Monday, February 13, 2012

Revisiting Kant

Kant is a love of mine, along with Locke and a few select others. It’s been awhile since I went through Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, so I have been reviewing it again. I have some portions to share, if you have the time and inclination as well as a tolerance for 96 word sentences, some of which are missing verbs but make up for it with lots of commas.

”I cannot agree with the opinion of several admirable thinkers – Sulzer among the rest – that in spite of the weakness of the arguments hitherto in use, we may hope , one day, to see sufficient demonstrations of the two cardinal propositions of pure reason – the existence of a Supreme Being, and immortality of the soul. I am certain, on the contrary, that this will never be the case. For on what ground can reason base such synthetical propositions, which do not relate to the objects of experience and their internal possibility? – But it is also demonstratively certain that no one will ever be able to maintain the contrary with the least show of probability. For as he can attempt such a proof solely upon the basis of pure reason, he is bound to prove that a Supreme Being, and a thinking subject in the character of a pure intelligence, are impossible. But where will he find the knowledge which can enable him to enounce synthetical judgments in regard to things which transcend the region of experience? We may, therefore, rest assured that the opposite will never be demonstrated. We need not, then, have recourse to scholastic arguments; we may always admit the truth of those propositions what are consistent with the speculative interests of reason in the sphere of experience, and form, moreover, the only means of uniting the speculative with the practical interest. Our opponent, who must not be considered here as a critic solely, we can be ready to meet with a non liquet which cannot fail to disconcert him; while we cannot deny his right to a similar retort, as we have on our side the advantage of the support of the subjective maxim of reason, and can therefore look upon all his sophistical arguments with calm indifference.

From this point of view, there is properly no antithetic of pure reason. For the only arena for such a struggle would be upon the field of pure theology and psychology; but on this ground there can be no combatant whom we need to fear. Ridicule and boasting can be his only weapons; and these may be laughed at, as mere child’s play. This consideration restores to reason her courage; for what source of confidence could be found, if she, whose vocation it is to destroy error, were at variance with herself and without any reasonable hope of ever reaching a state of permanent repose?”

I. Kant; “Critique of Pure Reason”; Prometheus Books, 1990, pgs. 416, 417.

”Allow your opponent to say what he thinks is reasonable, and combat him only with the weapons of reason.”
Ibid, pg. 418.

”If you have recourse to other means, if you attempt to coerce reason, if you raise the cry of treason to humanity, if you excite the feelings of the crowd, which can neither understand nor sympathize with the such subtle speculations – you will only make yourselves ridiculous. For the question does not concern the advantage or disadvantage which we are expected to reap for such inquiries; the question is merely, how far reason can advance in the field of speculation, apart from all kinds of interest, and whether we may depend upon the exertions of speculative reason or must renounce all reliance on it. Instead of joining the combatants, it is your part to be a tranquil spectator of the struggle – a laborious struggle for the parties engaged, but attended, in its progress as well as in its results, with the most advantageous consequences for the interests of thought and knowledge. It is absurd to expect to be enlightened by reason, and at the same time to prescribe to her what side of the question she must adopt. Moreover, reason is sufficiently held in check by its own power, the limits imposed on it by its own nature are sufficient; it is unnecessary for you to place over it additional guards, as if its power were dangerous to the constitution of the intellectual state. In the dialectic of reason there is no victory gained, which needs in the least disturb your tranquility.” [Emphasis added]
Ibid, pgs. 419, 420

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