Sam Harris and Free Will

A book review of "Free Will", a book by Sam Harris.

SUMMARY

Sam Harris bases his argument against free will on two premises: first, there is neuroscience which shows a delay in blood flow in the brain between initiation of blood flow and the declaration of conscious recognition, from fractions of a second to 7 to 10 seconds. Second, because we are ignorant of the causal physics which produces our thoughts and actions fully formed and complete to the conscious mind, there is no freedom involved in our conscious thinking.

These premises are exercised over and over throughout the book.

But these premises are defective in the first place and ignore other solutions completely. This book is a rationalization of a position which Harris has chosen in advance, a position which is necessary for his Atheism and Philosophical Materialism, both of which he also exercises in the book

The first premise is based on the concept that correlation is causation, which Harris embraces completely with no apparent realization of the logical defect, and no explanation for using it as a first principle.

The second premise is based on the concept that the ignorance of X proves something about X: consequences of X are an illusion. More completely stated, ignorance of the source of Q proves that Q is an illusion despite universal experience of Q and material evidence for Q.

Harris also demonstrates his ignorance of Christianity in an unjustified complaint, which is neither the case nor necessary to his argument.

THE BOOK
This is not, Harris says, philosophical materialism. He explains, on page 11:

“It is important to recognize that the case I am building against free will does not depend on philosophical materialism (the assumption that reality is, at bottom, purely physical). There is no question that (most, if not all) mental events are the product of physical events. The brain is physical system, entirely beholden to the laws of nature-and there is every reason to believe that changes in its functional state and material structure entirely dictate our thoughts and actions.”

This is fundamentally flawed from the get-go. First, he contradicts himself completely by claiming no philosophical materialism, then he makes completely materialist claims without any reasoning, any data. He makes red-flag generalizations to bolster his claim with imagined authority: “no question that”; “every reason to believe”. He has established both Philosophical Materialism and internal contradiction to be the foundation for his argument.

And he continues on page 12:

“But even if the human mind were made of soul-stuff, nothing about my argument would change. The unconscious operation of a soul would grant you no more freedom than the unconscious physiology of your brain does.”

And this provides the basis for ignoring the possibility of a non-material mind, which initiates the neural activity which Harris will repeatedly call “mysterious”, ad nauseum. So he has established, apparently in his mind, a blockade for the defense of materialism, which he denies using.

Harris’ principle for this book is singular and it is knowledge based. Says Harris on pg 8, after referring to the Libet, and two other fMRI brain scan experiments, discussed below:

“Some moments before you are aware of what you will do next – a time in which you subjectively appear to have complete freedom to behave however you please – your brain has already determined what you will do. You then become conscious of this “decision” and believe that you are in the process of making it.”

He continues on page 9:

“…I, as the conscious witness of my experience, no more initiate the events in my prefrontal cortex than I cause my heart to beat.”

And,

“…even if all mental states were truly co-incident with their underlying brain states – I cannot decide what I will next think or intend until a thought or intention arises.”

Harris proceeds to repeat these claims as if they were established fact, incorrigible and unquestionable and not Philosophical Materialist. On page 16:

“Today, the only philosophically respectable way to endorse free will is to be a compatiblist – because we know that determinism, in every sense relevant to human behavior, is true. Unconsious neural events determine our thoughts and actions – and are themselves determined by prior causes of which we are subjectively unaware.”

[emphasis added]

And on page 27:

“Cause and Effect
In physical terms we know that every human action can be reduced to a series of impersonal events: Genes are transcribed, neurotransmitters bind to their receptors, muscle fibers contract, and John Doe pulls the trigger on the gun.”

Determinism is the cheap leisure suit with which Philosophical Materialism dresses itself. (Note 1) Harris leaves no room for conscious decision: everything is predetermined.

On page 25:

“How can we be ‘free’ as conscious agents if everything that we consciously intend is caused by events in our brain that we do not intend and off which we are entirely unaware? We cannot. To say that “my brain” decided to think or act in a particular way, whether consciously or not, and that this is the basis for my freedom, is to ignore the very source of our belief in free will: the feeling of conscious agency. People feel that they are the authors of their thoughts and actions, and this is the only reason why there seems to be a problem of free will worth talking about.”

[emphasis in the original]

And here it seems necessary to object without going further yet. No, Harris, that is not the reason there is a free will issue. The reason is that the denial of free will is used as a foundational brick in the establishment of Atheism. That is the reason that the New Atheists, now including Harris, are fighting the free will battle: because if there is truly agency which is not deterministic, then there is more to humans and the universe than determinism and materialism and Atheism can account for. Free will MUST be defeated, in order to maintain the Atheist and Materialist narrative.

Harris repeats his single thought on virtually every page. He tries to drive it home on page 32:

“As we have begun to see, however, this feeling of freedom arises from our moment-to-moment ignorance of the prior causes of our thoughts and actions. The phrase “free will’ describes what it feels like to identify with certain mental states as they arise in consciousness. Thoughts like ‘What should I get my daughter for birthday? I know – I’ll take her to a pet store and have her pick out some tropical fish’ convey the apparent reality of choices, freely made. But from a deeper perspective (speaking both subjectively and objectively), thoughts simply arise unauthored and yet author our actions”.

And on page 40 he makes what appears to be a conclusion:

”What I will do next, and why, remains a mystery – one that is fully determined by the prior state of the universe and the laws of nature (including the contributions of chance). To declare my ‘freedom’ is tantamount to saying, ‘I don’t know why I did it, but it’s the sort of thing I tend to do, and I don’t mind doing it.”

Harris has defined the equivalent of an internal homunculus which controls our every action, thought and intention, and then lets us know what was decided outside of our conscious reach. I don’t know why I did it: I have no free will. Only Harris calls the homunculus a “mystery”, and he refers to this mystery on almost every subsequent page. We have this mystery, he says so we have no freedom of our own; every thought and intent has to be predetermined by the universe and chance, purely because we don’t understand this mystery.

Harris has pushed the agency (new redefinition of deterministic vs fatalistic) back into the mysterious, homunculus zone of the brain – out of our “self” and onto the mysterious Other which inhabits our neurons without our knowledge or control. Yet it is within us, it acts like it is us acting, it deludes us into thinking that we are doing it, thinking it, creating it, responsible for it ourselves. But the self is a delusion too; we are not the actors. We are merely the librarian storing the records, the Boswell to Johnson (neither of whom had agency either, of course), the hobo along for the ride, looking out the side door, not knowing where we are going but remembering where the boxcar has taken us before.

Harris never mentions that the mystery might in fact be based on non-causal correlation, which is done by non-instrumentation of the actual phenomena being discussed: the mystery might, in actual fact, not even exist. And further investigation will likely produce information on mental processes which are not even considered in the simplistic model which Harris and the neuroscientists are using in their current apologetics.

But WAIT! On page 42 Harris takes a new turn:

“There is no question that human beings can imagine and plan for the future, weigh competing desires, etc. – and that losing these capacities would greatly diminish us. External and internal pressures of various kinds can be present or absent while a person imagines, plans and acts - and such pressures determine our sense of whether he is morally responsible for his behavior. However, these things have nothing to do with free will”

[emphasis added]

What? Humans can consciously imagine and plan and act? Really?

Harris has previously defined free will and now re-defines it in light of obvious human agency. Now he defines free will as requiring knowledge of the psychological cause of his behavior, page 43:

“However, when I look for the psychological cause of my behavior, I find it utterly mysterious”.

Well, it is now becoming clear that his inability to explain his own psychology leads him to conclude that he cannot make intentional decisions and to affect causal actions based on those decisions. He concludes that chapter with this:

“- you cannot account for your decision either. You will do whatever it is you do, and it is meaningless to assert that you could have done otherwise.”

So he has it both ways here. IF/Because he cannot account for the origin of the neural activity, which remains a homuncular mystery to him, THEN he concludes that you will do whatever is predetermined for you to do, without any conscious control or ability to change what you do (it’s already done for you). Except as he also claims, humans can consciously “imagine, plan and act”.

This is completely dependent upon Philosophical Materialism and the denial that the mind might be other than previous electron positions in the universe, and might in fact cause the neural activity in the first place.

But that would seem to contradict the “science” Harris quotes. Does it? And does it matter? Harris is comfortable with contradictions, even in the same paragraph.

What about Libet? Libet’s experiment is now thought of as merely a first attempt, without providing accuracy in instrumentation; the response was measured externally, on the skin. An explanation of the Libet experiment is found here (http://www.informationphilosopher.com/freedom/libet_experiments.html), complete with a timing clock.

Additional experiments are noted by Harris, and many of them are subliminal tests which measure the subject’s response to very short visual exposures. These are claimed to show that there is mental processing of inputs which is not conscious. Surprisingly enough, Dennett points out that the short exposure might be consciously recognized and then forgotten with the same speed, so that there is no direct causal interpretation of this correlation. Neither Harris nor Dennett appears to recognize any timing difficulty in measuring the first microsecond that conscious recognition occurs. Merely reporting the event of conscious recognition incurs significant delay, itself, and is unaccounted for because it cannot be accurately measured. After all, consciousness seems to occupy much of the entire brain.

In fact, most, if not all, of these types of “neural science” depend upon correlation in order to “prove” causation. This is necessary, at least at this point in the science, because there is no direct instrumentation which can be connected to the “conscious awareness” in order to determine the exact time of awareness. While some researchers warn against this flaw, others publish papers claiming fact based on correlation alone; Harris refers to the latter.

Moreover, other correlates are ignored, such as related activity in other portions of the brain which are activated at only sub-threshold levels in terms of increased blood flow (a poor correlate in itself)(Note 2), so that there actually is no understanding of the full mental process. Further, what is being measured is stimulus – response, without acknowledging the full process of rational determination, which necessarily includes comparison with other acquired knowledge (requires a memory search), differentiation between cases, judgment based on a rule set which must be accessed, and refiling into a related memory location. Much less understood is the spontaneous generation of creative, original thoughts. None of these are measured, or even acknowledged as necessary to the making of an intentional decision.

So not only is the instrumentation not on the right correlate, it doesn’t measure actual mental processing.

Most glaring is the unanswered issue of how it is that the subconscious mind might be induced to make abstract decisions, create abstract thoughts previously unthought, causally produce action which can be carried out only by the conscious, but parasitic, mind, not to mention why consciousness is there at all given that everything is done subconsciously with the conscious mind merely receiving notice that it was done already.

This is dismissed as “mystery” by Harris. And if there is mystery, “then,” he asks, “where is the freedom in that?” Why not admit that X exists by universal experience, even if the neurological discharge is still a mystery.

But those questions are just the start of the hard questions surrounding free will, questions which, if answerable and answered, might turn determinism on its head.


Why is the dream-world irrational? Is the rational homunculus asleep? Why is consciousness required in order for rationality to be instituted into mental activity? Given that consciousness merely receives information after the fact, why doesn’t determinism work the same without consciousness as it does during consciousness?

How does determinism of atomic and electron placement clear back to the origin of the universe predict rational intellect? Or is there no rational intellect, purely because of determinism? Why do Harris and Dennett etc. need to make a distinction between complete determinism and “fatalism”, unless they need a hole in their argument to allow for the actuality of agency, even if agency is within the environmental and psychological constraints to which an individual is subject? If “freedom” is an illusion, then why is the distinction – strained as it is – necessary, or even logical, given the abjurance of fatalism and the existence of choice but not freedom?

And if there is the onerous delay required to initiate action and then conscious recognition of the action, why do carpenters have fingers remaining on their hands? If there is no synchronicity between physical reality and conscious perception of reality, then power tools would be lethal and unusable. There would be no chance to perform any delicate manual procedure consciously. If there are delays, the world would have moved on without waiting for our illusion to appear. We would be “living” some indeterminate time behind the real, physical world. Do we believe that this is actually the case, and if so why? Merely to satisfy Philosophical Materialism, an internally non-coherent ideology?

Harris says on page 46,

“Our interests in life are not always served by viewing people and things as collections of atoms – but this doesn’t negate the truth or utility of physics”.

Physics, Harris says, (or at least some tests somewhere) overrules our personal experience: a philosophical Materialistic and Scientistic statement which Harris follows on the same page with this:

“A creative change of inputs to the system – learning new skills, forming new relationships, adopting new habits of attention – may radically transform one’s life”.

This statement of conscious agency is a direct contradiction of his prior statement, and the book is full of similar direct contradictions. Full. For example, two pages later in a new chapter on Moral Responsibility, Harris makes this observation:

“Judgments of responsibility depend upon the overall complexion of one’s mind, not on the metaphysics of mental cause and effect”.

By complexion he means, apparently, the prior states; by metaphysics Harris means, apparently, agency;. This is verified by his position that justice cannot assign guilt when there is no conscious agency. This contradicts the prior statement just above, which attributes agency to changing one’s life around.

And he blames the current justice system for retributive punishment rather than realignment, ignoring the fact that removal from society is the only “punishment” given for almost all moderately serious infractions these days. And even Harris agrees that removal from society is necessary, introducing another contradiction still.

And by page 56, Harris cannot resist an attack on religion, specifically Christianity:

“Few concepts have offered greater scope for human cruelty than the idea of an immortal soul that stands independent of all material influences, ranging from genes to economic systems. Within a religious framework, a belief in free will supports the notion of sin – which seems to justify harsh punishment not only in this life but eternal punishment in the next. And yet, ironically, one of the fears attending our progress in science is that a more complete understanding of ourselves will dehumanize us.”

Harris’ misunderstanding of Christianity is dwarfed only by his misunderstanding of world history. First, the most massive cruelties of history were endured very recently, historically, and were administered by Atheist regimes – Lenin/Stalin, Mao, Pol Pot, Castro; and the psycho regime of Aryan-Nordic-NAZIism. Moreover, the idea of separating criminals is not just a religious premise. And Atheists have no belief in eternal life, so they cannot be threatened by “eternal punishment” in a next life which doesn’t exist. Strike one.

While the concept of sin, which is actually the concept of personal responsibility for one’s actions, is supported by free will, it is not free will that generated it. But if there is total determinism as the Atheists wish it to be understood, then there is no personal responsibility for anything, whether good or bad. And that is the greatest scope possible for human cruelty.
Strike two.

Finally, Christians are not afraid of actual, factual, disciplined, empirical science; it was invented by Christians, and Christians populate industrial R&D where non-ideological science is done successfully. But what is being done more and more is scientism, unsupported by actual disciplined, replicable, falsifiable, objective empiricism. And this is done in academia where results and consequences do not exist, and ideology can corrupt without repercussions. And even Michael Shermer, the Atheist celebrity Skeptic, has termed the fMRI investigations to be the equivalent of phrenology. The categorical, conclusive-types of “studies”, and declarations of “fact” to which the Atheist authors want to apply to non-falsifiable subjects should be anathema to anyone who values valid data provided by disciplined and rigorous empiricism rather than ideology.
Strike three.

What Harris has delivered is breathless ideology based on his one single idea, ( based on two fallacies) which is that, given determinism, IF the cause of neural firing or even prior history electron placement is not known, THEN there is no freedom to attach to human will, which therefore is an illusion. This is entirely non sequitur, with the conclusion in no way dependent upon the antecedent, and the antecedent not even being a piece of knowledge which could even conceivably prove the conclusion.

Finally, Harris makes the astonishing claim that accepting the lack of free will has made him more moral: more empathetic because of his new understanding that people really can’t help what they do. On page 62, for example, he makes this claim:

“How much credit does a person deserve for not being lazy? None at all. Laziness, like diligence is a neurological condition. Of course, conservatives are right to think that we must encourage people to work at the best of their abilities and discourage free riders wherever we can. And it is wise to hold people responsible for their actions when doing so influences their behavior and brings benefits to society. But this does not mean that we must be taken in by the illusion of free will. We need only acknowledge that efforts matter and that people can change.”

How many contradictions are contained within that single sub-paragraph? Laziness and diligence are predetermined and not created; but free riders are loafers and must be addressed. People are totally predetermined and not free agents, but if held responsible they can change their behaviors. Free will is an illusion, but “efforts matter” and “people can change” even though their conscious world is totally deterministic.

Even further it is entirely dependent upon Philosophical Materialism being exactly true, an assertion which is noncoherent in itself (note 3).

CONCLUSION
Harris is far from an objective source for information which might reflect on his ideology. He is rather an apologist for his ideology who rationalizes, trying to justify his Atheism and Philosophical Materialism. In his rush to support his ideology, he accepts fallacies and contradictions and questionable science without question.

Especially disturbing are the glowing endorsements from professors of philosophy on the back cover. The attachment to ideology over logic is palpable.

I truly resent having to spend money on this book, especially now after reading it, even more than before. It seems that Harris’ books must be read purely because it is Harris who is writing it, and that the Atheist community will read it breathlessly and believe it uncritically, because Harris is one of them. Plus he gained considerable notoriety with his book attacking Christianity, so he is widely known and read. So if one is following Atheism, then one must know what sort of apologetics Harris is pumping out now.

Not all Atheists buy into Harris’ attempts to justify Scientism and his personal version of logical positivism. Massimo Pigliucci has long been a foe of both scientism and Harris. And evolutionary biologist Austin Hughes stings Harris in his article in New Atlantis. But Harris is a charter member of the inbred New Atheists, who give each other awards and pimp each other’s new books. So of course he gets high marks from the usual suspects. The New Atheists have created nearly as many Atheists as the Catholic church.

So I had to take 90 minutes to read Harris’ assault on Free Will. It could have been shorter, maybe 12 pages rather than the 66 pages he stretched it to (using double spacing and hyper-wide margins, including top and bottom. But no matter. Once he had stated the premise, it became quite familiar, showing up on nearly every page and sometimes twice. And with just the one premise, he actually had very little to say, once it was said.


NOTES
(1) If determinism is valid, then the human is an uncaused causer, because human agency is rationally undeniable, and it defies predetermined control; therefore, if causality is to be maintained, the cause of human agency must be some as yet unidentified, but non-material thing, which we would call a substance, but which has no actual material substance which is subject to determinism.
Bertrand Russell, Nine Lectures on the Mind; paraphrased.

(2) The concept of bloodflow in the brain as a definitive indication of having made a decision is completely accepted without question by the Materialist neuroscientists. But there is no direct measurement of either the decision, or the actual receipt of information by the conscious mind. And the conclusion can be accepted only by declaring our every experience to be a delusion.

In fact, there is no knowledge that the bloodflow indicates a decision at all; that is a Jump To Conclusion. The bloodflow might be preparatory for initial conditions which need to be satisfied in order to make the decision consciously. This might include the need for memory access to comparable situations so that a rational comparison can be made. And it might include the differentiation process, and other processes required of rational decision making, before the decision is actually made. Or it might merely be a nutritional preparation for a process which is upcoming.

This is more likely than the total delusion which is favored by the Atheist neuroscientists, without actual direct evidence for its support.

(3) Philosophical Materialism makes the specific claim that material existence is the only existence there is, and that all knowledge can and must be materially generated. That claim is internally contradictory, because the claim cannot be proven using material evidence. Therefore, the claim cannot be knowledge under its own conditions, and is paradoxical (internally contradictory, and noncoherent), thus being irrational.