An Atheist Inductive Argument Scrutinized

A reader asks me to take a look at an Atheist’s probability arguments. It’s taken a few days, sorry. But here it is. First the argument as it is presented:

"Let S be the proposition that human moral experiences are a product of subjective values functions, and that those value functions are informed primarily by socialization and evolutionary history.

Let O be the proposition that human moral experiences are a product of some apprehension of objective moral values.

Let V be the observation that human moral opinions vary from person to person.

Let C be the observation that human moral opinions tend to vary more between cultures than between individuals.

P(V|O) < P(V|S) P(C|O) << P(V|S) Further, there does not appear to be any further evidence, E, such that P(E|V) > P(E|S)

Further, O is strictly less parsimonious than S.

Hence, we have strong justification for S over O."

The analysis appears to be a partial Bayesian induction, which doesn't go as far as the final calculation. It's just inductive, to the point of weighting, and it's not related to Kolmogorov algorithmic probability in any way. Its premises can be analyzed for any truth value which might inhere. As in any logical conclusions, including inductive of course, if the premises are not valid, true, and grounded in first principles, then they are false. That is the standard of Aristotlelian logic – college logic 101 – and it is the logic used here to analyze the probability claims. This is a failure of Bayes usage: besides being prone to prejudicial misuse, when used for metaphysical claims or unfalsifiable claims, it provides only highly dubious probability at best. It is incapable of objective fact generation, even using empirically derived probabilities. It is incapable of the capacity of deduction's ability to provide unquestionable truth when done properly.

A discussion of Induction via Bayesian assumptions is here, for a refresher (It's embedded in the articles):

The probability argument begins:

"Let S be the proposition that human moral experiences are a product of subjective values functions, and that those value functions are informed primarily by socialization and evolutionary history.

Let O be the proposition that human moral experiences are a product of some apprehension of objective moral values."

The term, “moral experiences” is undefined, and seems to be without any value regarding to the actual objective existence of moral principles. The term “experiences” seems to indicate subjective apprehension in both premises, not objective knowledge of anything. Science, for example, is not done on the basis of “human material experiences”; it is done on the basis of objective experimentation, performable by other experimenters as a test of replicability for validation and non-falsifiability. That’s how objectivity is produced in materialist premises.

So O has no bearing on actual existence of objective morality. Using it for such is false.

"Let V be the observation that human moral opinions vary from person to person.

Let C be the observation that human moral opinions tend to vary more between cultures than between individuals."

This “observation”, C, is beyond dubious, it is prejudiced and prejudicial for purposes of biasing the faux Bayesian analysis below; it is without any supporting data and is highly likely false purely because there are no Atheist moral principles at all which are derivable from Atheism, beyond those “moral” principles each individual Atheist creates for himself. Therefore, given the number of Atheists on the globe – and counting the communists, secularists, Hindus and Buddhists – the number of dissimilar, individually-derived “moralities” is very likely far higher than the objectively held moralities.

C is merely a prejudicial opinion, not an objective fact. It has no truth value for use in any calculation.

Now for the relative positioning of the premises.

"P(V|O) < P(V|S)"

This is a typical Bayesian Probability set up technique. It uses pure opinion, with no possible actual data to support any validity it might have. Especially given that O does not describe any useful information regarding the actual existence of objective morality.

In this case, the relative positioning of the two probabilities is purely by opinion, not by any objective factual probability calculation. In other words, it is a prejudiced personal projection made toward a presupposed objective. Were any actual facts discovered for use here, the relative positioning would likely be reversed.

"P(C|O) << P(V|S)"

This placement of relative probabilities also is based not on any fact or data or study, it is purely based on the presuppositional prejudices of the author. Given that both C and O are personal opinion, and obviously prejudicial, there is precisely no actual rational or empirical reason to believe that this is the case.

"Further, there does not appear to be any further evidence, E, such that P(E|V) > P(E|S)"

This is really interesting, given that there is no evidence provided for any of the premises, period. Denial of “further evidence” is in the form of a joke, then.

"Further, O is strictly less parsimonious than S."

It is hardly arguable that O is less parsimonious than S; this is a truth claim which has no basis whatsoever for its belief, because O has no actual meaning in the argument. In fact, if parsimony refers to simplicity vs excessive complexity, then O is far MORE parsimonious than S, given the complexity of S. So this is another failure, possibly that of Equivocation of the term, parsimony, but more likely just a blatant biasing of the argument toward the desired conclusion. It is based on no justification of any kind for the declared truth being asserted.

"Hence, we have strong justification for S over O."

No, there is absolutely nothing presented here which is anything other than opinion, which is declared to be truth for purposes of biasing “premises” in a phony “probability” calculation. That is not justification, it is propaganda. It is a poor man’s Bayesian exercise, where opinion is plugged in and declared to be factually useful for calculating a probability in the favor of the author.

Bayesian induction is a favorite of individuals who are scamming lesser knowledgeable folks. Bayesian calculations are useful only when prior premises have probabilities which are factually available as empirical determinations (I.e. NOT opinion). One example of successful usage of Bayesian Inference is the Coast Guard’s calculations regarding the probable position of a lost boater, based on prior conditions of wind, currents, tides, time at last known location, and prior routes taken by the boater. These are not opinions, they are facts which can be plugged into the Bayes equation, and the probable current location of the lost boater can then successfully calculated.

Bayesian Induction for metaphysical use is a resort of anti-intellectual scoundrels and scammers.

Bayesian Statistics, in the News

The NY Times discovers Bayesian Statistical Calculations, and even gives a shout out to the obvious problems with it:

"One downside of Bayesian statistics is that it requires prior information — and often scientists need to start with a guess or estimate. Assigning numbers to subjective judgments is “like fingernails on a chalkboard,” said physicist Kyle Cranmer, who helped develop a frequentist technique to identify the latest new subatomic particle — the Higgs boson.

Others say that in confronting the so-called replication crisis, the best cure for misleading findings is not Bayesian statistics, but good frequentist ones. It was frequentist statistics that allowed people to uncover all the problems with irreproducible research in the first place, said Deborah Mayo, a philosopher of science at Virginia Tech. The technique was developed to distinguish real effects from chance, and to prevent scientists from fooling themselves.

Uri Simonsohn, a psychologist at the University of Pennsylvania, agrees. Several years ago, he published a paper that exposed common statistical shenanigans in his field — logical leaps, unjustified conclusions, and various forms of unconscious and conscious cheating.

He said he had looked into Bayesian statistics and concluded that if people misused or misunderstood one system, they would do just as badly with the other. Bayesian statistics, in short, can’t save us from bad science."
[emphasis added]

It's actually worse than that. It is a favorite of ideological hacks who place their ideology into the equation up front, thereby getting the results they want rather than objective knowledge. Bayesian calculations are an open invitation to pretend that circular arguments are justified statistically.

That's not to say that with legitimate use of non-biased input, Bayes calculations can't be valuable, as in the case of the fisherman rescued by the Coast Guard which used Bayes to anticipate the location of the drifting man. But that uses known information, regarding physical data which is not ideological as an input to the calculation. That is far different from trying to calculate, say, the existence of a deity, where any input is prejudiced by definition.

Whenever Bayes is used, the calculations must ALWAYS be scrutinized for bias, because in some venues they always will be. And that is, indeed, like fingernails on a chalkboard.

Responding to Jeffrey Jay Lowder's Second Post Regarding My Ignorance and Lack of Knowledge and Integrity.

[Note: Be forewarned: this turned out to be very long.]

I just realized that given the last Lowder post was called the “third”, there must also have been a second (see how I did that?). Sure enough there is one. His rebut starts with this:

”If Stan knew as much about philosophy as he claims, he would know that questions don’t have defeaters. “

I never claimed to be a philosopher: I would never, ever do that, and I have written on why I would not ever do that. For one thing it seems to compromise thought processing due to the need to attain and maintain credentialing in the peer world; that stifles many paths. For another, it requires up-front rejection of all previous philosophical musings in order to produce something new, thereby producing necessary radicalism, which is an acceptable pathway. But yes, I did use a somewhat confusing term there, and the question should have been a clear assertion, with no inference required of the reader.

However, Lowder took an unnecessary shot at something which I don’t claim, in an obvious attempt to demean me, as a person, which is a reduction of his integrity in my estimation, not to mention a cheap rhetorical tactic.

Lowder said this:

"Because atheists, naturalists, and materialists aren’t required to believe that God, the supernatural, and the immaterial, respectively, cannot exist, there is no justifiable reason for Stan’s insistence that they prove as much."

Jeffery Jay Lowder is right in this sense: Atheism has no principles or beliefs attached to it all. None. Atheism, taken by itself, is a void, a negation, a rejection, and nothing more. There are no positive assertions or principles attached to basic Atheism, only the negative assertion that “there is no deity” (or in one of its deviant forms), which is more of an anti-principle and anti-belief.

However, atheists don’t sit still at that point, they proceed directly to backfill the void. What they backfill the void with is up to the individual. Some become Marxists, some become materialist/naturalists, some become metaphysical naturalists who do only induction, and so on. There is no intellectual or philosophical or moral limit on what the atheist might become, after the void. So the one thing which atheists have in common is the rejection of deity, and even then some claim only not to have any deity beliefs, some claim that there is no deity, some claim that it is “probable” that there is no deity, and so on. So it is true that the only thing that can be said about atheists is that they have no beliefs in common at all, except that they do not accept theism.

This lack of commonality in positive principles is what I refer to as the atheist void. But the void does have some fairly common consequences, including rejecting absolutes (except for a few personal preferences here and there); the need to create a personal moral theory or at least some principles which can be called morals in an emergency, or some principles which can be applied to the Other for shaming, but generally nothing which is absolute for the behavior of oneself. And there is the general drift toward Leftism and Messiahism which emerges from intellectual condescension and self-righteousness.

But, leaving that digression, many atheists do make some claims despite having no common principles, claims like “we are good without God”, or various teapot/FSM/unicorn/euthyphro false analogies, or naturalist/materialist demands for natural/material evidence, or demands for answers to prayers for cheeseburgers to be handed to them by God, etc.

But none of this atheist effluential ejecta addresses the real need for disciplined knowledge, or even acknowledges such a need. And that topic is generally met with thunderous silence when the topic is broached in terms of the necessities and sufficiencies required for actual objective conclusions.

So what I do now is to repeat my original statement, in the following manner, so as not to trigger the literalism police as I have in the past. I agree that clarity is essential in the pursuit of disciplined knowledge. So here is another attempt to make it clear what is required, if one claims any certainty regarding a material-based ideology - and if atheists don’t possess certainty, then why do they make such a big deal out of their contingent beliefs? (note 1)

” In general atheists claim that atheism is based on evidence and logic. Were that the case, and were atheism a robust truth, then there would be both empirical, experimental, falsifiable and not falsified, replicable and replicated, peer reviewed with open data, physical evidence (under physicalism); and/or a disciplined deductive argument which is of valid construction, grounded and demonstrably true premises, which passes the test of Reductio Ad Absurdum. “ (yes I changed the term to reductio).

And kindly notice that this statement, which is not a question, applies to whatever “atheism” is being claimed by any given atheist, whether it is that “God does not exist”, or “God cannot exist”, or “maybe God sorta kinda exists”, or “God probably doesn’t exist”, or “I refuse to give reasons for rejecting theism”, and so on. The point is that atheists, being in a contra-religion, never seem to want to discuss the actual objective, physical justification for their intellectual existence in the objectivity void, in real, empirical terms as are presented in the statement above.

Next Lowder declares my request for actual empirical data to be gibberish:

”Stan continues:

It is apparent that the concept of empirical evidence is different for JJ Lowder, in that it seems to refer to personal inferences which are taken from material situations, and even then not all of the claims even refer to actual material “things”. Perhaps this is a consequence of habitual inductive thinking; but the term “empirical” should ring a bell, one would think. Empiricism is the gold standard for material evidence. However, under mataphysical [sic] naturalism, who knows what the criteria might be, since they would likely be metaphysical? That renders them nonfalsifiable, empirically, though, and thus they can’t actually qualify as knowlege.

Lowder replies:

This is mostly a bunch of philosophical gibberish, but let me attempt to clarify what I think they key issues are. (1) As a Bayesian, I believe evidence is a term that describes a relationship between two or more propositions. One proposition (A) can be evidence for another proposition (B) insofar as A increases the probability of B. (2) For “ultimate” metaphysical hypotheses like supernaturalism, naturalism, and theism, we can objectively compare the intrinsic probabilities of such hypotheses using such criteria as modesty and scope.

And here is the rub: the act of objectively comparing propositions which have no actual objective source (objective: replicable, falsifiable, experimental data) is an exercise in comparing possible to probably fantasies. If neither A nor B have any real world existence, the comparison can still go on, despite the ideological bias which is hardly possible to avoid. And the fact that no one at Lowder’s place, nor Lowder himself has addressed this issue seems to convey that they don’t care about grounding A or B in objective empiricism or demonstrable valid and disciplined deduction. In other words, the propositions and their justifications are inferential all the way down, under inductive unknowability.

Next, Stan:

”The idea that subjective conclusions which are inferred from observations are conclusive, is incorrect.”

Lowder:

”Once again we see Stan attacking that stupid “atheists must believe conclusively / categorically / incorrigibly that God cannot exist” caricature of atheism. (What wouldStan do without that idea?)”

Actually what this statement really means is that their own inferred, inductive calculations are without any actual value, conclusively; so when they draw their conclusions (the probability of A is greater than the probability of B), they are not conclusive conclusions. As asked above, if atheists – this group anyway – can’t or won’t consider their conclusions to have actual knowledge value, then why do they persist in the selective use of induction at the expense of other available, more conclusive methods which they won’t use? And why do they persist as active internet atheists, if they admit to the lack of such knowledge? Could it be that the exclusive use of this specific tool always gives the answer they want, given that they can drive it that way?

Finally there is this exchange:

” Stan then complains I did not respond to the following challenge.

Stan:

Here’s the challenge to atheists: Rather than disproving disproof, as your approach has been, the more straightforward simple proof for atheism illuminates the problem for atheism:
When you can prove, conclusively, robustly, and incorrigibly that there positively is no deity in existence, cannot under any circumstance be a deity in existence, and have the material evidence for that, or even a disciplined, grouunded, [sic] deductive argument for that, then you have proven your case (atheism), and not until.

Further, when you can prove, conclusively, robustly, and incorrigibly that there positively is no non-material existence outside and beyond the capacity of material detection, and have the material evidence for that, or even a disciplined, grounded, deductive argument for that, then you have proven that case (materialism/physicalism as closed system), but not until.

Failure to provide these straightforward proofs would indicate that atheists and physicalists cannot have actual knowledge which supports their atheism and physicalism. Without that knowledge, atheism and physicalism are no more supported than mere fantasies.

Lowder:

”At the risk of repeating myself, here is my response.

1. Atheists qua atheists don’t believe that there “cannot under any circumstance be a deity in existence,” so there is no justifiable reason for Stan’s demand that they provide such evidence.

2. Atheists qua atheists don’t believe that there “is no non-material existence outside and beyond the capacity of material detection.” Here Stan seems to be confusing atheists with materialists, and so his demand of atheists is misplaced.

3. Stan’s assertion–that the belief that God does not exist requires a deductive proof to be justified–is just that: an assertion or a claim which requires some sort of justification. I do not find such a reason anywhere in his post. On the contrary, it seems to me that there is good reason to think Stan’s assertion is false. Just as theism can be justified if the weight of the evidence makes God’s existence highly probable, atheism can be justified if the weight of the evidence makes God’s existence highly improbable.”

First, “atheists qua atheists”? Lowder makes a claim for all atheists, now. His data here is lacking. But the assertion certainly can apply to himself, yet certainly not everyone I conversed with at his blog. So the universal is unwarranted. Nonetheless, the previous discussion of this, (way above) applies. And the conclusion applies: the use of self-created, ideologically-biased, prejudicial premises creates only fantasy conclusions.

Whether or not atheists don’t have a certainty belief, the challenge remains: if they cannot meet the criteria shown, then their atheism is not justified as anything more than a relativist belief system, in this case justified by forcing biased premises into a logical format for drawing a “probable” conclusion which they prefer. (note 2)

Now, for number 3. Lowder thinks that “the weight of evidence makes God’s existence highly improbable”, therefore a disciplined deduction is not necessary. Let’s see.

1. Theism accounts for all natural phenomena. Metaphysical naturalism does not, but probably claims that it can, even though it can’t at the moment.

2. Metaphysical naturalism is an arbitrary designation of a category which is not evident without significant justification. Even many atheists do not hold to metaphysics, and naturalism is without any material proof even possible for its belief in a closed, exclusive system. So the combination of naturalism with the non-physicalism of metaphysics is not accepted by a very wide swath of atheists and naturalists. The theory is thus a minority position within a minority position.

3. The refusal to admit the usage of deduction into the closely held cloister (which is dedicated to induction at the exclusion of the more direct connection between first principles and undeniable conclusions) seems odd, to the point of protective of a culture of willful self-delusion.

4. This is strengthened by use of ungrounded propositions to “support” other ungrounded propositions as increasing the probability of their truth. By ungrounded I mean that any probability calculations involving these propositions cannot be based on anything other than wishful thinking, because the actuals cannot be known; so probability must be created out of nothing in particular to support the argument. The probability is pure opinion.

5. The actuals are specified as mutually exclusive and binary (either there is a God or there is not a God). So it is either a 1 or a 0. So the priors are not based on any knowledge of whether the actuals are 1 or 0, they are based on prejudicially selected instances which are used as propositions and are assigned probability, also prejudicially. There is no other way to assign probabilities in the case of ideological, non-physical, competing theories of origin.

An example: Until 80 years ago it was thought that an infinitely old, fixed universe was more than just probable, it was truth; Einstein thought so until Hubble showed him the red shift. That particular probability went from 1 to 0 very quickly.

If simple naturalism is true, then there are logical lock-outs, such as the physical emergence of consciousness, agency, intellect, qualia, etc., from minerals, for example. The naturalist has no way to deduce those physical realities, and apparently avoids even trying to do so, in favor of comparing Just So Stories.

If metaphysics is added to simple naturalism, there is still no way to deduce the emergence of consciousness, agency, intellect, qualia, etc., using “metaphysics”, because there are no known or objectively knowable principles of “metaphysics”, and thus there are certainly none that override the principles of physics. So what then is the probability of the existence of this agency called “metaphysics”, which explains the physically unexplainable? Whatever probability is assigned is without any reasoning or grounding possible, other than the fatuous attempt to create a new metaphysical, supernatural agency (non-deity), for the use of atheism – to defeat the existing theory of a metaphysical, supernatural agent (deity). This is implied, not stated; to state it is to illuminate its absurdity.

Here Are Some Tests For Prejudice:
1. Are all cases covered? Are all objections covered?
2. Are the arguments grounded in objective fact, or are they ungrounded opinion?
3. Are the arguments based on reproducible, falsifiable principles?
4. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Belief_bias
5. Is this a search for emergent truth, or a search for justification?


From the philosophy pages, some definitions:

induction
Probable reasoning whose conclusion goes beyond what is formally contained in its premises; see deduction / induction.

deduction / induction
Distinction in logic between types of reasoning, arguments, or inferences. In a deductive argument, the truth of the premises is supposed to guarantee the truth of the conclusion; in an inductive argument, the truth of the premises merely makes it probable that the conclusion is true.

Next: Addressing the “Rule of Total Evidence”, of which Lowder provided a scan for my edification:

Lowder’s source (Unknown text-type book):

”It is difficult to say in a general way what “available evidence” means in this context. How much research is required to be sure that we have accounted for all available relevant evidence? Obviously, we are seldom in a position to spend years of our lives - or even hours – acquiring evidence that is “available” in the sense that it is part of the store house of human knowledge. Often we must make judgments and take actions (such as agreeing to an operation) in the absence of evidence that may be “available” but that we are unable to obtain because we lack time or money. The requirement of total evidence is not intended to place unrealistic restrictions on reasoning. It only demands a reasonable effort to find appropriate reference classes. To follow the rule of total evidence, we must not ignore –through carelessness, prejudice, or laziness – evidence that is within our reach, and we must not suppress evidence that is known to be relevant.

Admirable in intent (ignoring the first excuses for not having time, etc.), but lacking two things: first a definition or set of criteria for what qualifies a concept or item as “evidence”; second, how to avoid bias in arguments consisting of ideological concepts which are ungrounded, either physically, or logically in first principles. So this seems to be an ethic which is not accompanied by operational details.

For example, the problems with naturalist solutions to features of life (i.e. consciousness, agency, etc., as given above) do not yield to naturalistic explanations; only bias can conclude otherwise, because those things cannot be deduced, nor can they be replicated via current objective science. Further, the extension of naturalism into metaphysical realms produces no actual explanations in terms of the metaphysical agent(s) and metaphysical principles by which the observable features of life are produced outside and beyond the physical realm. So there is nothing there upon which to confer a probability, except via opinion.

So the idea of Total Evidence must also take into account the questions of what qualifies as evidence, how explanatory it actually is, whether it is complete or merely implied, whether it is objective rather than a personal or shared bias, the personal integrity of the claimant, the objective of truth vs. justification, and so on. This issue does not exist in disciplined deduction.

So, after having claimed that I have no integrity, how will JJ Lowder defend his own?

NOTES:
Note 1: The observation that the atheists always choose the prejudicial “probability” of no God should indicate that their actual beliefs are subsumed in their choices, and their arguments are mere artifacts which reflect those actual beliefs.

Note 2: Let’s check Lowder’s own inductive arguments, here:

First argument: Lowder:

”False. A circular argument is an argument in which the conclusion is stated in (or entailed by) one or more of the premises. Consider the following argument which uses Bayes’s Theorem.
Let B be our background information; E be the existence of human consciousness; T be theism; and N be naturalism. 1. E is known to be true, i.e., Pr(E) is close to 1.

2. N is not intrinsically much more probable than T, i.e., Pr(N | B) is not much greater than Pr(T | B).
3. Pr(E | T) =1 > Pr(E | N).
4. Other evidence held equal, N is probably false, i.e., Pr(N | B & E) < 1/2.
Which premise(s) entail the conclusion? Answer: none. This shows the argument is not circular.
There are instances where opinion of the calculator would not necessarily be a factor; atheist calculations of the probability of the truth of atheism would not qualify as objective, however, and would not qualify as one of those instances.

Premise 2 is a declaration of probability, an assertion, not a fact. If this were a calculated probability based on say, proper sample sizes out of a distribution, then that is one consideration. But the manner used by Lowder for ideological considerations is the inverse of that. What the ideologist does is to create the probabilities for N and T out of no data whatsoever. So the prejudice involved and injected into the premise is palpable. It cannot be otherwise, without actual objective (empirical) reasons for determining the probabilities. Therefore, the prejudice for the outcome is contained in the premise: it is decidedly circular, and denial of the ideologist cannot change that. The second half of the last sentence of item 4 seems to verify this(!)

The problem is NOT with induction; the problem is with the application of induction to improper uses.

Second argument:

Lowder: ” This is a yet another statement of Stan’s prejudice. To show why it is false, let’s consider an actual evidential (Bayesian) argument for naturalism.

Consider William Lane Craig’s version of the fine-tuning argument which goes like this.

1. The fine-tuning of the universe’s initial conditions is either the result of chance, necessity or design. (Premise)
2. It is not the result of chance or necessity. (Premise)
3. Therefore, it is the result of design. (From 1 and 2) This argument is clearly valid. We want to know the probability of (3). As in the case of DA1, the probability of (3) will depend upon the probability of (2). If we have a very weak degree of belief that (2) is true, say we think Pr(2)=0.25, then, by itself, this argument only warrants the belief Pr(3)=0.25.

If we jump directly to the biased presupposition (in bold), it is obvious that the Pr(2) is purely based on “weak belief”, which is given an arbitrary value of 0.25, with no reasoning or data or evidence whatsoever.

The ONLY justification given is “if we have a very weak BELIEF”, and “SAY we THINK”.

This obviously contains beliefs, and personal thoughts, as probabilities for evidence: it even says so.

It is logically absurd to claim that no bias is involved in this process, when it is used for ideologies. It is designed around prejudice. It actually requires prejudice. To claim, as Lowder does above, that this is an "evidential" argument, is false; it is personal bias. Under the circumstances (inductive logic used for ideological purposes) it is apparent that the pursuit is an exercise in willful self-delusion, and that the use of it in a context of "intellectual" or "philosophical" elitism is purely self-indulgent.

JJ Lowder Again

JJ Lowder now says,

The accusation is not, “Stan responded neither to the analysis nor the list of empirical evidence; therefore, Stan lied.” Rather, the accusation is this: “Stan says that no one produced any case in defense of atheism, but Lowder did and Stan knows it. ”

While we are at the truth claim stage, I guess I will just call that statement by Lowder what it is: a lie. Here’s the entire exchange, which, unless he deleted it remains on his blogspace:

Stan:
” After I posted a number of comments with various commenters requesting the standard evidence and logic for support of their beliefs, everyone but two of them just went away: vanished. The two who remained educated me on the actual purpose of the forum, and then went into silly mode, as do most atheists who are challenged with producing the actual evidence and logic which they claim is their domain.”

Lowder:
“This is an outright lie. Again, I refer interested readers to the comment I posted above two days ago. Stan may be fooling himself, but I doubt he's fooling anyone else.”

And again, here is the standard request for evidence which I made, over and over:

” In general atheists claim that atheism is based on evidence and logic. Were that the case, and were atheism a robust truth, then there would be both empirical, experimental, falsifiable and not falsified, replicable and replicated, peer reviewed with open data, physical evidence (under physicalism); and/or a disciplined deductive argument which is of valid construction, grounded and demonstrably true premises, which passes the test of Argumentum Ad Absurdum. “

Neither Lowder nor anyone else provided empirical, scientific, experimental….etc. data; and in fact he goes on to claim, apparently, that neither induction nor deduction are scientific terms, induction for the use of the classification sciences (“No, Stan, induction is NOT a “classification tool.”) [Yes, it is, JJ, in the naïve form called “instantiation model; Lipton; “Inference to the Best Explanation” International Library of Philosophy, p 14] and the theoretical sciences (deduction) (“This has nothing to do with “declaring a hypothesis” and then “investigating it to determine its truth value.”)[Deductive science doesn’t do hypotheses? Really? And neither does Inductive? Then why do you talk about hypotheses in this very post?]. Whether that is what he meant or not is not certain, but it is heavily implied.

He is tautologically correct to say that inductive logic is logic, and deductive logic is logic, but that is trivial. The production of objective knowledge requires objective observations which are managed by objective techniques. Since the Enlightenment, it has been generally agreed that objective knowledge has been generated by empiricism, which produces investigation by prediction (hypotheses, JJ), experimental testing for hypothesis prediction vs. experimental results, falsifiability with experimental non-falsification, and intellectual products that are available to everyone to examine for themselves.

Moving on to Bayes:

Stan:
” Bayesian probability theory is an attempt to reconcile the tension between a hypothesis and its alternative(s).

JJ:
”Ummm, no. Bayesian probability theory uses Bayes’s Theorem to measure the effect of new information upon one’s degree of belief in a hypothesis.”

Wait, you just said no to hypotheses, right? Never mind. But the following seems to place your definition on the back burner:

From Abelson; “Statistics as Principled Argument” p42:

”The theorem [Bayes’ Theorem] addresses the problem introduced earlier, namely, how to take into account the competition between a hypothesis and its alternatives. A given set of data is seen as altering the odds (i.e. the relative likelihood) that a hypothesis is true, compared with its alternatives. To apply Bayes’ Theorem, one needs some estimate of these odds before the data are collected. The data then may tip the balance in these odds depending on the relative likelihood of the data under the hypothesis and its alternatives”

Pretty much what I had said myself.

From Harri Valpoa;

http://users.ics.aalto.fi/harri/thesis/valpola_thesis/node12.html: Beliefs are always subjective, and therefore all the probabilities appearing in Bayesian probability theory are conditional. In particular, under the belief interpretation probability is not an objective property of some physical setting, but is conditional to the prior assumptions and experience of the learning system. It is completely reasonable to talk about ``the probability that there is a tenth planet in the solar system'' although this planet either exists or does not exist and there is no sense in interpreting the probability as a frequency of observing a tenth planet. Sometimes the probabilities can be roughly equated with empirical frequencies, but this can be considered as a special case of the belief interpretation as was shown by Cox [19].

One way to look at the circularity of induction is the Justification Paradox: induction cannot be justified using induction (Hume). Another circularity issue with induction (as previously mentioned) is the issue of the possibility of confirmation bias (and disconfirmation bias) due to non-objective probability assignments (also Observer Selection Bias); these possibilities raise suspicions which have little release for the skeptic, so only the true believer is satisfied with the induction, which self-fulfills.

Stan:
” This is an Argumentum Ad Absurdum falsification for the use of Bayes, at least for ideologies.”

JJ:
”1. This point has nothing to do with the arguments I provided, which rely solely upon objective factors to determine the relevant probabilities.”

Here he ignores a blatant falsification of his method using Ad Absurdum, and instead refers to his own argument, claiming that they are based on "objective factors". OK. So let’s look at the new one he provides:

(1) Evolution is antecedently much more probable on the assumption that naturalism is true than on the assumption that theism is true.

This is not evidence, it is an assertion of prejudice. Evolution itself cannot predict a single outcome, and in fact predicts every outcome, including no outcome; further, it cannot even predict and produce a mechanism for thousands of required parallel modifications to minerals that are required to produce mere life, much less conscious qualia, intellect and agency. In terms of fact, naturalism cannot be demonstrated to be correct using naturalism as its premise. Further there is no disconnect between a creator for nature, and the natural behavior of the universe and its components as observed. Evolution in no manner excludes a deity, and it is the exclusion of deity which defines naturalism. There is no reason to make the assumption being made in (1).

”(2) The statement that pain and pleasure systematically connected to reproductive success is antecedently much more probable on the assumption that evolutionary naturalism is true than on the assumption that evolutionary theism is true.”

This isn’t even a sentence:The statement that (pain and pleasure systematically connected to reproductive success) is a fragment, not a sentence; assuming the intended verb was to have been “are”, the resulting statement is still not universally correct, anyway, given that mitosis likely is a programmed function, not driven by external sensate experiences. And it is not necessary to argue for evolutionary theism to see the fallacy within this argument. Even so, the proposal that the concept of pleasure, for example, is known to be not associated with theism is false, or at least is without any possible reasoning in its defense, other than mere denial. These first two items in the inductive argument are not evidential in the least; they are purely prejudicial and without any cause for belief other than pure prejudice. So the following conclusion of this HYPOTHESIS, cannot follow, except under the prejudice of the premises.

”(3) Therefore, evolution conjoined with this statement about pain and pleasure is antecedently very much more probable on the assumption that naturalism is true than on the assumption that theism is true. [From 1 and 2]

The conclusion, (3) is prejudicially supported, only, nothing else.

(4) Naturalism is at least as plausible as theism.

Why? If naturalism is the explanation, how does it explain naturalism? It cannot. Because evolution succumbs to rational inquiry due to the reasons above, and naturalism is circular, as is induction, and because the prior argument is purely prejudicial and without a shred of empirical proof, experimental data, and is not falsifiable, much less replicable, there is no rational reason to accept naturalism as plausible at all. Naturalism is an assertion and nothing more, no physical, empirical disciplined differentiating data is possible to support the assertion of naturalism. And that goes in spades for metaphysical naturalism. Repeat: No empirical physical data is possible for the conclusion that naturalism is a true proposition. Thus, none of the remaining statements have any meaning:

”(5) Therefore, other evidence held equal, naturalism is very much more probable than theism. [From 3 and 4] (6) Naturalism entails that theism is false. (7) Therefore, other evidence held equal, it is highly probable that theism is false. [From 5 and 6] Whether one agrees with this argument or not, the probability calculations in this argument aren’t subjective. They’re either objectively true or objective false.”

(5) is based on prejudiced premises, and is thus trivial; (6) is just a definition: naturalism is defined as having no God: an assertion, only.

(6) This conclusion, even removed from its previous shady premises, is faulty. It is not the case that finding natural phenomena proves naturalism and disproves theism; under theism, nature was created the way it is by a creating agent, therefore it is eminently compatible with theism that nature works the way it does. In no manner is naturalism shown to be necessary in the attempted exclusion of deity. The conclusion does not follow under the definition of theism and the arbitrary restriction of naturalism.

This is a great example of Disconfirmation Bias (a wordplay on the concept of Confirmation Bias). The argument ignores the intellectual problems which attach, including the aforementioned consciousness and qualia, intellect, agency, and other features of life that cannot be objectively evaluated under any naturalist or empirical physical testing, without the use of suspicious inferential bias. The arguments are not evidential, they are assertions without data, assertions without knowable likelihoods, and are solely asserted as the prejudice of the author’s opinions.

If there exist calculations somewhere for supporting each line item, there is little doubt that they do not reflect any objective, empirical, experimental, falsifiable but not falsified, replicable and replicated, peer review and open data for support of the naturalist claims being made. And there is no knowable way to produce real and realistic probabilities for Bayesian vessels, which are for prejudicial arguments when used in ideological terms. So, JJ, Objective? No. Evidential? No.

Now to continue with Lowder's complaint against me:

"2. If the use of Bayes’s Theorem were inappropriate for the philosophy of religion, then theistic Bayesians like Richard Swinburne, the McGrews, and Richard Otte didn’t get the memo. Or … maybe it is appropriate and they understand Bayesian probability theory better than Stan does."

Or maybe it is an exercise in futility, because the opposition would accept absolutely no theodicy whatsoever, no matter how meticulously accurate it might be; the reason for that is seen in the declaration of naturalism: the non-existence of deity is declared; it is asserted as fact and then supporting premises are cherry picked, as shown above.

Neither rationality nor truth seeking are the objectives in these debates; getting an "apparent" big win regardless of the mangling of rational principles is the objective. The theologians are not playing to the atheists, they are playing to the undecideds just as are the atheists who are not playing to the theists. It is pure religious evangelism on both sides. Were the undecideds to tumble to the necessities of rational thought, including predictive, deductive necessities being placed on materialist philosophies, including the analysis of circularity, of self-refutation, of embedded bias, of non sequitur conclusions as demonstrated above, atheists would have a tough recruiting task, indeed.

At any rate, it is an Argument From Authority Fallacy, and some snark thrown in.

What I Learned At Patheos

My foray into patheos–land is over. I don’t usually venture into other blogs because they are commonly infested with nasty hangers-on (PZ anyone?), but this one seemed different… at first. And it is different, but really only in the politeness of their same old refusal to actually engage in any analysis of atheism. After I posted a number of comments with various commenters requesting the standard evidence and logic for support of their beliefs, everyone but two of them just went away: vanished. The two who remained educated me on the actual purpose of the forum, and then went into silly mode, as do most atheists who are challenged with producing the actual evidence and logic which they claim is their domain.

Induction
The purpose of that area of the web, I was told, is not deduction; they just aren’t interested in deduction, it’s, well, not interesting. What they like at that site is induction and Bayesian probabilities. Now as we know over here, induction is a fine precursor to science, in the sense that it is a classification tool. Items with like or similar characteristics are placed into a single category, and then differentiated into sub-categories, and sub-sub-categories. But it also is a tool for rationalization, of a sort, where a conclusion is asserted and premises are sought which support it. This is intellectually hazardous, because a case can be built with supportive premises while ignoring, or not identifying, negating premises. When used exclusively, it can lead to self-fulfilling prophecies. This is especially the case when it is used as the tool for justifying a cherished worldview.

Deduction, is rather the opposite. A hypothesis is declared, and investigated to determine its truth value, based on explicit rules for maintaining the complete integrity of all elements of the argument, as well as contrary alternatives. Empiricism uses deduction as a check on inductively declared hypotheses. Deduction/experimentation are the objective part of physical knowledge attainment. Induction is not.

Bayes
Bayesian probability theory is an attempt to reconcile the tension between a hypothesis and its alternative(s). One of the problems with Bayesian calculations arises when the actual probabilities are not known, and the prejudice of the person doing the calculations is allowed entry into the calculating process. A famous case called simply the Philpott Example is used in one statistics book to demonstrate the collapse of the calculation into prjudice: it occurs when the calculator believes that the proposition being investigated is absurd so he assigns a probability of zero to it. That winds up giving the Bayesian calculation a value of zero divided by zero. Even if he assigns an actual non-zero value to it, it still can be seen to be prejudicial, being based solely on the opinion of the individual. This is an Argumentum Ad Absurdum falsification for the use of Bayes, at least for ideologies.

Bayesian calculations are also circular, in the sense that a presupposition of truth of a proposition actually serves to place the conclusion into the hypothesis. Since the calculation involves a subjective input, it is again based solely on the opinion of the individual. So used in isolation from other techniques (disciplined deduction for example), dependence on Bayes can devolve into self-fulfilling prophecies just like induction.

There are instances where opinion of the calculator would not necessarily be a factor; atheist calculations of the probability of the truth of atheism would not qualify as objective, however, and would not qualify as one of those instances.

But back to my gentle steering away.
I was informed that while they just don’t do deduction at that site that I might be better off finding a site which does do deductions. In the meantime they really wanted to attack my beliefs, which of course I never reveal, since I am involved purely in analyzing atheist propositions, and nothing more. No matter how many times I pointed out that atheism should be robust enough to be defended based on its own facts and principles, no one engaged. No one ever produced any case in defense of Atheism, except for silly stories a couple of times. All they did was the standard dance around, dodging all attempts to get them to produce conclusive reasons for having atheism as a worldview. there was lots of language chopping over there, with complaints about my having said that “atheism says…”, when atheism doesn’t really say anything because its not a person or agent, but then turning right around and doing the same thing themselves and making excuses for their use. (This is merely a minor quibble about the level to which discussion devolved).

I’m genuinely disappointed. I thought that a more civil class of atheist (hard to find) would engage in analytical discussion of the validity and truth content of atheism. But it was not to be. It took me too long to find that out. But at least for the most part they weren’t rude.

Metaphysical Atheism
Here’s an interesting observation on what I got out of (my very brief contact with) their concept of “metaphysical atheism”. There is some indication that they accept that agency, for example, requires non-physicalist explanation. So they have created “metaphysical atheism” which would contain metaphysical answers for those non-deterministic features of being alive (I think that must be what it is, I’m not completely sure). So they have created another level of principles which supercede physicalist principles with the caveat that there absolutely is no deity involved.

This is, of course, not testable because it is not physically available for testing. So it is a non-falsifiable, non-objective position (again, if I have understood it from my brief time there). What it is, is an induction of a necessary solution based only on fantasy (fantasy was thrown out a couple of times at my own comments there) but coupled with a fiat declaration of no deity involvement, also with no reasoning attached other, I suppose, than that’s how the fantasy is constructed. This seems hardly discernable from a religious declaration, only based merely upon necessity for the worldview; a set of conditions for self-fulfillment for a predetermined conclusion: rationalization.

So what they have, is an untestable induction which does nothing to address the question of source: what is the source of the metaphysical control of physical matter in the production of agency. If it "just is", then they could say that about agency itself, without any need for supernatural rules controlling natural existence. It appears to me that they have merely created a dualist material existence, with the second part of the material, material-B, being "undetermined matter", just like Bertrand Russell did in his "Nine Lectures on Mind". In other words, a fantasy dual material solution, which is necessary for the maintenance of physicalism/materialism.

I have left them to their own devices; they have no intention of analyzing their own premises, and that is what my purpose is – to analyze atheist thoughts, hypotheses, logical usage, and material evidence for the support of their position. Atheists do still claim to have worldviews based in logic and evidence, even though when they do use logic they don’t use the analytical part; and material evidence, well that’s for the other guy to hand them if they even care about it all. There is no concept whatsoever that their own worldview should stand on its own merits, independent of any other worldview.

I’m sure I could have handled myself better had I known up front that they don’t do analytic deductive logic. For one thing, I think, retroactively, that I should just have left Dr. Thibodeau to his own inductions, and never have even bothered him. Oh well.

ADDENDUM: Now I'm being called a liar, over at Patheos. It is claimed that I did not respond to the analysis nor to the list of purported empirical studies which apparently robustly prove that there is no deity possible and that a deity cannot exist. I replied to the analysis; and I also said that I would read all the list of evidence. Who is lying?