale, and balance it carefully so that it has equal mass on both sides of the fulcrum, and then we add mass to one side, then that side will go down. But we cannot say that the mass caused it; it is gravity which caused it. Without gravity the entire balance system is meaningless.
Adding recognizable contents to a register cannot be said to cause the operation of the CPU for the same reason. The CPU is driven to do what it does by its internal design. If a register shows contents out of random inputs which the CPU recognizes as an instruction, it will perform that instruction, again, blindly. An instruction is a trigger for the CPU to do what it is designed to do. It is not a forcing function. The CPU will perform whatever instruction is in the register, again, blindly. The software directs the operation (as opposed to causing it) by putting the necessary states in the register to direct the CPU operation in a proper manner.
I'll address this comment which you made to Martin, and Martin can chime in when he gets here:
"Not all software is the manipulation of symbols with no meaning other than in someone's mind. In process control, the software is manipulating representations of physical facts,"
The representation is symbolic, and the physical facts have meaning both to the system being controlled and the person setting up the controller.
"output it generates is a representation of physical actions to be taken by the machinery."
Also transmitted symbolically and with specific meaning.
Upon further thinking, I suspect that for item 2 you hold a meaning that I do not, specifically that the software “causes” the CPU to do something.
No, I'm trying to avoid that meaning; I would say that the representation of the software, in the form of memory contents which will be used as instructions to the CPU, causes the CPU to behave in the way specified in those instructions.
Preemptive objection. While the software does not “cause” the CPU to operate, neither does the CPU “cause” the information to produce meaningful results.
Agreed up to a point. In the process control case, for example, the output of the CPU might be (blindly) interpreted as specifying some operation to be performed, for example an output port controlling the speed of a motor. However, I'll stipulate that in the case of a system designed to perform a specific function, the specific meanings in such cases are imposed by the system designer. Furthermore, if we replace the memory contents with some random bits, then the CPU output no longer has the meaning intended by the designer, but the attached device will still use the same interpretation of the values it receives. Agree?
” No, I'm trying to avoid that meaning; I would say that the representation of the software, in the form of memory contents which will be used as instructions to the CPU, causes the CPU to behave in the way specified in those instructions.”
Then I still take exception, because the CPU is “caused” to operate in that way by its design when it is enabled (or signaled) to do so by the appropriate representation by states in a register. (Perhaps we’re saying the same thing, but I suspect not). Can we agree that a trigger is not a cause?
” Agreed up to a point. In the process control case…. Agree?”
Yes, to the extent stated. However, you have not addressed the issue of the necessity of the “meaning” being embedded in symbols for transmission and interpretation, and also symbolic hardware "states" for manipulation by the CPU.
Andrew G,
In process control, the software is manipulating representations of physical facts,
That's the same thing. By "symbol" I mean anything that represents something beyond itself, like, as you say, a representation. Or a model. Information. Correspondence. Etc.
The problem is that on materialism, all you have to work with are particles and energy. For something to represent something else requires a mind to assign that meaning to it. Which doesn't do you any good if you are trying to reduce the mind to the material.
Then I still take exception, because the CPU is “caused” to operate in that way by its design when it is enabled (or signaled) to do so by the appropriate representation by states in a register. (Perhaps we’re saying the same thing, but I suspect not). Can we agree that a trigger is not a cause?
I don't think we can. Unless I'm misunderstanding you, you seem to be restricting the concept of "cause" much more tightly than common usage of the word implies. What criteria are you using to distinguish whether something is, or is not, a cause of a given effect?
101211 AndrewG
A cause is a forcing function, necessary and sufficient to produce a reaction (effect), and the reaction cannot be greater than the forcing function (second law of Thermodynamics).
A trigger is the removal of restrictions against the forcing function, allowing the forcing function to operate freely.
Example:
Gunfire. There are two separate views of cause: natural caused, and agent caused.
First, natural causal chain:
The cause of gunfire is expansion of gasses in an enclosed cartridge and gun barrel pushing against a bullet forcing it down the barrel toward the open end;
First previous cause is the firing of the primer which ignites the gunpowder;
Second previous cause is the striking of the primer by a firing pin;
Third previous cause is the striking of the firing pin by a hammer;
Fourth previous cause is the release of the hammer from a cocked position by the movement of a trigger. The trigger can be operated by an agent, or not: if a gun is disturbed by a tornado or an earthquake or merely falls over such that its trigger is disturbed by impact or hitting another object, then the causal chain is freed up to operate, and gunfire would result, sans agent.
Now for the Agent version of cause:
Gunfire is caused by the person who pulls the trigger, removing the restraint from firing which is the static state of the weapon, and placing it into its dynamic state. This is not a forcing function, it is a triggering function: a state change. The person does not accelerate the bullet down the barrel.
You appear to be thinking of the software as a forcing function. The hardware designer thinks of software as an agent, or an extension of an agent. The temporary state of the instruction register is read by the CPU as a state change for the internal operations of the CPU. Every instruction cycle the CPU reads in the states of the register, and performs according to those states. It is not caused to do so by the software. It will do so even without software, setting a flag indicating an illegal state in the instruction register.
Because the effect (CPU operation) is greater in mass, energy and complexity than the software state, the software state cannot be the physical cause of the effect (second law of thermodynamics again). Thus, it can be seen only as a trigger. In the case of the CPU, the trigger functions to legalize the states read by the CPU.
(continued)
(continued from above)
I see no manner of interpretation which would conclude that the instructions which exist as static states in a register are the cause of the CPU operations. The CPU is driven to activity by the clock which activates internal state machines, and it will operate (without meaning) on whatever states exist in the external register. The CPU reads the states in the register and then internally selects the proper hardware response. If the instruction is illegal, the CPU would set an “illegal instruction” flag and then go into a holding loop. Organizing the states in the register merely adds meaning and allows a legal CPU operation to be performed.
It might be argued that the agent is necessary and therefore the agent is at least part of the cause. But in the case of the CPU, the hardware will perform according to whatever states are in the register, regardless of whether those states are meaningful or were provided by an agent. Meaningless states result in meaningless activity and “running off into the weeds”. But the addition of an agent to the causal chain merely adds meaning, it does not cause CPU operations.
Another attempt at analogy:
A child pulls a pebble from under a large boulder on a mountainside. The boulder shifts, then it converts its potential energy into kinetic energy and rolls down the mountain. As it rolls, it collides with other boulders, which are dislodged and convert their potential energies into kinetic energies, and collide with still more boulders. The landslide becomes huge, and when it reaches the bottom of the mountain, it destroys 12 houses, 15 vehicles, kills 18 people, 22 dogs, 16 cats.
The child did not produce (cause) the destruction, but was the agent that enabled the destruction. However, the destruction could also have been caused naturally and without agency, say by a small earthquake.
I just can’t resist one more analog: Does a symphony conductor cause sound waves to reach the ears of the audience? No, he enables the soundwaves to be organized into coherency (music). The conductor is not causal for the sound, he is causal for the meaning contained in the sound.
OK, I’ll stop, this could go on and on and…
Stan,
Many thanks for your replies. Have sent you an email.
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