Nondeterminism Determined: Automaton or Autonomous?

I've been spending an inordinate amount of time over at Scott's blog lately, because that is where most of the conversation is taking place. The "conversation" is an attempt to find a mutually agreeable rational path between materialism and suernaturalism. We are currently in the grip of determinism, and whether it can be considered a lock-down on reality. So here are some challenges that determinism must face, if it is the only truth and materialism is the only reality.

A contributor, "beelzebub" as he self-appellates, has joined the fray and makes the claim that there are nondeterministic state machines. His point is that nondeterminism can always be reduced to determinism. My response to him follows his comment:

[Beelz] said,
"In fact regular expressions are usually conceived nondeterministically and then converted to deterministic machines."

[My response]:
How would regular expressions be determined deterministically?

Conversion to determinism is not a particularly convincing argument. Conversion from determinism to nondeterminism, coupled with empirical verification, repeatability, and falsifiability coupled with empirical non-falsification would be compelling.

Do you have examples of this?

February 28, 2008 7:01 AM

The conversion from nondeterminism to determinism is a no-brainer. Every human-designed object is an example of this, and especially so in the realm of computing electronics. It might even be considered an entropic event. Machines commonly make other machines these days. But machines do not, in and of themselves, invent machines.

But is there a case, even one, where a deterministic device converted itself to a nondeterministic device? Or has any deterministic "thing" (i.e. an instruction processor) converted itself into a nondeterministic, discerning, decision-maker; automaton to autonomous?

The promise of nondeterministic machines fails the test of "becoming". It is not possible for a deterministic being to confer nondeterminism on another entity. Call it entropy, call it law of sufficient cause, call it Fred; it does not happen any where in nature.(*)

Let's get one thing straight. Determinism means that the entity which is deterministic can do only what it is made to do, through instructions from somewhere else. It cannot, by definition, create its own instruction set. It has no volition. It has no free will. It is locked onto behaviors that it does not and cannot control. Totally locked; completely locked. If any proponent of determinism tries to deny this, then the discussion devolves into deceptive word-play, and is not worth pursuing from that point forward.

Since the deterministic entity is merely an instruction processor, processing instructions not derived by itself, then is it likely to produce a nondeterministic output? Or invent a nondeterministic entity? If there is thought to be a likelihood, then the empirical data must be presented to prove it. And can it be falsified? No, it cannot because it is not possible to prove the negative of this proposition. So the proposition is not empirical, it is metaphysical, and since it is claimed as a proposition of materialism, then it is FALSE.

Now if partial nondeterminism is ruled out, and it is, and if the conversion upward from determinism to nondeterminism is ruled out, and it is, then where does nondeterminism come from?

Exactly. This is the point where it becomes necessary for the materialist to deny that nondeterminism exists at all... and that becomes the final downfall.

Because if an automaton declares that autonomy does not exist, where is the credibility for such a statement. After all, an automaton cannot be expected to make its own discerning decisions; it is programmed to respond only in a pre-established manner, without reflection, without any hint of meaning, just an intellectually blind response. This is the complete disconnect for the theory that nondeterminism doesn't exist. The proponent of determinism makes the proposition using the hidden presupposition that he, himself, is nondeterministic, and is quite able to use discernment to make nondeterministic decisions... one of which is that nondeterminism doesn't exist. This is a classical self-referential self-denying paradox. For the determinist amongst us, a paradox is logical death to the proposition that exhibits it. The denial of nondeterminism is FALSE; moreover, nondeterminism is shown to exist by virtue of the denial itself, which could not have occured if the proponent were actually deterministic.

By now we have ascertained that nondeterminism cannot derive from determinism, and that nondeterminism does, in fact, exist. So on to the final question:

What is the source of nondeterminism?

Now it is your turn.

(*)The claim that nondeterminism "evolved" as the need for autonomy demanded its existence, is so hollow that it rings. There is no proof, empirical or otherwise that this occured. The claim cannot falsified for the same reason that it cannot be empirically proven: it is a Just So Story Fallacy; therefore, the claim is metaphysical by definition, and fictional by inspection. It is FALSE.

Can Intuition be Validated?

In an unexpected leap forward, Scott has professed a belief not just in God but also in Jesus, and presumably Christian morality. With a twist at the end he retains his propensity for skepticism, again presumably of all his professed beliefs. If I have that wrong, then let me know, and ignore the following. At any rate, he did not refer to any evidence which compelled his belief, but admitted the inability to prove, another interesting departure. Scott accepts both ends of our spectrum here, (from methodological materialism to metaphysical realities), so what we are doing at this point is mapping the supposed breach between them, and traversing (slowly) that breach.

We have already established a few stones to step forward on, and I will recap them here:

In our prior conversation we have established that there is logically no possibility of disproving the existence of a deity; that metaphysics exists outside the auspices of materialist testing capabilities; and that there exists a human faculty that allows access to metaphysical abstractions: intuition.

We have also discussed various types of evidence, including non-physical evidence, known to us via intuition, revelation, and eyewitnesses, although we haven’t elaborated on the last two types. And, there is another type which will come up at some juncture, but needn’t be discussed right now: circumstantial evidence.

Is it even possible to use any of these types of evidence to prove conclusively and with no room for doubt that no power exists outside of our paltry four dimensions, especially no power which has massive creative power and thus intelligence? How can that be proved? Can it be assumed, if intuition proves to be unreliable ( a familiar charge)?

Discernment
Intuition is a powerful tool, but how reliable is it? Is there a way to validate the accuracy of one’s intuition? Well, if we follow Locke’s lead, and we will, then there is another human faculty that exists for just that purpose. This faculty is innate, and it is the inborn tool of rationality: the faculty of discernment. According to Locke, discernment consists of several layers: apprehension, comparison, differentiation, judgment, comprehension. Taken together these phases form cognition. And they are innate, as opposed to information, which is not innate (Locke).When we intuit something, we can compare our intuited information against other, previous, related inputs, and then conclude whether the intuition is correct. This exercises our ability to discern probabilities as well as entities.

For example, how valid is the faculty of intuition itself? We discern that there are objects which we find to be credible, probabilistically, which are not physical. (Think of math, logic, first principles, etc). So we have discerned that intuition can be accurate.

Errors in Intuition
How would we define and discover errors in our intuition? First, what would be the source of error in intuition?

Here some examples of error generators:

a) Faithful adherence to a worldview despite contrary evidence, which is rationalized and forced to fit the preconception.

b) Outright denial of the faculties of intuition and discernment. (w/o proof).

c) Suppression of faculties, as with materialism.

d) Improper calculation of probabilities, or weighting given to arguments.

Can we intuit that human wisdom can exist? Human agency? Human intelligence, communicable via speech, invention, written symbols?Scott has taken the big leap forward and could answer these questions based on his metaphysical beliefs, but my intent is to plod methodically out of materialism and ever deeper into the intuited reality beyond the material realm. Will we arrive at the same place in which Scott has professed faith?

If we intuit that humans do, or should, have individual rights, by what mechanism are those rights generated? If this is an absolute standard, what is the source of its absoluteness? Even totalitarians believe these things, although the rights are only for themselves. And the rights might be conferred by nature on the one hand, or a deity on the other; either way the rights for the particular individual are absolute. So if a person is not a totalitarian or in fear of a totalitarian, then individual human rights can be intuited to be conferred metaphysically, presumably from a deity.

If we do not intuit this, is it false or is it a failure of our intuition?

Suppression and Failure of Intuition
I personally believe that it is possible to suppress one’s intuition when in the pursuit of a personal worldview that is contradictory. I also believe that it is possible to have a complete organic failure of the faculty of intuition, just as it is possible to have a failure of the faculty of discernment, which robs one of common sense. These failures can be voluntary, as in self-deception, or involuntary as in permanent confusion and delusion. If these faculties exist, then their possible failure also exists. If we have a failure, the one sure way to know is to compare our intuitions to the most commonly generally-held intuitions, and look for external congruence and internal coherence.

Next round, Calibrating our Intution: the most commonly held intuitions....which is most easily believed? Why… or why not?

Also coming soon, What possible evidence falsifies God?

Venturing out without a net

Now that the conversation with Scott has ventured tentatively into the region of intangible entities, it seems necessary to think about what type of objects we might expect to come across in such a place of non-sensuality. When we shove off from the shores of Materialism, what is left to find?

So let's start with Materialism, and then, push off.

Materialism blockades the access to transcendentals, and requires, by definition, that all mental objects actually be physically manifested in the meat of the brain. So the mind is by Materialist definition deterministic, or at least partially deterministic, which amounts to the same thing.

Materialism depends upon a blind, predetermined succession of physical brain events occurring, which result in the mind, the will, and language, all of which are physical and predetermined.

"The brain is a meat machine";
Marvin Minsky

“We and all other animals are machines created by our genes. A monkey is a machine that preserves genes up trees"
Richard Dawkins

Since thoughts and speech are predetermined, they are not reflective of any personal volition of the owner. As such, the events have no meaning, either to the owner or the listener, and the results of such thought and speech events should also have no meaning.

If these entities are without meaning, can they produce meaning, or project meaning? How could this be decided?

If the mind has no meaning and projects no meaning, then language has no meaning, and these very words have no meaning. Therefore it is left up to our intuition to determine whether or not meaning could exist, either here or elsewhere.

In fact, we might ask ourselves if the word “meaning” itself has a meaning. If we did, we would be using language. So we must have intuited (and believe) that language has meaning, or the exercise would be futile and a waste of time. And we also must have believed that meaning exists, because we asked if that word had any.

So, since we do believe in meaning, we have, then, intuited that meaning exists and that the word "meaning" has meaning. So meaning, and the "meaning of meaning" are now seen to be valid mental objects, and objects which are not physical in any manner.

The same goes for ideas: we all develop the idea of an idea. It is necessary for invention:

"What is required for all other human inventions is the notion that one can actively, consciously construct new ideas. We take this for granted, but it is not a "natural" development. Three-year-old children have lots of ideas and even make up new ideas. But they do not have the Idea of an Idea that they can construct anew; they do not naturally arrive at the idea that making up new ideas is something people do. The Idea of an Idea is a cultural creation that children have to learn."

"It is only with the Idea of an Idea that we get conscious specific intellectual constructions like democracy, science, the number system, the computer, the birth control pill, and so on. The Idea of an Idea is the generative notion behind the very notion of an invention and is causally necessary for all specific inventions."

George Lakoff is Professor of Linguistics at the University of California at Berkeley, where he is on the faculty of the Institute of Cognitive Studies.


Of course, an idea is a transcendent mental entity; it is not measurable by any material, natural, empirical method. It is known to exist in ourselves only by introspection; in others only through either communication (a transcendental), or by inference (also a transcendental). The mind states, or brain states, or electrical activity of the brain will never serve to reveal an “idea of an idea”.

These are just starting points for launching into the portion of reality that is accessible only through intuition.

Are these points acceptable? Can we move forward from here?

Scott: Climbing high? or Climbing out?

Popper wrote that falsification is his method to eliminate the “demarcation” problem, which is the problem of separating the physical issues from the metaphysical issues. Metaphysical issues cannot be falsified for the same reason that they cannot be proven: they are not physical. At one point Popper writes that it doesn’t matter if the falsification testing is done, what matters is that it could be done. The capability of testing for falseness proves the material nature of the issue, and eliminates any metaphysical contenders, thereby showing the suitability of the issue for empirical pursuit.

As I tried to emphasize before, the purely non-physical cannot be found in the purely physical realm. Period. I do not dispute this, I agree 100%, because it is true by definition. It is a tautology; or as Popper calls it, a universal. And for that reason, physical testing of non-physical issues can not be expected to produce physical test results, ever. For one thing, how would one test a non-physical thing, physically? It is contradictory, paradoxical, and in Popper’s words, non-sensical (sort of a play on words there).

Are we able to agree that there is not now and never can be physical proof of the non-physical? For example, all ID references are actually inferences drawn from certain characteristics of certain phenomena. There is not, and cannot be, the certainty of tangible proof of intelligence which might have been involved in our history. While inferences are widely used in historical biology, that is not the issue here. Inferences do not lead to certainty, and metaphysical inferences are not empirically useful. I think we agree to this?

Scott said,

“To me, the question is whether or not you can reason your way to such a position [a realm outside naturalism] on the basis of evidence.”

“But here’s the thing: if I can’t also connect the dots between those claims and purely natural causes, then practically speaking, I’m not making much headway. It remains but a metaphysical stance only. So we can have that conversation, if you like, but I hope you understand the burden lies with you.”

“Remember, the question for me is not whether or not I assent to the existence of a realm outside naturalism, because (after all) I hold pretty conventional Christian beliefs. To me, the question is whether or not you can reason your way to such a position on the basis of evidence. For now, I’ll forego the question of whether or not either of us possess an ‘internal faculty of discrimination’ that's valid, etc.....if only to give you a fighting chance, Because, Stan, that hill you want to climb ?....it’s steep, brother.”


Assuming that this is a discussion and not a debate, the question of burden seems odd; however, I accept the burden for the purpose of this conversation, and now I request a serious look into the nature of “evidence” as I have highlighted in your comments, above. Can we find any type of credible evidence that speaks for a non-physical reality? Even given the understanding that the evidence we seek is not for an empirical entity? If we demand empirical, “purely natural” causes, then we have regressed to metaphysical naturalism, haven’t we? So we do need to investigate the nature of evidence and the limits or expansiveness of its capabilities.

There are several categories of evidence, generally including sensory (tangible), internal experiential, and intuited. We can ignore the “revealed” and “eyewitness” categories for now. I suggest the following for discussion:

Sensory evidence is derived from our apprehension of external sources and is useful to empiricism, because external sources are accessible to other’s sensory inputs also, and can be verified independently.

Internal experiential evidence is independent of external sources, and is useful in defining the being that is one’s self. This is the evidence invoked by Descartes, who rejected all sensory evidence in order to discover what sort of a “being” he was, based on his unique internal composition. Because this sort of evidence is outside the auspices of empiricism, Materialists deny its existence, insisting that internal experiences are deceptions visited upon us by our own nervous system. Where is the evidence of deception? Why should a deceived Materialist be thought credible anyway?

Intuitive evidence is the knowledge of valid concepts which exist both outside of empiricism, and outside one’s self. Logic, mathematics, universals are some of the issues determined to be valid intuitively. Some Atheists, notably Nietzsche, and followers denied that any of these First Principles or universals could be proved and therefore they were not valid and could not be accepted. (“Beyond Good and Evil”, Friedrich Nietzsche; translated, Walter Kaufmann, Vintage 1989, p22-24.) The deception lies here, in conflating the need for testing with non-physical, intuited true essences.

As long as we have Popper up to bat, here are some related excerpts from his book, “The Logic of Scientific Discovery”:

Popper on Metaphysics:
“The fact that value judgments influence my proposals does not mean that I am making the mistake of which I have accused the positivists – that of trying to kill metaphysics by calling it names. I do not even go so far as to assert that metaphysics has no value for empirical science. For it cannot be denied that along with metaphysical ideas which have obstructed the advance of science there have been others – such as speculative atomism – which have aided it. And looking at the matter from the psychological angle, I an inclined to think that scientific discovery is impossible without faith in ideas which are of a purely speculative kind, and sometimes even quite hazy; a faith that is completely unwarranted from the point of view of science, and which, to that extent, is ‘metaphysical’”,
“Logic of Scientific Discovery”, Popper, 1935 /2006 Routledge; p16, 17. (Emph added)


On intuition, Popper opines, then quotes Einstein,
“My view may be expressed by saying that every discovery contains ‘an irrational element’, or ‘a creative intuition’, in Bergson’s sense. In a similar way Einstein speaks of the ‘search for those highly universal laws … from which a picture of the world can be obtained be pure deduction. There is no logical path’, he says, ‘leading to these … laws. They can only be reached by intuition, based upon something like an intellectual love (Einfuhlung) of the objects of experience.”
Popper, LSD, p 8,9; Einstein, Address on Max Planck’s 60th birthday, 1918. (emph added)

So, Scott, it is not necessary for me to climb the hill you have prescribed, because that hill is a paradox with no summit. (There can be no physical proof for non-physical existences; these are mutually exclusive, and their conjunction is contradictory and paradoxical). My approach is and has been to look for, oh say, something that we believe, with no tangible evidence possible for its existence.

I think that Materialism is rather more of a hole of its own construction, which it may not - by dogmatic principle - leave, and then condemns others for leaving or not entering. And again, methodological naturalist empiricism, down in that materialist hole, belongs there, sifting through the natural dirt. But that dirt is not all there is to reality, unless the other avenues of evidence are convincingly denied. They cannot be successfully empirically denied due to the paradox of their conjunction.

Here’s an example of a belief I came by recently, with no proof. After a recent medical escapade, I came to realize that I still exist as more than meat, even though being totally unconscious in the sense of being anesthetized (no dreams). When I recovered consciousness, I regained the same characteristics as before I was anesthetized. So my existence during that time, if one requires thought to be the basic prerequisite for existence, appeared to have disappeared, yet it subsequently returned completely. I have no knowledge of my mind’s existence during that time, but I infer from subsequent experience that it did not cease to exist. Can I presume to “know”, intuitively, the truth of this, that I did not cease to exist during anesthesia? The answer appears obvious, but the evidence is intuitive, not empirical; inferred, not experimental.

Maybe more pointedly, “can evidence via intuition ever point to the validity of an intangible existence?” Or maybe, “can evidence via intuition provide enough certainty to support belief in an intangible existence?”

You see, I believe that it can, and I believe that, in spite of having no tangible empirical data to back me up.

This path, then, is non-empirical; I wonder if you wish to take off and leave the land of the tangible, for the possible existence beyond tangible? Can we accept the existence of intuition as a tool for acquiring evidence? Can we see that there are things that can be accepted as true or valid, without tangible physical evidence? If not, then I suggest that the philosophy being held to is metaphysical naturalism, which is a lock-down situation. I know that you denied that, but then you also seem to absolutely require physical test results for non-physical entities; so one of those must be an error, possibly my error of interpretation.

Can we move on into the arena of intuiton?

Stan

Axioms and First Principles

Scott,
OK then, right to the point this time. The question at hand:

“Given that I need a foundation of some support, what principles would you commend, and for what reason? Am I compelled by logic to adopt any, some or all of these principles?”


There are several definitions of the concept, “axiom”. Two seem to fall out:

(a) A precept that is used to support a different claim, but which is itself unprovable, therefore it is assumed valid for the sake of argument. Structure:

“Given N, and assuming A, then P”,
where A is the axiom, unprovable but assumed valid for this instance.

(b) A precept that is self-evident, unprovable, whose negation is self-contradictory.

I think that (a) is the type of axiom to which you were referring. That type of axiom is not known absolutely, but could be considered statistically to be probable, as you said.

Type (b) is a sort of jump off point to the First Principles, which have the following characteristics (maybe more):


(1) Validity is self-evident, or it is “incorrigible” (not correctable).

(2) Unprovable.

(3) Negation is self-contradictory.

(4) Exist as a ‘bottom” element in a regressive analysis, without which an infinite regression would occur.

(5) Generally tautological (definitions).

(6) The circularity of tautology implies a priori comprehension.
For example, the dictionary uses words to define words (it is circular); one must understand some word at some point a priori in order to use the dictionary.


Examples of First Principles:

Euclid
“Things that are equal to the same thing are equal to each other”

Aristotle
"For the same (characteristic) simultaneously to belong and not belong to the same (object) in the same (way) is impossible."

Descartes
“Cogito ergo sum” (I think therefore I am) (also, “I doubt everything, but I think about doubting, therefore I am a thinking being, therefore I am)

The general list of First Principles is both epistemologically and ontologically applicable (i.e. both truth values and existence values).


These are intuitive:

Identity: if it is true it is true; if it exists it exists.

Non-contradiction: It cannot be both true and false simultaneously. It cannot both exist and not exist.

Excluded Middle: It cannot be partially true, partially false. It cannot partially exist.

Cause and Effect: For every effect there is a necessary and sufficient cause.


These are probabilistic:

a. The Immutability of math throughout the universe.

b. The Immutability of physical law throughout the universe.

c. The Immutability of physical law throughout time (past and future).

d. The mutability of all levels of verifiability (Gödel's theorems).


There is more detail here:

Now to the point. If these things are wrong, then much of rational thought and it’s offspring, empiricism, cannot be thought to provide any valid concepts. So these things are thought to be true….without proof. More to the point they are understood as valid statements, intuitively.

If that last statement is true, then intuition is a valid tool for comprehension of concepts possessing those truth values which exist outside the range of empirical testing or proof.

I stop here, with the understanding that the discussion of erroneous intuition, imagination, self-delusion, and dreams might be next.

For now, is this path as stated so far, reasonable?

As for a box to contain my own philosophical position, radical idealism it is not. Perusing the box categories on Wiki, I suppose that Justificationism comes close. I accept and support the discipline of empirical science. I do not support Naturalism or Materialism which I consider to be false, agenda-burdened, and parasitic to empiricism. Abduction is difficult to support due to the use of wild extrapolations without checks and balances.

And I agree with Einstein’s rebuke to Hume concerning locking out meta-physics by definition:

“…those convictions which are necessary and determinant for our conduct and judgments cannot be found solely along this solid scientific way.
For the scientific method can teach us nothing else beyond how facts are related to, and conditioned by, each other. The aspiration toward such objective knowledge belongs to the highest of which man is capable, and you will certainly not suspect me of wishing to belittle the achievements and the heroic efforts of man in this sphere. Yet it is equally clear that knowledge of what is does not open the door to directly to what should be .”
Albert Einstein, Science and Religion, Mein Weltbild, Amsterdam: Querido Verlag, 1934.

Stan

A Question about Naturalism and Empiricism

Today we begin an on-line discussion with co-blogger, Scott Hatfield at http://monkeytrials.blogspot.com/. We begin with a question that concerns those in positions of professional science, and also those not in such positions. My thought is that we might pursue such issues into the no-no zone: transcendence, in order to determine if there is any rational path into zones of no physical presence. First I will post, and then Scott will take it and post, then I will....you get the picture.

The first question is as follows:

"Is there anything that compels a working scientist (who tends to function, albeit not exclusively, as an empiricist) into adopting either naturalism or materialism as a private matter?"

My take on this is twofold: First, depending upon your definition of Natualism and Materialism, a working scientist has to believe that for each physical effect there exists a physical cause that is measurable and repeatable per the rules of empiricism, otherwise the efforts toward empirical resolution would be futile. From what I have seen, both Materialism and Naturalism require that causes exist in physical space-time. A typical definition is as follows:

Epistemological Naturalism(Part 3): Things not located in space or time cannot enter into causal relationships.
Evan Fales, Naturalism and Physicalism, The Cambridge Companion to ATHEISM, 2007, pg126.

This does not define away things not located in space-time, as does a more critical Materialism definition. It does require physical effects to have physical causes.

Second: Now if self-experienced or introspective "things" do occur, they would exist outside the realm of empiricism, and they must have a different kind of evidence to support the knowledge of their existence: physical knowledge under empiricism will not do, it cannot do the job. This type of existence, and causal relationship is not denied under Naturalism [Note 1 below] but is denied under physicalism / Naturalism. The question then reduces to the type of evidence that we might allow to be valid when approaching apparently transcendent "things". (Transcendence being the state of existence outside the range of physical empirical existence and causality).

A second question for discussion is as follows:

"Is there any reason for a working scientist to deny (not to recognize) the non-empirical basis for empiricism itself?

An example is the First Principles, ontological, that are required in order to halt the necessity of an infinite regression of validation of sub-levels of the postulates or premises. Other examples are the universals, numbers, sets, math, logic, and the rational persistent immutable physical laws across the universe, etc that are presumed true / valid, without hope of empirical proof of the reason for their existence.

At this point I turn it over to Scott for discussion and other ways of looking at this.

[Note 1: Correction: not denied under empiricism][1/10/08]