Thursday, January 26, 2012

Free Will, Agency, Self, Life: Part 3

Part 3: Is Free Will an Infinite Regression?

There are several arguments running around which propose that Free Will involves an infinite regression. One argument proposes that before one can choose the next thought, then he would have to be able to choose to choose the next thought, and to choose to choose to choose the next thought, ad infinitum, which leads to the absurdity of an infinite regression. Do we actually choose the next thought? Is it a choice made between a number of possible next thoughts? Or do we develop the next thought as a step in the progression of our thought process currently underway? It is much more likely that we develop each thought either independently or as a step in a progression of thoughts. This is a singular step, not an infinite regression. It is not necessary to think that we choose between possible next thoughts, and that concept certainly does not guarantee that an infinite regression is a necessary part of Free Will.

In terms of decisions, it is said that we must “decide to decide”, or “decide to decide to decide”, ad infinitum. Under this proposition, it is said that no control is possible since it is necessary to invoke an infinite regression just make a single decision. But again, it is more parsimonious to invoke “development”: we develop a decision after finding that a decision is necessary. It is not necessary to think that we must decide to decide, and that concept is no guarantee that an infinite regression is a necessary part of Free Will.

The idea of an infinite regression is commonly applied to the issue of verification of the premises within an argument. Premises cannot be valid if they are circular, or if they refer to an infinite regression of sub-premises that cannot be grounded in known axiomatic truths.

For a proposition to have truth value, its premises must have truth value. In the following (valid form) proposition, there are two truth claims:
P1: IF [X], Then [Y] < First truth claim.
P2: [X] < Second truth claim.
C: [C] < inevitable conclusion, IFF the two truth claims are, in fact, true.

Our Free Will proposition has these elements:
X = conditions surrounding free will (superset):
(a) free from restraints;
(b) free from compulsions;
(c) free from antecedent conditions.

Y = proposed implication of X (subset of X): Free Will.

We have already established that it is possible for the conditions named in X to exist. But does X actually imply (=>) Y?

Because it is a definition, then it is tautologically true. But do we want to sit on that level, or should we validate that somehow?

Validation
In order to validate the argument for Free Will, it must be shown that human will exists, and that it is a subset of the freedoms listed, hence it is Free Will.

(a) Human will is observable, as is human agency. Both will and agency are empirically sound concepts. Will and agency are either axiomatic, in the sense that the universe would be much different if there is no will or agency and everything were in fact deterministically causal, or they are false, leading to philosophical acceptance of total universal delusion.

Determinism is a concept which goes against human observations, and which requires the extraordinary proof which Sagan extolled. The discussion of determinism as opposed to observation of human Free Will is discussed below, where axioms are considered.

Delusion is not an acceptable premise in logic statements. Why would arguments which premise delusion be acceptable as explanations of what is? The case for delusion is anti-empirical; it asks us to accept that our observations are delusions merely in order to salvage a particular theory.

Especially logically egregious is when the delusion being posited negates truth values, even that of its own posit of delusion (internally non-coherence). The case for delusion is internally contradictory and its internal confliction is fatal for any use in a logical argument. However, it is possible to accept delusion for oneself and not subscribe to logic at all because of one’s acknowledged delusion. That eliminates the argument altogether for that one arguer, and him only, because under delusion no premise can be validated.

There is no valid reason to accept universal delusion (avoidance of empirical observations) as a valid premise in logical arguments.

(b) IF [asserted human will is observable], THEN [at least some humans are free to assert it].

This argument, being based on either an axiom or a false statement, is either True, or it is meaningless in the sense that humans are deluded and can know the truth value of nothing: everything is meaningless. The delusion argument is discussed just above. The question here is whether the observability of human will makes it axiomatic.

Axioms are undeniable, incorrigible truth statements that are apparent upon their presentation, or are apparent upon addressing the contrary to the statement. The contrary to the existence of human free will is human enslaved determinism. This is a true dilemma, being binary and without degrees; either human free will exists, or it does not.

In order for human Free Will to be an axiom, the falsity of its converse must be readily apparent and undeniable. Is human enslaved determinism the actual state of humanity? In order for us to accept this as the actual state, we must also accept some of the consequences of this premise.

First, in a universe of total human enslaved determinism, every concept would be predetermined and deterministic (fully causal) clear back to the origin of the universe. Given enough computer power, every thought could be perfectly predicted based on prior causes. This would lead to sub-premises, such as that consciousness is not necessary for any interface with the physical world; there is no need to think a thought, because there is no originality possible since every thought is predetermined causally. The flow of human existence and endeavor is inexorable and unchangeable, to the last detail.

But even more interestingly it leads to the negation of all theories; those thoughts are not original either, and being totally predetermined, there is no reason to think that they have knowledge value for humans, much less truth value. Since all thoughts are totally causal and predetermined, there is no reason to think that logic is an actual discipline or valid in any respect; it is more likely that that our thoughts are valueless (and delusional).

Being in possession of only valueless or delusional thoughts, our experience of human accomplishments, sky scrapers, helicopters, radiated information, mass manufacturing of toilets, and the acquiring of humans seeking power over other humans, etc, is either a delusion, or it occurred inevitably as a natural progression of predetermined causation going back to the origin of the universe, with no chance of personal interference due to will.

What would cause us to believe this view of the human experience, as opposed to that view which is actually very easily observed, empirically? Again, delusion comes into play: must we accept that we are deluded, with no control in actuality? According to what is easily and commonly observed, the existence of human Free Will is axiomatic.

Being axiomatic, the concept is not an infinite regression of premises.

Invalidation
In order to invalidate, it must be shown empirically that either (a) human will does not exist, or (b) that human will is negated by some other universal constraint which prohibits it from having any freedom, contrary to observation, and (c) that humans are in fact deluded, and (d) that either the appearance of will is false, or that some other non-human agent is the cause of the creations which we observe.

For attempts to empirically demonstrate that human Free Will is a non-valid concept, it must be recognized that empiricism itself must first be proven valid in the absence of human Free Will.

Causal chains going back at least to the electron level will need to be verified, specifically and empirically.

Not allowed under Sagan’s condition of “extraordinary evidence” are speculations, story telling, extrapolations, or any form of Scientism. Only actual empirical evidence need apply.

That will take some doing.

2 comments:

Augustus Pablo said...

determinism -
"But even more interestingly ... there is no reason to think that they have knowledge value for humans, much less truth value. Since all thoughts are totally causal and predetermined, ... it is more likely that that our thoughts are valueless (and delusional)."

This post raises a lot of questions about how you came to your conclusions but let's start in a random spot.

How does "valueless" follow if determinism is true? What is value? Usefulness? And value or lack of value to whom? Do you agree that any undesired conclusion (that thoughts are valueless) has no bearing on whether that conclusion is true or not? (That a conclusion's truth value is not determined by whether or not the conclusion is seen as desired.)

Stan said...

Augustus Pablo,

"How does "valueless" follow if determinism is true?"

If a thought (or at least what passes for a thought) is totally determined by physical causation, then it is not rationally determined. Under determinism, we are deluded in thinking that thoughts are our own, that we have constructed them, and can evaluate them. But in reality, we consciously only receive results; we do not contribute thinking processes, under determinism, including evaluative thinking. A thought could not be judged as having rational value since conscious judgment would not be not really a thought, it is totally deterministic as well.


"What is value? Usefulness?"

The focus here being on logic, the value referred to is truth value.

"And value or lack of value to whom?"

Truth is of value to those who care about valid thoughts based on true premises, and forming them into a true worldview. We usually assume that thoughts, properly constructed, have a truth value, which we can judge. If all thoughts are predetermined and are not judgable, then there is no truth value. They are no longer differentiable because they are merely effects of deterministic causality.

"Do you agree that any undesired conclusion (that thoughts are valueless) has no bearing on whether that conclusion is true or not? (That a conclusion's truth value is not determined by whether or not the conclusion is seen as desired.)"

If the conclusion is non-coherent with the premise, then it negates the truth value of the premise; that is undesired, because it makes the argument false. One cannot say that “IF [X], THEN [!X]” has an undesired conclusion which does not reflect on the value of the premise. So no, I do not agree. Logically undesirable means false; I probably should have made that clear.

If what passes for thoughts are not actually created nor are they judged, then there is no rational basis for accepting or rejecting them; either everything is “rational” by tautology (because it is an expectation of an effect of a cause) or nothing is rational under those constraints.

The result is that knowledge of anything becomes impossible, because there is no differentiation between true and not true.

That being the case, then we cannot know if our thoughts are deterministic; so declaring them deterministic leads to a logical inability to know that which has be declared: a classical Epimenides paradox (internal non-coherence).