An Analysis: Jason Thibodeau On Nontheism

What started out as note-taking for a conversation with Jason Thibodeau regarding his 2012 article, “Do Atheists Need a Moral Theory to be Moral Realists?”, turned into a serious look at the logic behind his propostion. So the first part of this will be note-like, morphing later on into an analysis (which doesn't develop until half way through, because that's where he actually starts his justification; seems there's always got to be theism-bashing first, even though the purported thrust of this article is a justification of metaphysical principles WITHOUT theism.)

He starts by assuming that moral theory has an ontological status. That’s where my notes start; also I assigned my own reference numbers to the paragraphs or concepts he put in place, so that I could differentiate them more easily.

1. Ontological Status for Moral Theory.

Assigning the status of ontology to moral theory is based on what evidence? Is it so assigned based only on the assumption of materialism/physicalism? If so, what is the evidence for those? Are there lumps of mass/energy called moral theories?

2. Moral Facts in Physicalist Theory.

How does a “moral fact” exist in a purely physical context? If there are “facts” that exist physically, then what do they weigh? What mass/energy do the contain? Or are facts merely phantoms, not physical things in themselves, perhaps a belief about some physical thing which is, in truth, mass/energy?

3. Tu Quoque for religion.

The argument will be made against religion, rather than for, Atheist moral facts?

“ these worldviews stand on equal footing; neither has any more right than the other to claim the ability to answer perplexing questions about the foundations of morality.”

4. Euthyphro.

“We have two choices:

a. Wrong actions (like murder) are wrong just because God commands[2]that we not engage in them. Right actions are right just because God commands that we perform them.

b. God commands that we not engage in wrong actions (such as murder) because these actions are wrong. And he commands that we perform right actions because they are right.”

That is not a correct statement of Euthyphro's actual reach.

Euthyphro leads to four, not two, possibilities.

1. God is subordinate to moral principles. (God is contingent)
2. Moral principles are subordinate to God. (God is capricious)
3. God is moral principle. (tautology)
4. God and moral principles are totally independent. (mutually exclusive)

Euthyphro is not a logical dichotomy; it is a False Dichotomy, a logical error of omission where the actual necessary proposition is omitted from the argument.

4. Euthyphro is dispensed with:

” My contention is that theism has no more secure metaphysical basis that accounts for objective morality than atheism. If I am right, then despite the philosophical value of Socrates' argument, atheism can be defended against the moral argument quite independently of the concerns that arise from the Euthyphro dilemma.”

“Even if it impossible to prove in some scientific/positivistic fashion that moral values exist, we probably find ourselves far more certain of the wrongness of such actions [as an adulterer's abandoning one's wife and children] than we may be of the truth of Einstein's relativity theories or of the universe's expansion. (Copan, 2003, p. 151)”

This is a purely western view of morality, not a general human consideration. So its value as a general universal principle is questionable, and it is without evidentiary support.

Side note of no particular assigned value: Buddha left his wife and children and took off on the road.

5. Intuitions as Moral Theory:

“there is no reason why an atheist cannot appeal to such intuitions as his basis for maintaining that morality is objective”.

Except that most Atheist philosophers give intuitions no credibility whatsoever; in fact, they are considered to be just more subjective delusions to be discredited by their lack of objective content for universal evaluation.

“Atheists no more need a godless moral theory to rely on these powerful moral intuitions than theists need a divine one to do the same.”

Non sequitur: theists do require a god source; that's why they are theists. Second half of the assertion is false.

“Unless there is a demonstrable, deep incoherence in atheistic moral realism, the atheist's commitment to objective morality can be as strong as that of the theist.”

And there IS a deep incoherence in Atheistic moral realism. Let’s take a look:

IF Atheism rejects all external sources of moral authority
THEN moral authority is internal to the Atheist.

IF moral authority is internal to the Atheist,
THEN moral authority is subjective within each Atheist.

IF moral authority is subjective within each Atheist,
THEN moral authority is subjective, not objective; morals so derived are not objective; morals so derived are personal proclivities; morals so derived are without force for any other individual; morals so derived are relative to the individual and thus are relativistic, relieving them of any objective values.

Further,

IF there is no such “thing” as moral authority,
THEN there are no authorized morals.

Here is the claim for universal applicability of any and all principles, save one:

“Similarly, in order to maintain that objective mathematics and logic are compatible with atheism, atheists need not develop a secular foundation for math and logic.”

In other words: There is no reason to prove something is true, if it can be demonstrated that "there is no reason to prove something is true". Circular.

Moreover, Atheism is either merely a rejection, in which case it has no actual principles, or it is a declaration of knowledge of non-existence, in which case it has one actual principle (an unprovable principle).

If Atheism has no principles attached to it, then it is trivial to assert compatability with it.

If Atheism has just one negative principle, then it is also trivial to assert compatibility with it. Under this theory, killing and eating children is also compatible with either theory of Atheism, as is any other practice X as well as its negation, practice !X. Atheism is a void into which everything fits without bending or filing.

“The demand that, if they are to be moral realists, atheists must offer a well-developed theory of the foundation of morality assumes that theists are already in possession of such an account”.

False. The demand is on each separately and independently, and is for (a) moral authority (source), and (b) moral theory grounded in the source. What theism says has no bearing on the validity or falsity of what Atheists claim. Atheist claims must withstand scrutiny on their own, without reference to theism.

“If there were no assumption that morality is easier to account for in a theistic framework, then it could not possibly count as a strike against atheism that it lacks an explanation of the basis of morality”.

This is an attempt to Poison The Well with claims that Atheism depends on theism, when in actuality if Atheism is the case, then it has no need of demeaning theism in advance of making its case.

“ I will show that (1) there is no reason to suppose that morality is more easily explained on the assumption that God exists and (2) there is no argument that succeeds in demonstrating that moral realism is the least bit in tension with the position that there is no God. Simply put, positing God makes it neither easier nor harder to explain the basis of morality. Contra Martin, then, atheists need not develop a secular foundation for morality in order to be moral realists.”

If this is the argument, then it is without value in declaring actual value for Atheist moral theories, which are easily demonstrated to be internal, subjective rather than objective, and without moral authority. We’ll see as we move along.

6. Still More Euthyphro:

“Though I will not pursue the argument here, I think that the Euthyphro dilemma is fatal to any theory that grounds morality in the will or character of God.[5] The responses to this dilemma[6] are unconvincing, and the autonomy of ethics seems to require that God plays no role in the grounding of moral facts.[7] However, focusing on the Euthyphro dilemma can result in our neglecting very significant weaknesses in theistic moral theories.”

This was already established, above.

“When we move beyond Euthyphro-type concerns, we find that theistic accounts of morality fail to answer many pressing foundational issues (which, in turn, leaves ample room for moral skepticism even under the assumption that God exists). Thus, when it comes to explaining objective morality, disbelief in a Supreme Being does not make the task more difficult. The task is difficult, period. Theistic "explanations" are little more than attempts to allay our curiosity while simultaneously maintaining the appropriate level of reverence for the profundity of the question; they blindly gesture toward an answer without actually removing any of the mystery.”

So far, this presents no case.

“Typically, responses to the moral argument for theism involve three lines of criticism: First and foremost, critics will appeal to the Euthyphro dilemma to show that theistic voluntarism[8] about morality has very counterintuitive consequences.[9] Second, the nontheistic moral realist will point to various deficiencies in the explanatory apparatus of the theistic theory.[10] Third, the defender of the thesis that morality is independent of God may sketch, develop, and/or defend some nontheistic moral theory.[11]”

The first and second issues have no bearing on the validity of an atheist theory, which is to be developed as the third part of the argument apparently. So I will skip to #3.

Well, scanning down, it is difficult to pull #3 out; I will skip, then, to the numbered, bolded statements.

7. Consideration 1: Naturalism/Materialism is Incompatible with Moral Realism

Because Atheism is compatible with everything and nothing, I will grant the Atheism part. However, Naturalism/Materialism have a hard row to hoe, because under the theory that only physical existence exists, then moral realism must be shown to be physical/material, existing in fixed lumps of mass, or indestructible waves of energy.

Let’s continue.

“…this concern is misdirected when used as a criticism of atheism.”

Good. Let’s see why that is:

“The primary mistake is to assume that atheism is equivalent to a kind of reductive materialism, according to which real properties are all and only those that are invoked in materialist or physicalist explanations. But this assumption is problematic in at least two ways. First, we are not aware of every physical law, and thus cannot claim to know the boundaries the physical. Second, and more to the point, most atheists do not actually hold such a view because there are real properties other than those that figure in physical laws. ”

I doubt seriously that it can be shown that “most atheists” do not hold such a view; my experience is otherwise. However, the real problem here is the assertion of “real properties other than those which figure in physical laws”. Are they physical or not?

“… but on the above criteria, it seems that it is not; logical validity figures in no physical law of which I am aware. But almost every atheist who has ever written is committed to the existence of validity as a genuine property. If atheists can legitimately be realists about validity and other logical properties, then why can they not also legitimately be realists about moral properties?”

This is problematic on two levels; first, physicalist; second, on the comprehension of first principles. If the intent is to destroy physicalism as a reliable theory of what exists – such as logical validity – then the argument is on the mark. On the other hand, given that logical validity is dependent upon first principles which are observable characteristics of the physical universe, then it fails. First Principles, of course, are observations which are deemed self-evident and incorrigible, and that process of assessment is outside of the realm of physical existence, being a conscious decision. (Apparently it all always comes back to whether the conscious mind is either an agent or a physical “thing”).

8. Next is an excellent argument to discuss:

“Nontheism: to the extent that they are explainable, all properties/events/objects are explainable without reference to God/gods; there are no properties that require a metaphysical grounding and/or explanation in terms of God/gods.”

First, why are we even discussing this, when the argument directly for the Atheist grounding is what we want to see and discuss? Second, after having made the case for nonphysical things existing (just above), how is the rejection of metaphysical grounding even possible without serious contradiction/incoherence? But moving on:

“As the bare claim that God is not necessary to explain the existence of anything, nontheism (as I have defined it) is much more relevant than reductive materialism to an evaluation of the implications of a worldview that lacks belief in God.”

Now I get it; it is possible to have a metaphysical, but not metaphysical, argument, one which is not restricted by the necessity of having mass/energy under the theories of physicalism/materialism. This also appears to be internally incoherent. But let’s move on again:

“Nontheism does not imply that there are no nonreducible properties, nor does it imply that there are no nonnatural or nonphysical properties. It only denies that there are properties whose metaphysical ground/explanation involves the existence or activities of God(s).”

Then we have moved directly into New Ageism, where physical proof is no longer necessary or possible, but where it can be invoked as true and valid without the usual standards of validation.

“The explanatory apparatus available to the nontheist is not limited to naturalistic explanations; it would be proper to characterize the metaphysics of nontheism as open, with the one caveat that gods are not allowed.”

This statement confirms the suspicion just above.

This sort of intellectual environment allows neither discrimination nor differentiation, because it has no principles with which to do so. It has removed both physical restrictions and has summarily decreed that there is no superior being allowed. This construction allows the Atheist to be the declared supreme intellect within the environment he creates, and to eliminate even physical restrictions (which necessarily removes the First Principles, and eliminates logic by excising it from its grounding). If this is the basis for the rest of the paper, it should be understood that the environment itself proposes that anything and nothing are provable within it.

“So it is an important consequence of the metaphysical openness of nontheism that nontheism can grant the existence of any feature of the universe for which there is either ample evidence or sufficient argument.”

This is an incomplete statement of the full impact of the “nontheist” environment. In fact, this statement is indiscernible from physicalist arguments. Any argument or evidence is sufficient in this environment of non-discrimination; so it can be either true or false depending only upon opinion. It’s rather like Baysianism in that regard.

9. Full-On Assertion Of The Validity of Myths, Just So Stories and Fables:

“A nontheist can follow the reasonable general principle that we ought to believe in whatever there is ample evidence to believe in. And this rule holds whether or not we have a theory that explains the metaphysical basis of that in which we believe. It is false that for everything in which we believe, we need an elaborate worldview that explains how such things are possible. For example, our scientifically naïve ancestors did not require a theory about what stars are and what makes them possible in order to believe that they exist.”

10. First Argument From No Restrictions:

“So it is an important consequence of the metaphysical openness of nontheism that nontheism can grant the existence of any feature of the universe for which there is either ample evidence or sufficient argument. Thus every consideration in favor of moral realism (that does not reference God as an explanatory power) can be used by the nontheist to justify his moral realism. In particular, every argument that Copan offers to justify the belief that morality is objective in his "The Moral Argument" can be appealed to by the nontheist. Nothing that is metaphysically odd or unusual is closed off to the nontheist just in virtue of its apparent irreducibility to physical properties.[16]”

This is blatant use of theism by merely denying that it is theism. It is intellectual theft by denying any restrictions due to materialism or logic. It is not justified by the author other than that with no restrictions, anything can be done, anything can be proven, and there being no discrimination or differentiation on the basis of validity or truth value, then truth is whatever is declared, no more and no less.

11. Consideration 2: On an Atheistic Worldview Moral Properties are Queer or Difficult to Account For This argument is granted. The environment now can accept either way with equanimity.

"But I see no reason to suppose that it is impossible to understand the foundations of morality without thereby knowing how to answer questions about moral motivation."

Of course not. Those questions would get in the way.

“Assuming that mortal persons cannot accomplish the task, whatever capacities God possesses in virtue of being a person cannot explain how he is able to create objective value while mortals lack that capability.”

But of course, no explanations are needed any more, right? Right? Or is it only theist propositions that require explanation? Blatant Special Pleading.

12. Consideration 3: Atheism has no Account of How Morality is Grounded or Explained And that is the entire thrust of this long article: to prove that Atheism doesn’t need to have an account of how morality is grounded or explained. (!)

So what the author does here is to go off on theism, rather than to support his own lack of account or lack of need for an account; he can just believe. There is serial Tu Quoquing going on here.

13. Consideration 4: You cannot Derive Value from Valuelessness

“For any move that the theist might make in response to this fact (assuming that it is a fact), there is a parallel, nontheistic move. For example, if the theist insists (with Copan below) that God has inherent moral value, the atheist can assert that the universe (or at least certain parts/aspects of it) does as well.”

This descends into absurdity. The Atheist, having established that he can make any assertion under the new “nontheist”, open environment where no discrimination against falseness can exist, goes ahead and makes an absurd assertion which has no possible proof. The “universe” does not predict or in any manner assure the existence of a metaphysical moral code; such is not deducible from mass/energy, so the nontheist just makes it so by declaring it to be so. There is zero proof that moral value is created by the universe. By confusing the issue with theism, the Atheist once again is playing word games with theism rather than providing any cogent reason for believing his statements.

Moving ahead, theism becomes the main topic, in a category supposed to be involving “deriving value from valuelessness”. Where is the Atheist positive position which proves that the opposite is actually true? Not here.

14. Finally; the End:

“Both Craig and Copan have chastised atheists for the perceived failure to offer an adequate explanation for how objective moral value can be grounded in a nontheistic universe. But before atheists feel obliged to offer such an account, they should demand the corresponding theistic one. This God-based account must do more than simply point to the Almighty (and his words, deeds, character, commands, etc.) as the source of moral facts; it must answer precisely the sorts of questions that Craig and Copan claim atheistic theories have not answered.”

This is an outrageously obvious Special Pleading. There is willful blindness to the nontheist demand to have no restrictions of physical or logical nature placed on himself, enabling the most egregiously unprovable and irrational statements to be declared as truth – while demanding that theists not be so liberated from proofs or logic.

I’m aghast.