Epicurus Again

Epicurus has again come up in some atheist blogs. The quote is this:

"Is God willing to prevent evil, but not able? Then he is not omnipotent.

Is he able, but not willing? Then he is malevolent.

Is he both able and willing? Then whence cometh evil?

Is he neither able nor willing? Then why call him God?" - Epicurus

This is a series of IF/THEN deductions. Let's take them one at a time.

(a) IF [Is God willing to prevent evil, but not able], Then [He is not omnipotent].

This is valid in form, but not sound; the premise is not viable for a deity, if omnipotence is presupposed as necessary. That requires a discussion of the necessity of omnipotence for a deity, and what omnipotence entails. Further, it is made trivial by (b'), below.

(b) IF [He is able, but not willing]; Then [He is malevolent].

This is not sound, because the consequent does not follow necessarily from the premise. If God has a superior reason for allowing the presence of evil, such as allowing His creations to have free will and agency to deal with evil vs. good, then He is not malevolent; He is the opposite of malevolent. Non Sequitur. The valid and sound statement is this:

(b') IF [He is able, but not willing, in order to provide a greater good], THEN [He is justified in not removing evil, AND He is all good, giving superior gifts]

(c) IF [He is both able and willing], Then [whence cometh evil]

If (b') is the case, then (c) is trivial.

(d) IF [He is neither able nor willing], Then [why call him God]

If (b') is the case, then (d) is trivial.

The Epicurus argument contains the fallacy of the consequent not being the necessary conclusion of the premise. The premise entails other possible conclusions than the one given. So the one given is prejudicial, and not necessary.